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 THE INTERNET OF TORTS: EXPANDING 
CIVIL LIABILITY STANDARDS TO ADDRESS 
CORPORATE REMOTE INTERFERENCE 
REBECCA CROOTOF† 
ABSTRACT 
Thanks to the proliferation of internet-connected devices that 
constitute the “Internet of Things” (“IoT”), companies can now 
remotely and automatically alter or deactivate household items. In 
addition to empowering industry at the expense of individuals, this 
remote interference can cause property damage and bodily injury when 
an otherwise operational car, alarm system, or implanted medical 
device abruptly ceases to function. 
Even as the potential for harm escalates, contract and tort law work 
in tandem to shield IoT companies from liability. Exculpatory clauses 
limit civil remedies, IoT devices’ bundled object/service nature thwarts 
implied warranty claims, and contractual notice of remote interference 
precludes common law tort suits. Meanwhile, absent a better 
understanding of how IoT-enabled injuries operate and propagate, 
judges are likely to apply products liability and negligence standards 
narrowly, in ways that curtail corporate liability. 
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But this is hardly the first time a new technology has altered social 
and power relations between industries and individuals, creating a 
potential liability inflection point. As before, we must decide what to 
incentivize and who to protect, with an awareness that the choices we 
make now will shape future assumptions about IoT companies’ 
obligations and consumer rights. Accordingly, this Article proposes 
reforms to contract and tort law to expand corporate liability and 
minimize foreseeable consumer injury. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Missing a payment on your leased car was once the first step of an 
extended, multistage negotiation between you and a lender, bounded 
by enforcement costs, contract law, and consumer protection rules.1 
Today, however, car companies are using starter-interrupt devices to 
remotely “boot” cars just days after a payment is missed.2 This self-help 
practice is currently lawful and provides significant cost savings to 
businesses, but it creates an obvious risk of injury when an otherwise 
operational car does not work as expected. There have been reports of 
parents unable to take children to the emergency room, individuals 
marooned in dangerous neighborhoods, and people whose cars were 
disabled while idling in an intersection.3 
This is but one of many examples of how internet-connected 
devices, collectively referred to as the “Internet of Things” (“IoT”), 
allow companies to engage in remote interference—the practice of 
employing an over-the-air update to remotely alter or deactivate a 
physical device. After identifying this contractually legitimized vector 
for harm and discussing why our current civil liability regime is ill-
suited to regulate it, this Article proposes legal reforms to expand 
corporate liability and minimize foreseeable user injury. Enacting 
1. Usually, the practical difficulties and costs associated with repossession result in lenders 
waiting to take action until after two or more consecutive missed monthly payments. Some states 
require creditors to give notice before repossessing a car, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 537.012(2) (2017), 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255B, § 20A(c) (2017); others grant car lessors in default the right to 
reinstate their loans or otherwise cure the default, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255B, § 20A(c) 
(2017), ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 5-110 (2017). While many states permit lenders to repossess a car a 
day after a loan default, they are constrained by an obligation to not breach the peace. See, e.g., 
GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-609 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-609 (2013).
 2. See Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving 
That Car, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/miss-a-
payment-good-luck-moving-that-car [https://perma.cc/2YF4-EHZB] (describing a lender who 
“remotely activated a device . . . that prevented [a lessor’s] car from starting”).
 3. Id. 
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these suggestions will foster a powerful regulatory and social-norms 
feedback loop, shaping our future assumptions about IoT companies’ 
obligations and consumer rights. 
Thanks to recent technological advances, it is increasingly easy to 
add sensors and wireless capabilities into more and more items, 
allowing companies to transform innumerable once-“dumb” items into 
“smart” IoT devices.4 As this Article is concerned with the issue of 
consumer physical harm, it focuses on IoT devices intended for 
individual and household use. These include both relatively 
independent gadgets—like an implantable medical device, wearable 
step tracker, smart appliance, or vehicle—and integration systems— 
like a smart-home hub that networks lights, entertainment, and 
environmental controls.5 
The ongoing connection between these devices and IoT 
companies6 allows for corporate remote interference, which can 
benefit both industry and individuals: over-the-air updates can address 
bugs, protect against discovered malware, correct cyber vulnerabilities, 
enable new capabilities,7 or even save lives.8 The ability to remotely 
alter IoT devices also reduces industry costs of complying with 
4. This bent has sparked Twitter feeds like @internetofshit, which catalogs excessively 
connected products, including IoT doghouses, coffee mugs, sex toys, jean jackets, condoms, and 
fidget spinners. See generally Internet of Shit (@internetofshit), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/internetofshit?lang=en [https://perma.cc/JFJ6-3RYZ]. 
5. The full Internet of Things includes implantables, devices, vehicles, building and 
logistical systems, and other physical items with sensors, software, and network connectivity that 
enable data collection and sharing. 
6. While acknowledging that it will not always be accurate or appropriate to lump different 
entities together, this Article uses “IoT companies” as shorthand that includes IoT device 
manufacturers, distributers, and cloud-based service providers. 
7. Tesla, for example, anticipates using software updates to gradually improve cars’ self-
driving capabilities. See generally Sheikh v. Tesla, No. 17-CV-02193-BLF, 2018 WL 5794532 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 2, 2018) (upholding the settlement agreement in a class action lawsuit against Tesla for 
its delayed rollout of Enhanced Autopilot features). 
8. In response to a May 2018 Consumer Reports’ allegation that Tesla Model 3’s stopping 
distance was worse than any other contemporary car, Tesla pushed an over-the-air software 
update that improved the car’s braking distance by nineteen feet, undoubtedly saving lives. Sean 
O’Kane, Tesla Can Change So Much with Over-the-Air Updates That It’s Messing with Some 
Owners’ Heads, VERGE (June 2, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/2/17413732/tesla-
over-the-air-software-updates-brakes [https:// 
perma.cc/5XGX-A9HV]; see also Brian Dolan, Prediction: Health Wearable to Save 1.3 Million 
Lives by 2020, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.mobihealthnews.com/39062/prediction-health-wearables-to-save-1-3-million-lives-
by-2020 [https://perma.cc/7DN8-2H4D].  
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changing regulations,9 monitoring compliance with terms and 
conditions, and enforcing consequences for contractual breaches.10 
Companies may pass these savings on to consumers in the form of 
cheaper products or a greater willingness to extend credit to riskier 
borrowers.11 For example, the ability to remotely boot a car reduces 
the need for physical repossessions, minimizing the potential for 
embarrassment, trespass, or breaches of the peace and the attendant 
physical risks to repossession agents, consumers, and bystanders.12 
The benefits of corporate remote interference are widely touted, 
but the drawbacks are less obvious. Some scholars and commentators 
are detailing how connected items create consumer-privacy issues and 
underappreciated economic harms,13 and others are discussing how IoT 
devices’ malfunctions or weak cybersecurity create an increased risk of 
9. This, in turn, makes it easier to regulate internet-connected devices, as Jonathan Zittrain 
predicted a decade ago. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO 
STOP IT 103 (2008). 
10. E.g., Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2. 
11. Starter-interrupt devices, for example, enable high-risk borrowers to qualify for cars they 
might not otherwise have been able to lease. See id. 
12. Granted, consumers might experience remote interference as far more invasive than 
traditional repossessions. In many states, repossession agents cannot trespass on private property, 
even to retrieve secured collateral. Remote interference permits a company to “reach inside” an 
individual’s home to alter household devices. As Professor Julie Cohen has observed while 
discussing industry interference with digital files, “Plainly, the nonviolent nature of electronic self-
help—not to mention electronic ‘regulation’ of performance—does not negate its invasiveness 
from the consumer’s perspective.” Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1105 (1998); see also id. at 1102 (“Courts . . . have not explained, 
because they have not needed to, whether the judicially-developed ‘breach of the peace’ standard 
is only designed to minimize the likelihood of physical violence and harm to persons and property, 
or is (or should be) more broadly concerned with preventing nonconsensual intrusion . . . .”). As 
a hypothetical, she imagines a high-tech repo team with the ability to “beam” a contested item 
out of a living room and argues that it would be difficult to claim that no intrusion had occurred. 
Id. at 1106. An IoT company’s ability to remotely interfere with an item is akin to Cohen’s 
imagined invasive “beaming” it out: in both cases, the consumer can no longer make use of a 
purchased item in their home.
 13. See generally, e.g., Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things: 
Should Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused by Hacked Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J. LAW 
REFORM 913 (2017); Margot E. Kaminski, Matthew Rueben, William D. Smart & Cindy M. 
Grimm, Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983, 984 (2017); Christina Mulligan, Personal 
Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things, 50 GA. L. REV. 1121, 1163–65 (2016) [hereinafter 
Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes]; Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First 
Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 
(2014); Richard L. Rutledge, Aaron K. Massey, Annie I. Antón & Peter Swire, Clarifying the 
Internet of Things by Defining the Internet of Devices (2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://peterswire.net/wp-content/uploads/Clarifying-the-Internet-of-Things-by-Defining-the-
Internet-of-Devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4NR-88NA]. 
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physical harm.14 These topics deserve attention—not least because 
standing rules and the economic-loss doctrine bar many suits that 
would otherwise result in liability for IoT companies—but the focus on 
privacy, cybersecurity, and criminal hacks has obscured the increased 
risk of physical harm from nonaccidental corporate acts. 
This is the first law review article to discuss how the benefits of 
unconstrained corporate remote interference may come at the expense 
of consumers’ physical safety.15 Because IoT devices interact with and 
affect our physical environment, corporate remote interference can 
foreseeably cause physical harm. Your oven turning on unexpectedly 
14. See, e.g., BENJAMIN C. DEAN, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, STRICT 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 1 (2018) (discussing how insecure IoT 
devices may enable new vectors for physical harms); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INTERNET 
OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 12 (2015) [hereinafter FTC 
REPORT] (“[U]nauthorized persons might exploit security vulnerabilities to create risks to 
physical safety in some cases.”); U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, TORTS OF THE 
FUTURE: ADDRESSING THE LIABILITY AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES 42–43 (2017); Sara Sun Beale & Peter Berris, Hacking the Internet of Things: 
Vulnerabilities, Dangers, and Legal Responses, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 161, 163–66 (2018) 
(describing instances where IoT devices or systems have been hacked or could be hacked to cause 
physical and financial harm, including hacks into the healthcare system, automated railways, 
smart automobiles, aviation technology, and dams); Butler, supra note 13; Stacy-Ann Elvy, 
Hybrid Transactions and the INTERNET of Things: Goods, Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 77, 118 (2017); Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: 
Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENVER L. REV. 
87, 109 (2018); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1909–12 (2019) 
(discussing how IoT household devices can be hijacked by domestic abusers, creating a new 
avenue for invasion of sexual privacy). 
15. Of course, harmful remote interference is far from the only issue associated with the 
growing IoT ecosystem. Recent scholarship has highlighted IoT devices’ extensive cybersecurity 
problems. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Security and the Internet of Things, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 
(Feb. 1, 2017, 8:24 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/security_and_th.html 
[https://perma.cc/BET8-UXXA] (stating that, because “[a]ll computers are hackable,” we “need 
to reverse the trend to connect everything to the internet”). Others have highlighted the IoT’s 
attendant national security and international security risks. See generally Laura DeNardis & Mark 
Raymond, The Internet of Things as a Global Policy Frontier, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 475 (2017) 
(discussing global policy concerns); Ido Kilovaty, Freedom To Hack, 80 OHIO STATE L.J. 455 
(2019) (proposing legal remedies to address IoT security concerns). Scholars have also raised 
concerns about how the IoT enables expanded law enforcement and industry surveillance, see, 
e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 109–10; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the 
Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 812 (2016); Steven I. Friedland, Drinking 
from the Fire Hose: How Massive Self-Surveillance from the Internet of Things is Changing the 
Face of Privacy, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 891, 907–11 (2017), and increases opportunities for 
surreptitious consumer manipulation, see, e.g., Ryan Calo, Tiny Salespeople: Mediated 
Transactions and the Internet of Things, 2013 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 70, 70 (2013). See 
generally Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014) (detailing 
how collected information can be used to manipulate consumer choice). 
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increases the risk of a house fire;16 your car turning off unexpectedly 
increases the risk that you will be stranded in a dangerous area.17 You 
trust an IoT baby monitor, senior lifeline, home-security system, or fire 
alarm to notify you of a problem—but should a software update disable 
the alert system without warning, your reliance could lead to tragedy.18 
Your garage or front door could be left open, inviting theft or assault, 
in retaliation for a bad review of a smart lock on Amazon.19 And 
implantable IoT medical devices—like pacemakers and insulin 
pumps—make the physical risks of remote deactivation all the more 
visceral.20 
In short, this technology increases consumer risk without a 
corresponding increase in corporate liability. Given how IoT devices 
increasingly affect our environment and bodies, the potential 
magnitude and kinds of harm from corporate remote interference are 
significant; given that the digital nature of the IoT enables relatively 
costless and automated action, the potential scale of these harms is 
staggering. Meanwhile, IoT companies are creating, monitoring, and 
enforcing contractual-governance regimes with few legal incentives to 
ensure foreseeable harms are avoided. Finally, absent a better 
understanding of how IoT-enabled injuries operate and propagate, 
judges will likely apply products liability and negligence standards in 
ways that minimize corporate liability. Thus, the actual harm individual 
consumers experience is familiar—after all, repossessed cars have 
never been able to take children to emergency rooms, and 
16. Ashley Carman, Smart Ovens Have Been Turning on Overnight and Preheating to 400 
Degrees, VERGE (Aug. 14, 2019, 2:54 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/14/20802774/june-
smart-oven-remote-preheat-update-user-error [https://perma.cc/ZE2Z-ASUW].
 17. Stephen Ellison, Tesla’s App Goes Down for Hours, Leaving Some Stranded, NBC (Sept. 
2, 2019, 8:41 PM), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Teslas-App-Goes-Down-For-Hours-
Leaving-Some-Stranded-559215411.html [https://perma.cc/7RMS-4GR7]. 
18. See, e.g., Ed Harding, Foxborough Family Says Home Medical Alert System Failed Loved 
One, WCVB (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.wcvb.com/article/foxborough-family-says-home-
medical-alert-system-failed-loved-one/8207243 [https://perma.cc/UMJ6-GUDE] (reporting that 
a woman, wearing a medical alert system designed to automatically sense and report falls, fell 
without an alert being issued and later died of unknown causes).
 19. See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (discussing how the owner and distributer 
of an IoT garage-door opener responded to a poor Amazon review by deactivating the customer’s 
device).
 20. See, e.g., Ian Kerr, The Internet of People? Reflections on the Future Regulation of 
Human-Implantable Radio Frequency Identification, in LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL: 
ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY 341–43 (Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves & Carole Lucock eds., 
2009). See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Michael Mattioli, Steve Myers & Austin Brady, Securing 
the Internet of Healthcare, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 405, 407 (2018) (discussing the cybersecurity 
and privacy “vulnerabilities replete in the supply chain for medical devices”). 
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malfunctioning alert systems or medical devices have long caused 
injuries. But our current civil liability system is ill-equipped to address 
this new vector for harm. To correct this imbalance, this Article 
proposes expanding liability for harms resulting from corporate remote 
interference. 
Part I introduces IoT devices and discusses how these internet-
connected objects foster a new ongoing and intimate relationship 
between IoT companies and users, characterized both by an increased 
power differential and an increased risk of harm.21 Companies can 
harness IoT devices’ extensive surveillance capabilities22 to monitor 
consumer compliance with contractual terms—written by and for the 
company23—and employ strategic remote interference to extort 
concessions and engage in self-help enforcement.24 Critically, and in 
contrast to prior forms of electronic self-help, corporate remote 
interference with IoT devices can cause property and bodily harm. If, 
as Ryan Calo has quipped, robots are “software that can touch you,”25 
IoT devices are contracts that can hurt you. 
Part II discusses how contract and tort law work in tandem to 
shield companies from liability for the harms caused by their remote 
interference.26 Unsophisticated consumers agree to nonnegotiated 
21. See Elvy, supra note 14, at 91–93 (describing the new type of continuous and asymmetric 
relationship between IoT companies and their customers). This relationship is further 
complicated by the fact that devices are increasingly licensed, rather than sold. For considerations 
of the various social and legal implications of increasingly licensed items, see generally JOSHUA 
A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY AND THE NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM (2017); 
AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016); Christina Mulligan, Licenses and the Property/Contract Interface, 
93 IND. L.J. 1073 (2018); Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 13; Molly Shaffer Van 
Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008).
 22. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill & Surya Mattu, The House That Spied on Me, GIZMODO (Feb. 7, 
2018, 1:25 PM), https://gizmodo.com/the-house-that-spied-on-me-1822429852 
[https://perma.cc/H7WV-HDZH].
 23. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing how GPS trackers are being used to determine if rental 
and leased cars are driven outside of permitted areas).
 24. See infra Part I.A.3 (recounting how remote interference enables corporate self-help).
 25. RYAN CALO, BROOKINGS, THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL ROBOTICS COMMISSION 5 
(2014). 
26. Contracts, intellectual property, and cyberlaw scholars have mapped out issues raised 
when companies use terms of service and technological self-help to sidestep consumer protections 
in the digital context. See generally, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012) [hereinafter RADIN, BOILERPLATE]; 
Cohen, supra note 12, at 1103; Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by 
Machine, 160 J. INST. THEO. ECON. 143 (2004) [hereinafter Radin, Regulation by Contract]. This 
Article builds on this scholarship in describing how IoT devices increase both companies’ ability 
to surveil consumers and the risk of physical harm. 
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terms of service, which notify them of the possibility of remote 
interference and purport to limit corporate liability for its 
consequences.27 Even if a court determines that a liability-limiting 
clause is invalid as unconscionable or contrary to public policy, IoT 
devices’ bundled goods/services nature thwart breach of warranty 
claims,28 while the contractual notification precludes other common 
law tort suits.29 Meanwhile, none of the products liability standards 
map well onto these situations, and the duty analysis for a negligence 
claim is confused by tempting but misleading analogies. Further, for 
both products liability and negligence actions, the causal chain may 
appear tenuous. Not only can corporate remote interference facilitate 
accidental and criminal intervening sources of harm, it also shifts 
responsibility to those intervening sources.30 This allows companies to 
evade the reputational costs that might otherwise attend dramatic 
injuries resulting from remote interference, limiting the market’s 
ability to address this problem—indeed, if anything, it encourages a 
market for lemons.31 In short, remote interference has foreseeable, 
harmful consequences, but our current civil liability regime is unlikely 
to hold IoT companies sufficiently accountable. 
But, as discussed in Part III, law can evolve. Civil liability 
standards regularly change in the wake of technological development, 
new sources of harm, and attendant shifts in power and social 
relations.32 The proliferation of IoT devices heralds another possible 
27. See infra Part II.A.1 (providing examples of IoT exculpatory clauses). 
28. See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining why U.C.C. implied warranties will not attach to many 
IoT devices). 
29. See infra Part II.A.3 (arguing that notification will bar trespass to chattels and conversion 
claims). 
30. See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing how autonomous-vehicle accidents are often attributed 
to others involved in the accidents, rather than to the companies who fielded a vehicle that cannot 
engage in actions that would be expected of a human driver).
 31. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (arguing that “good” products are crowded out by 
“bad” ones when consumers cannot distinguish between high- and low-quality (or safe and 
unsafe) versions). 
32. Tort law scholars and legal historians regularly discuss the social and legal impacts of 
new technologies; this Article continues that tradition with a focus on the relational and power 
shifts facilitated by IoT devices. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY (1980); P.H. WINFIELD, A TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORT (5th ed. 1950); JOHN 
FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, 
AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004) [hereinafter WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC]; 
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the 
592 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:583 
liability inflection point,33 the outcome of which will determine our 
future basic assumptions about IoT companies’ obligations and 
consumer rights. In one potential timeline, consumers will continue to 
bear the brunt of harms resulting from corporate remote interference, 
and consumer expectations regarding corporate duties—or lack 
thereof—will develop accordingly. In another, preferable future, 
liability will be allocated in a more balanced way, and consumers will 
reasonably expect companies to take steps to prevent foreseeable 
harms. 
Part III concludes by outlining various routes toward expanding 
corporate liability for harms resulting from remote interference. In 
some situations, it may be sufficient to adopt more expansive 
understandings of existing tech-neutral doctrine; in others, it may be 
clarifying to articulate tech-specific rules. This Article discusses the 
relative benefits of strengthening the unconscionability and public 
policy doctrines to limit the reach of exculpatory clauses; recognizing 
broader relational duties, which might take the form of a new implied 
warranty, a new products liability claim, or a new informal fiduciary 
duty; and extending proximate cause standards.34 It closes  with a  
Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Donald G. Gifford, Technological 
Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident 
Compensation, 11 J. TORT L. 71, 123–29 (2018); Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and 
Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1241 (2012); John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort 
Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690 (2001) 
[hereinafter Witt, Toward a New History]. 
33. Professor Douglas Kysar has discussed how new technologies and social facts may spur 
the development of new liability theories: 
Just as railroad and workplace carnage forced recognition of new forms of risk in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, just as automobile and product-caused accidents 
illuminated extended chains of responsibility in the twentieth century, climate change 
will challenge prevailing conceptions of wrongdoing in the twenty-first century. 
Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2011). 
Similarly, the changed corporation–consumer relationship enabled by IoT devices may justify an 
expanded liability analysis. 
34. In doing so, this Article contributes to a growing body of scholarship on how increasingly 
connected, automated, and even autonomous systems challenge or alter liability standards. See 
generally, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015); 
Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 565 (2018); Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous 
Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347 (2016); Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous 
Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1611 (2017); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulating, 
and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1839–43 (2014); Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Application of 
Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied Machine Intelligence, in  ROBOT LAW 51 (Ryan Calo, A. 
Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016); Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming 
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discussion of how courts, legislatures, and agencies at both the state 
and federal levels can complement each other in implementing these 
recommendations. 
Calibrated correctly, our civil liability regime can evolve to 
preserve the benefits of remote interference and ensure that IoT 
companies are incentivized to better protect consumers. 
I. A NEW CORPORATION–CONSUMER RELATIONSHIP 
While there is no agreed-upon definition for the “Internet of 
Things,”35 everyone can agree there are a lot of them. And the already 
mind-boggling number of internet-connected devices is expected to 
skyrocket as companies slap sensors and wireless capabilities onto 
more and more items. A 2015 McKinsey Report estimated that “there 
are more than nine billion connected devices around the world, 
including smartphones and computers,” and that by 2025 there may be 
somewhere between twenty-five to fifty billion such devices.36 Others 
predict that there will be more than one trillion IoT devices by 2025.37 
As this Article considers the problem of consumer harm, it focuses on 
the millions of IoT devices marketed for individual or household use 
rather than public or industrial IoT systems, such as smart city or 
Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321 
(2012); Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1 (2017) [hereinafter Smith, Automated Driving]; Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity Driven 
Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777 (2014) [hereinafter Smith, Proximity Driven Liability]; David C. 
Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 117 (2014); William D. Smart, Cindy M. Grimm & Woodrow Hartzog, An Education 
Theory of Fault for Autonomous Systems (Aug. 29, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://people.oregonstate.edu/~smartw/library/papers/2017/werobot2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G56E-AHNJ]. 
35. A Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) report describes the IoT as encompassing 
“‘things’ such as devices or sensors—other than computers, smartphones or tablets—that connect, 
communicate or transmit information with or between each other through the Internet.” FTC 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. A McKinsey report defined it as “sensors and actuators connected 
by networks to computing systems . . . . exclud[ing] systems in which all of the sensors’ primary 
purpose is to receive intentional human input.” MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, THE INTERNET 
OF THINGS: MAPPING THE VALUE BEYOND THE HYPE 1 (2015) [hereinafter MCKINSEY 
REPORT]. Delightfully, some have described IoT devices as “enchanted objects”—“ordinary 
things made extraordinary.” DAVID ROSE, ENCHANTED OBJECTS: DESIGN, HUMAN DESIRE, 
AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 7 (2014). 
36. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 17. 
37. Bill Wasik, In the Programmable World, All Our Objects Will Act as One, WIRED (May 
14, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-things-2 [https://perma.cc/UG4T-RXV7]. 
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factory logistical, monitoring, or maintenance systems.38 This subset of 
IoT devices represents a significant percentage of the IoT ecosystem: 
it is estimated to have an economic impact of $370 billion to $1.9 trillion 
per year by 2025.39 
An IoT device’s distinctive fusion of traits—its ability to collect 
personal data, its capacity for ongoing communication with an IoT 
company, and its physicality—combine to form a product that is 
simultaneously an object and a service.40 An IoT speaker might double 
as a smart-home hub or link with a voice-activated, cloud-based service 
to provide requested content. A smart thermostat develops customized 
energy-saving heating plans and a monthly energy report. An internet-
connected vehicle offers built-in navigation, roadside assistance, or 
real-time alerts regarding engine, emission, or airbag status. Water 
bottles can track your daily water intake, egg monitors can send 
reminders that eggs are going bad, and tires can alert you if they 
become deflated.41 Medical wearables and implantables allow for 
38. This Article regularly refers to Nest, Google’s smart-home hub, GOOGLE NEST, 
https://store.google.com/us/category/connected_home?hl=en-
US&GoogleNest&utm_source=nest_ 
redirect&utm_medium=google_oo&utm_campaign=GS102776&utm_term=control 
[https://perma.cc/ 
EDW5-5KJQ]; Alexa Voice Service, Amazon’s cloud-based voice service that links with 
innumerable devices, Alexa Voice Service, AMAZON ALEXA, 
https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-voice-service [https://perma.cc/S86P-G6TD]; and Tesla, an 
automotive and energy car company that specializes in increasingly autonomous vehicles, TESLA, 
https://www.tesla.com [https://perma.cc/8UWB-N5TN].
 39. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 35, at 7.
 40. Elvy, supra note 14, at 144–45 (describing how the IoT has “usher[ed] in an era” of 
devices that are both services and goods, and no longer “static objects”). This is related to what 
Radin has termed the “contract as product” understanding of contract law, which she defines as 
occurring when “the contract is part of the product, part of the collection of functional 
components, and not a separate text about that collection.” Margaret Jane Radin, Information 
Tangibility, in  ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 395, 410 (Ove Grandstrand, 
ed., 2003) [hereinafter Radin, Information Tangibility]. You no longer simply buys a phone: you 
buy a phone with specific contractual terms, such as a requirement to litigate disputes in California 
under California law. Id. at 411–12. Similarly, with IoT devices, you are not only buying the 
device—you are buying the device, the service, and the terms of that service. See id. at 412–14 
(discussing how this conflation is undermining the “idea that a contract is a text, separate from 
and ‘about’ (accompanying) some machine or functionality”). 
41. Note that, despite being about IoT devices, this paper does not use “a fridge ordering 
milk” as an example. At least, not anymore. Pzremek Palka, How To Write a Law and Technology 
Paper?, PRZEMYSLAW.TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 30, 2018), https://przemyslaw.technology/ 
2018/11/30/how-to-write-a-law-and-technology-paper [https://perma.cc/PF2X-YCT2]. 
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better drug management and the early identification of a need for 
intervention.42 
As a result, and as detailed more fully below, when you engage 
with an IoT device, you do more than just use an item; you enter into 
an ongoing and surprisingly intimate relationship with an IoT 
company, characterized by a new power dynamic—and a new risk of 
property and bodily harm.  
A. An Exacerbated Power Imbalance 
New technologies giveth, and new technologies taketh away. But 
while it is increasingly understood that IoT-enabled services come at 
the cost of one’s privacy, it is less recognized that they also come at the 
cost of one’s agency.43 
IoT devices’ touted provision of individualized services requires 
individualized data gathering, which in turn enables individualized 
manipulation and individualized enforcement via corporate remote 
interference.44 Not only can IoT companies use software and hardware 
to limit how consumers can use a device,45 but they can also monitor 
compliance with their terms of service, which allows them to 
strategically time remote interference to extort concessions or engage 
42. See generally Syagnik Banerjee, Thomas A. Hemphill & Phil Longstreet, Is IOT a Threat 
to Consumer Consent? The Perils of Wearable Devices’ Health Data Exposure (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3038872 
[https://perma.cc/2WGG-FKE7]. 
43. Numerous scholars are exploring the implications of increased surveillance for privacy 
law and consumer protection law. See supra notes 13–15. See generally Neil M. Richards, The 
Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013). This Article is primarily concerned with 
how IoT companies are leveraging their surveillance capabilities to exert more control over 
consumers.
 44. See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing how IoT companies can hold consumer devices hostage 
to elicit agreement to new contractual terms and engage in individualized remote interference). 
45. Scholars have long detailed how design decisions enable corporate control and limit 
consumer uses. See, e.g., HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 224 (Donald Nicholson 
Smith trans., 1991) (1984) (observing that what is possible within a space depends on what its 
designers want to permit and encourage); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 81–84, 123–37, 
323–24, 327–29 (2006) (describing the distinctive characteristics and impacts of architectural 
regulation, with a focus on computer code); LUCY A. SUCHMAN, HUMAN-MACHINE 
RECONFIGURATIONS 186–92, 257–84 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing how users’ interactions with 
technologies are structured by their design); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 210, 225–27 (2007) (arguing that the design of online environments constrict 
users’ behavior in much the same way as the design of physical environments); Steve Woolgar, 
Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON 
POWER, TECHNOLOGY, AND DOMINATION 59, 67–69 (John Law ed., 1991) (noting how 
technological designs limit users’ activities). 
596 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:583 
in self-help. Indeed, given their new powers to monitor, companies may 
include previously unthinkable, stringent rules into their contracts, 
further directing when and how consumers can use their purchased 
devices. 
Between contracts replacing “the law of the state with the ‘law’ of 
the firm”46 and new technology enabling the law of the surveilling firm, 
corporate remote interference systematically empowers IoT 
companies at the expense of IoT-device users.47 
1. Intensified Corporate-Compliance Monitoring. Companies have 
always been able to glean information about their customers from 
interactions, but IoT devices are collecting, crunching, and conveying 
individualized data on an entirely new scale. They amass a wealth of 
aggregate and individually linked data about the most private aspects 
of our lives,48 granting IoT companies insight into our routines, habits, 
and proclivities; household IoT devices gather and share information 
about when you wake up, how long you brush your teeth, when you 
46. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 143.
 47. Id. at 147. Simultaneously, to the extent states co-opt corporate power, internet-
connected devices “significantly reduce[] the number and variety of people and institutions 
required to apply the state’s power on a mass scale.” ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 118; see, e.g., 
Peter Campbell, Volvo Cars Caps Vehicle Speed To Prevent Road Deaths, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 4, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3c2f66bc-3e61-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44 
[https://perma.cc/K3FM-DFFY] (reporting on blanket, GPS-linked electronic speed-limiting and 
that Volvo is considering using it to cap vehicle speed near schools and hospitals). 
48. Furthermore, most IoT devices marketed for individual and home use collect 
information in the home, a traditionally private space. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, 
in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187, 188 (Patrick Lin, 
George Bekey & Keith Abney eds., 2012). 
Certainly, it is technologically possible to have household IoT devices that do not collect 
individualized information, do not share it with IoT companies, and are not subject to remote 
corporate control. Konnex, for example, is an open standard used for commercial and domestic 
building automation that is not linked to an IoT company and does not permit third-party access 
or control. 
Given the value generated by data sets, however, IoT companies have market incentives 
to collect as much information about their users as possible; given various liability risks, they also 
have legal incentives to maintain control over the IoT devices. Nor can consumers opt out of these 
surveillance systems; most purchase agreements require consumers to consent to data reporting, 
and warranties are often conditioned on not tampering with the IoT device. See, e.g., Kashmir 
Hill, Nest Hackers Will Offer Tool To Keep the Google-Owned Company from Getting Users’ 
Data, FORBES (July 16, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/16/nest-hack-
privacy-tool/#3b38af583464 [https:// 
perma.cc/W2RC-FVC3] (reporting on how Nests report household information to Google and 
how the device can be altered to prevent it from sending personal data). 
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turn your lights on or off, and what shows you watch.49 Although much 
of the data is explicitly or implicitly volunteered—after all, individuals 
choose to wear fitness trackers or install smart-home hubs50—data 
about our lives is increasingly being collected without our knowledge 
by our own IoT devices,51 by others’ devices,52 and by public devices.53 
IoT and other data-mining companies generate additional information 
through data aggregation and extrapolation.54 Between the amount 
and kind of data collected, IoT companies now know more personal 
details about individual device users than the nosiest small-town 
shopkeeper or the most tech-enabled brick-and-mortar store.55 
Further, because all IoT devices have transmitters that permit 
information sharing,56 they are in regular communication with 
49. Hill & Mattu, supra note 22. IoT companies may even use gathered information to mock 
you. In December 2017, Netflix tweeted, “To the 53 people who’ve watched A Christmas Prince 
every day for the past 18 days: Who hurt you?” Netflix US (@netflix), TWITTER (Dec. 10, 2017, 
6:52 PM), https://twitter.com/netflix/status/940051734650503168 [https://perma.cc/SS7V-RYY2]. 
50. Friedland, supra note 15, at 898.
 51. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 822 (noting that “many consumers may not even know they 
possess objects that are revealing information about their personal lives”); see also Hudson 
Hongo, Smart Sex Toy Maker Sued for Sneakily Collecting ‘Intimate’ Data, GIZMODO (Sept. 12, 
2016), https://gizmodo.com/smart-sex-toy-maker-sued-for-sneakily-collecting-intima-
1786559792 [https:// 
perma.cc/7UVA-WTBF] (“In August, hackers at the Def Con security conference revealed that 
Standard Innovation’s We-Vibe smart vibrators transmitted user data—including heat level and 
vibration intensity—to the company in real time.”); Arvind Narayanan (@random_walker), 
TWITTER (Sept. 27, 2019, 6:08 AM), https://twitter.com/random_walker/ 
status/1177570679232876544 [https://perma.cc/TZY2-GTJX] (discussing three papers that detail 
how smart TVs and related devices track users). 
52. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 811 (“[W]hat we ordinarily think of as static objects will 
become communication tools, revealing our paths, interests, habits, and lives to companies and 
law enforcers.”). 
53. Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 647 (2015) (“There is no opportunity for notice and choice in smart publics 
or any smart shared space.”); see also Siraj Datoo, This Recycling Bin Is Following You, QUARTZ 
(Aug. 8, 2013), https://qz.com/112873/this-recycling-bin-is-following-you [https://perma.cc/AVP8-
UVF6] (noting that London’s smart garbage bins collect data from pedestrians’ smart phones to 
create targeted advertisements). 
54. As IoT devices collect information on the “micro-patterns” of an individual’s habits, it 
will be increasingly possible to predict “future macro-patterns.” Ferguson, supra note 15, at 822.
 55. See, e.g., Paul Michael, 8 Ways Retailers Are Tracking Your Every Move, TIME (Sept. 23, 
2016), http://time.com/money/4506297/how-retailers-track-you [https://perma.cc/Z28J-76MM] 
(reporting on how stores geofence smartphones to identify when individuals approach, enter, and 
leave stores). 
56. These connectivity structures can take a variety of forms: IoT devices can connect with 
and transmit data to other devices, to service providers, or to a hub or gateway, which then 
connects to service providers. David Hamilton, The Four Internet of Things Connectivity Models 
Explained, WEB HOST INDUSTRY REVIEW (Apr. 29, 2016), available at 
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corporate service providers, allowing for real-time monitoring. As 
detailed in a recent article about a monitored, IoT-connected home, 
smart-home devices persistently contact outside servers.57 Amazon’s 
Echo hub connected with company servers every few minutes,58 and 
the smart plugs—which merely control and monitor electrical usage— 
were “pinging home almost every hour.”59 The latest Roomba creates 
maps of owners’ homes, which it then shares with parent companies 
iRobot and Google.60 Even seemingly independent IoT devices, like 
wearable step trackers, pacemakers, and vehicles, frequently exchange 
information with companies to report on usage and receive security 
updates. 
This near-constant data gathering and transfer enables a new level 
of postsale corporate surveillance. Previously, most postsale services 
bundled with the sale of a good tended to be limited to relatively 
infrequent, known interactions. Installation services are quickly 
fulfilled; maintenance services occur at regularly scheduled intervals; 
warranty services are only triggered in the event of a malfunction or 
defect and are bounded by a known end date. And even though 
subscription plans and utilities are provided on a near-constant basis, 
consumers’ relationships with utility companies are limited. 
Subscribers and property owners are charged at regular intervals, 
punctuated with relatively rare as-needed repairs to portions of the 
system under the company’s control. Thus, while “[l]eases, service 
contracts, loyalty programs, customer marketing, and even end-user 
license agreements are forms of an ongoing relationship, even with 
users other than the original buyers,”61 the IoT corporation–consumer 
relationships are distinctively intimate and ongoing. 
IoT-device-enabled surveillance grants companies a newfound 
ability to identify violations of once under-enforced or unenforceable 
contractual terms. For example, car rental companies regularly restrict 
http://www.inetservicescloud.com/the-four-internet-of-things-connectivity-models-explained 
[https://perma.cc/ZZY3-C7RG]. 
57. Hill & Mattu, supra note 22.
 58. Id.
 59. Id.
 60. Maggie Astor, Your Roomba May Be Mapping Your Home, Collecting Data That Could 
Be Shared, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/technology/roomba-
irobot-data-privacy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9TZ8-SN9P]; James Vincent, Google Wants to 
Improve Your Smart Home with iRobot’s Room Maps, VERGE (Oct. 31, 2008), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/31/18041876/google-irobot-smart-home-spatial-data-
mapping-collaboration [https://perma.cc/SVY8-5LEQ].
 61. Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1804. 
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out-of-state driving.62 Absent an incident, however, this rule was often 
ignored by both the company and consumer, as it was generally 
unenforceable (if still a useful liability shield for the company in the 
case of an out-of-state accident). But GPS trackers now allow 
companies to monitor where and how fast a car is driven. One renter, 
who anticipated a $259.51 rental bill, had to pay $3405.05 due to a one-
dollar-per-mile fine for having crossed state lines;63 another was 
charged a $450 fine for three instances of speeding.64 More recently, a 
woman’s auto loan contract restricted her from driving outside of a 
four-county perimeter.65 When she fled to a shelter outside of that zone 
to escape her abusive husband, the company sent a tow truck to 
retrieve the vehicle.66 
IoT companies also market their compliance surveillance to other 
industries. For example, a smart intercom company’s New York City 
advertising campaign emphasizes that landlords can use their 
technology to photograph visitors, allowing them to determine if 
tenants are illegally subletting units—which would then allow them to 
evict tenants and take steps to circumvent rent-control laws.67 
IoT companies’ newfound ability to engage in individualized 
surveillance marks a seismic shift in the enforceability of contractual 
provisions. Indeed, it invites companies to incorporate increasingly 
stringent and invasive terms into their contracts—precisely because 
62. See, e.g., Fox Rent A Car – Frequently Asked Questions, FOX RENT A CAR, 
https://www.foxrentacar.com/en/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/B2SU-LGNF] (providing 
information regarding the states within which a vehicle may be driven, depending on where it is 
rented). 
63. Christopher Elliott, Business Travel: Some Rental Cars Are Keeping Tabs on the Drivers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/13/business/business-travel-some-
rental-cars-are-keeping-tabs-on-the-drivers.html [https://perma.cc/TA4S-ZUNE] (“The industry 
views telematics as a way to enforce its contracts . . . .”).
 64. Catherine Greenman, The Car Snitched. He Sued., N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/28/technology/the-car-snitched-he-sued.html 
[https://perma.cc/ 
8PFC-SPY7].  
65. Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
 66. Id.
 67. Alfred Ng, Smart Home Tech Can Help Evict Renters, Surveillance Company Tells 
Landlords, CNET (Oct. 25, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/install-smart-home-tech-
evict-renters-surveillance-company-tells-landlords [https://perma.cc/T2BT-9BDR] (reporting 
that an email advertised, “Use the GateGuard AI Doorman Intercom to catch illegal sublets, non-
primaries, Airbnbs, so you can vacate a unit,” and “Combine a $950/mo studio and a $1400/mo 
one-bedroom into a $4200 DEREGULATED two-bedroom”). 
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those terms can now be enforced.68 Lenders can already monitor when 
a leased vehicle is at the lessor’s place of employment;69 it is easy to 
imagine a lender conditioning the use of the car on employment 
attendance. 
2. Facilitating (Automated) Corporate Remote Interference. 
“Remote interference” is the act of altering how an IoT device works 
at a distance, either by pushing through an over-the-air software 
update or discontinuing a service. Companies can remotely alter a 
device’s software to add new functions, such as when Tesla pushed an 
update that helped unfreeze the charge port in cold weather;70 to 
remove other functions, as occurred when Nokia required users to 
accept a software update that disabled a key feature of its smart 
scales;71 or to completely deactivate a device or larger system, as when 
a starter-interrupt device “boots” a leased car.72 Terminating a service 
may also constitute remote interference.73 Without the ability to 
exchange information with a service provider, an IoT smart-home hub 
is little more than an unusually expensive paperweight—as users of the 
Revolv learned to their dismay when the company announced it would 
be shutting down support for the hub and its associated apps.74 For 
other IoT devices, the lack of a service will simply render a once-smart 
item dumb. In 2016, for example, lighting company TCP stopped 
hosting a server that enabled their IoT lightbulbs’ remote 
68. See, e.g., Kristelia A. García, Technological Rights Accretion, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: 
NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 19, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/technological-rights-accretion-by-
kristelia-a-garcia [https://perma.cc/Y6CX-35AS] (discussing an app that “purports to use 
blockchain technology to enable visual artists to ‘track’ art they sell such that if and when it is 
later resold, they are able to enforce a so-called ‘resale royalty,’” a contractual term “that has 
been repeatedly considered and explicitly rejected by Congress”). 
69. Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2 (noting that a lender “typically shuts down 
cars when they are parked at the borrower’s house or workplace”).
 70. Fred Lambert, Tesla Releases Software Update To Help Unfreeze Charge Port, 
ELECTREK (Dec. 27, 2018), https://electrek.co/2018/12/27/tesla-software-update-unfreeze-
charge-port [https://perma.cc/ 
8M8M-GZ6E].
 71. Daniel Cooper, Nokia Will Disable the Key Feature of Its Priciest Scale, ENGADGET (Jan. 
22, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/01/22/nokia-disables-pulse-wave-velocity-body-
cardio [https://perma.cc/85CX-TWPJ]. 
72. Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
 73. Elvy, supra note 14, at 100 (“[T]he range of operations of an IOT device is very much 
dependent on the services and software provided by companies.”).
 74. Alissa Walker, If You Use Revolv’s Smart Hub, You Are Officially Screwed (Thanks 
Nest!), GIZMODO (Apr. 4, 2016), https://gizmodo.com/nest-owned-smart-hub-gets-permanently-
killed-1768977505 [https://perma.cc/5TM3-E5EM].  
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functionality.75 The bulbs still provide light, but the capabilities that 
justified their steeper price tag no longer exist.76 In contrast, for other 
devices, certain services are relatively superfluous. For example, the 
termination of a radio streaming service has little impact on a car’s 
overall utility. 
An IoT company’s right to engage in remote interference is often 
enshrined in its terms of service.77 Google Nest smart-home products, 
for example, require users to consent in advance to automatic “patches, 
bug fixes, updates, upgrades and other modifications to improve the 
performance of the Product Software and related services.”78 While the 
benefits of corporate remote interference are often advertised,79 it also 
creates significant and underappreciated negative externalities. 
Because IoT devices are digital, automating remote interference 
is relatively costless. If anything, it may result in cost savings, 
incentivizing companies to automate. But automating remote 
interference raises the same concerns that attend any discussion of 
algorithmic, “perfect” enforcement,80 including the creation of a 
75. Kate Cox, TCP Disconnects “Smart” Lightbulb Servers, Leaves Buyers in the Dark, 
CONSUMERIST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://consumerist.com/2016/08/19/tcp-disconnects-smart-
lightbulb-servers-leaves-buyers-in-the-dark [https://perma.cc/TAQ2-JNL8].
 76. Id.
 77. See, e.g., Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON (May 17, 2018) [hereinafter Alexa Terms], 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201809740 
[https://perma.cc/3HEL-LTH8] (“We may change, suspend, or discontinue Alexa, or any part of 
it, at any time without notice.”); Software Updates, TESLA, 
https://www.tesla.com/support/software-updates [https://perma.cc/VXX9-PWCL] (“[Tesla] cars 
regularly receive over-the-air software updates that add new features and enhance existing ones 
over Wi-Fi. When updates become available, you’ll receive a notification on your center 
touchscreen display, with the option to install the update immediately or schedule for later.”); 
Terms of Use for Hue, PHILIPS HUE [hereinafter Philips Hue Terms], 
https://www2.meethue.com/en-us/product-terms [https://perma.cc/A24U-U6E3] (“Signify may 
update or change software for seamless Services, and may do so remotely without notifying 
you.”); Uconnect Terms and Conditions, UCONNECT, ¶ 17 [hereinafter Uconnect Terms], 
https://www.driveuconnect.com/terms-and-conditions.html [https://perma.cc/R9U8-7XMA] 
(“At any time we may need or be required to update or change the software on your vehicle, and 
may do so remotely without notifying you. You agree that we may perform these software updates 
or changes remotely without any further consent required . . . .”).
 78. End-User License Agreement, NEST [hereinafter Nest License Agreement], 
https://nest.com/nz/legal/eula [https://perma.cc/3M6Z-W48Q].
 79. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
 80. See generally, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1249 (2008) (discussing the drawbacks of automating administrative decision-making); Meg 
Leta Jones & Karen Levy, Sporting Chances: Robot Referees and the Automation of 
Enforcement (Nov. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3293076 
[https://perma.cc/VA7B-UBUD] (extrapolating from the resistance to the use of automated 
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Kafkaesque bureaucratic enforcement regime.81 Automated decision-
making is self-executing, and therefore incontrovertible, inarguable, 
and self-sustaining.82 It minimizes opportunities for efficient breach, 
mutually beneficial negotiation, and compromise.83 For example, when 
the transaction costs associated with repossession were high, lenders 
often contacted consumers before a repossession to negotiate 
immediate partial payment or a longer-term loan with a higher interest 
rate. With automated remote interference, however, company 
representatives have less incentive to communicate with consumers. 
Further, no system is error free, but automation locks in and amplifies 
errors.84 One individual has alleged that his car has been “routinely 
shut down[,] even when he was current on his $362 monthly car 
payment.”85 Instead of being able to demonstrate proof of payment to 
a repossession agent, he was reduced to using a screwdriver to rig the 
starter in to get home.86 Automating the use of starter-interrupt devices 
would multiply these kinds of errors, while simultaneously making 
difficult for affected parties to communicate with someone to correct 
them. 
3. Enabling Corporate Self-Help. Traditionally, a company 
attempting to repossess an item after an alleged breach of contract 
would have two options: engage in self-help or involve the state.87 
However, given the risk of physical violence that accompanied self-
officiating systems in professional sports to identify the benefits of imperfect human decision-
makers).
 81. See, e.g., Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, 
VERGE (May 21, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-
algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/GX3W-F3MZ].
 82. LESSIG, supra note 45, at 342. 
83. Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 13, at 1161–62 (observing that 
applying digital rights management technologies “to real-world objects, such as cars, weapons, or 
computers” eliminates opportunities for efficient breaches and “risks making rights-infringing, 
but necessary, decisions impossible”).
 84. Cf. ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 114–16 (discussing the risk that algorithmically enabled 
perfect enforcement locks in mistakes in the context of copyright and First Amendment law); 
Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 13, at 1165 (“[T]he failures of [digital rights 
management technologies] are legion, particularly when the technology fails on its own terms and 
blocks people from accessing content they have a license to access.”). 
85. Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
 86. Id. 
87. As the name implies, “self-help” consists of private actions taken by parties to a 
controversy, either to prevent or resolve a dispute, without the involvement of a government actor 
or disinterested third party. Celia R. Taylor, Self-Help in Contract Law: An Exploration and 
Proposal, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 841 (1998). 
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help repossession, it is only lawful if it can be done without breaching 
the peace.88 If the holder of the disputed property protests its removal89 
or keeps the property in a locked building,90 the would-be reclaimant 
is obliged to involve the state, as “[o]nly the state could enter a private 
home or office against the owner’s will, and then only within the limits 
established by the due process principles.”91 Even in jurisdictions 
where a contract explicitly permits creditors to enter private dwellings 
for the purposes of repossession, courts regularly read the “breach of 
the peace” exception into the contract.92 Similarly, many states prohibit 
landlords from engaging in self-help to repossess a disputed property, 
while those that permit self-help do so subject to a “breach of the 
peace” standard.93 
Today, the possibility of remote interference creates a third option 
when there is a contractual dispute: instead of attempting to physically 
retrieve an item, an IoT company can employ remote interference to 
effectively “digitally repossess” some features or an entire item—an 
act that, absent the contract, would be considered criminal.94 
Of course, self-help corporate remote interference may be 
acceptable in some scenarios. For example, a company can raise rates 
for a subscription service and stop providing the service should a 
customer refuse to pay, even if that renders an IoT device useless.95 The 
benefits of self-help in such circumstances outweigh the various costs 
88. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1103. 
89. Both Connecticut and New York courts have held that conduct resulting in verbal 
objections alone can constitute prohibited breaches of the peace. Aviles v. Wayside Auto Body, 
Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 216, 226 (D. Conn. 2014) (“[A] repossessor may breach the peace if they 
repossess a vehicle in the face of oral protest from the owner of the vehicle.”); Boles v. Cty. of 
Montgomery, No. 6:11–cv–522, 2014 WL 582259, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (“It is clear that a mere 
verbal objection to the removal of property constitutes a breach of the peace.”). 
90. Most states allow repossessors to enter driveways that are open to the public. See, e.g., 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7508.2(d) (prohibiting entry into “any private building or secured 
area”). Massachusetts, however, does not allow any entrance onto private property. MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 255B, § 20B (2017). 
91. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1103. This common law prohibition on creating a “breach of the 
peace” was incorporated into U.C.C. articles 9 and 2A. U.C.C. § 2A-525 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1990); U.C.C. § 9-503 (2010). 
92. Cohen, supra note 12, at 1104 n.51. 
93. Id. at 1104 n.49. 
94. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018). 
95. Should discontinuing a service create a foreseeable risk of harm, there may be a 
heightened notice requirement. See infra Part II.C (discussing how certain entities—namely, 
utilities and landlords—must provide notice of discontinued service commensurate with the 
potential risk of harm). 
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of state involvement to both parties and to the state.96 However, 
because self-helpers judge the righteousness of their own cause, 
“[t]here is ample reason to worry that they will misconstrue the law 
along the way—not just, or even primarily, on account of bad faith,” 
but rather because they are unconsciously motivated to reach a 
particular response.97 Self-interested enforcement is even more 
problematic when the relevant law is drafted by the enforcing entity— 
as is the case when IoT companies act in accordance with their terms 
of service. 
IoT companies are already using remote interference or the threat 
of remote interference to hold IoT devices hostage and compel 
consumer action or extract concessions. One such example is 
conditioning product use on agreement to unilateral contractual 
modifications.98 Should a user object, their only recourse is to forego 
using the device.99 For example, Sonos, a smart-speaker company, 
recently announced that it would not provide expected and necessary 
software updates unless consumers agreed to changes to the privacy 
and data-collection policy, which expand the company’s ability to use 
the speakers to collect, use, and share personal data.100 As a company 
spokesperson stated: “The customer can choose to acknowledge the 
policy, or can accept that over time their product may cease to 
96. Cf. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 49 (2014) 
(“Self-help would not pose such a knotty problem for legal designers if it did not yield valuable 
benefits.”). The possibility of self-help may deter “wrongdoing from occurring in the first place, 
reduce administrative costs, promote autonomy- or sovereignty-related values, and facilitate 
speedier redress.” Id. At a deeper level, self-help might foster “cooperative relations, mitigate 
feelings of alienation from the law, or generate deeper internalization of first-order legal norms.” 
Id.
 97. Id. at 50 (noting that self-helpers may be biased by “motivated cognition and reliance on 
congenial interpretive methods or theories of law”).
 98. See generally NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013) (discussing how wrap contracts 
unfairly burden consumers and create a coercive contracting environment). For a humorous take 
on the issue, see Nitrozac & Snaggy, The Internet of Ransomware Things, JOY OF TECH, 
http://www.geekculture.com/joyoftech/joyarchives/2340.html [https://perma.cc/RM63-
D9WY] (illustrating how IoT devices might be held hostage; for example, a coffee maker 
threatens, “20 bucks in my PayPal account or I’ll only brew decaf!”).
 99. See, e.g., Nest License Agreement, supra note 78 (“You consent to this automatic update. 
If you do not want such Updates, your remedy is to stop using the Product.”); Uconnect Terms, 
supra note 77, ¶ 25 (“Sprint reserves the right to modify the Uconnect Services (including remote 
updates on the Device)” and its terms of service “at any time without notice or liability to you in 
its sole discretion. If you do not agree with the modifications, your sole and exclusive remedy is 
to not use the Uconnect Services.”). 
100. Zack Whittaker, Sonos Says Users Must Accept New Privacy Policy or Devices May 
“Cease To Function,”  ZERO DAY (Aug. 21, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/article/sonos-accept-
new-privacy-policy-speakers-cease-to-function [https://perma.cc/N7WC-YTHB]. 
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function.”101 Alternatively, an IoT company may engage in secretly 
coercive remote interference, such as when Apple pushed an 
operating-server update including a hardware-management feature 
that slowed down processors in phones with aging batteries, apparently 
to boost sales of its newer iPhone models.102 
The power to enforce includes the power to decide when to 
enforce. Networked devices and personalized surveillance enable 
strategically manipulative action; the more companies know about 
individuals and the more devices they can control, the more 
influentially they can time when and how they address contractual 
breaches. Your car can be disabled just before work or a flight, or you 
might receive a notification that your smart thermostat was turned off 
or your front door unlocked while you are on vacation.103 
In the absence of state oversight, bad-faith actors are freer to 
abuse these new self-help powers. In April 2017, an individual who 
purchased Garadget—an internet-connected garage door opener— 
reported problems and left an angry comment on the Garadget 
community board, followed by a one-star review on Amazon.104 Denis 
Grisak, the product’s inventor and distributer, responded by denying 
the unit server connection.105 Because the Garadget purchaser had not 
activated the device, he was not at risk of being locked out of his garage 
or having his garage door left open—but another customer who had 
activated the device and then annoyed the company might have 
been.106 Absent a shift in governance, it will become increasingly 
commonplace for IoT companies to exploit this coercive capability.107 
101. Id.
 102. Steve Mullis, Lawsuits Mount as Apple Manages Fallout from Revelation of Slowed 
iPhones, NPR (Dec. 31, 2017, 8:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/31/574792184/lawsuits-
mount-as-apple-manages-fallout-from-revelation-of-slowed-iphones [https://perma.cc/JZ4R-
FZJ6].
 103. Cf. Ben Dickson, The IoT Ransomware Threat Is More Serious Than You Think, IOT 
SEC. FOUND. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.iotsecurityfoundation.org/the-iot-ransomware-threat-
is-more-serious-than-you-think [https://perma.cc/6QFU-TJ4L] (arguing that it is the timing of 
ransomware attacks, rather than their irreversibility, that will render IoT ransomware effective).
 104. Sean Gallagher, IoT Garage Door Opener Maker Bricks Customer’s Product After Bad 
Review, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 4, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/04/iot-garage-door-opener-maker-bricks-customers-product-after-bad-review 
[https://perma.cc/F883-ZR76].
 105. Id.
 106. Id.
 107. See, e.g., Tim Cushing, Software Company Shows How Not To Handle Negative Review, 
TECHDIRT (Dec. 22, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
606 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:583 
We have seen how connected products enable contractually 
permitted industry control before.108 Companies have long employed 
terms of service and digital rights management technologies to limit 
consumer options—say, to keep consumers from sharing music files or 
independently repairing a device.109 Famously, Amazon remotely 
deleted e-books from users’ Kindle e-readers, including George 
Orwell’s “1984,” of all possible texts!110 Unrelenting self-help 
enforcement, mediated through technology, is problematic enough in 
the digital realm. But in the IoT context, it also increases the risk of 
physical injury to consumers. 
B. A New Vector for Harm 
IoT devices are “embodied”111: they have a presence in and ability 
to interact with the physical world.112 And with physicality comes the 
20161220/12411836320/software-company-shows-how-not-to-handle-negative-review.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/H2RX-62Y7].
 108. Cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet Platforms as the 
New Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234, 237 (2018) (“Those who control the terms of 
access to, and administration of, infrastructure are in a position to dominate those who depend 
on that infrastructure.”). 
109. Right-to-repair advocates argue that “manufacturers have increasingly used restrictive 
warranties, digital locks, and more to make it hard, or in some cases even impossible, for 
consumers to fix everything from iPhones to John Deere tractors.” Louise Matsakis, Security 
Experts Unite over the Right To Repair, WIRED (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/right-to-repair-security-experts-california [https://perma.cc/X7A9-
GSY6]. For example, American farmers have been reduced to buying black-market Ukrainian 
software to be able to repair broken tractors without having to go to John Deere dealerships, as 
is required by the John Deere license agreement and enforced by the tractor’s software. Jason 
Koebler, Farmers Are Hacking Their Tractors with Ukrainian Firmware, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 
21, 2017, 3:17 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xykkkd/why-american-farmers-
are-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware [https://perma.cc/DN9G-8ECP]. For a 
defense of right-to-repair laws, see generally Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 563 (2016) (arguing that the “freedom to tinker” ought to be protected 
under IP law). 
110. Amazon remotely removed these copies in response to a claim that the company 
“selling” the e-books did not have the rights to them. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books 
from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/ 
technology/companies/18amazon.html [https://perma.cc/R8FH-82QV].
 111. CALO, supra note 25, at 5 (observing that robotic systems combine “the promiscuity of 
data with physical embodiment”). 
112. To some, this is their most distinctive feature. DeNardis & Raymond, supra note 15, at 
477 (“The ‘Internet of Things’ is a tepid conceptual phrase designed to characterize [a] major 
transformation in the evolution of the Internet: its expansion beyond communication between 
people, or between people and information content, and into billions of everyday objects.”); see 
also Schneier, supra note 15 (“The internet is no longer a web that we connect to. Instead, it’s a 
computerized, networked, and interconnected world that we live in. This is the future, and what 
we’re calling the Internet of Things.”). 
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possibility of physical harm.113 Consider the relatively innocuous 
Roomba, an autonomous vacuum-cleaning robot. In addition to 
cleaning untold numbers of floors, one Roomba caused the 
Pooptastrophe;114 another “attacked” its sleeping owner;115 and a third 
destroyed itself on a hot plate and, due to the resulting smoke damage, 
left its owner homeless.116 While there might be disagreement about 
where fault lies in each of these scenarios, the overarching point is that 
IoT devices’ physicality alters and magnifies the harm potential of 
remote interference. The remote deletion of your music file or e-book 
might frustrate you; the remote disabling of your security alarm, car, or 
implantable medical device could kill you. 
The possibilities for potential injuries are limited only by the 
item’s damage potential. A disabled smart thermostat could allow a 
house to become so hot or cold that plumbing, pets, and potentially 
even people could be harmed.117 Pacemakers, insulin pumps, drug-
administration devices, and other wearable or implanted medical 
devices could affect someone’s physical health,118 while IoT vehicles 
113. Jack Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 45, 49 (2015); Calo, 
supra note 34, at 534.
 114. Jessie Newton, FACEBOOK (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/ 
jesse.newton.37/posts/776177951574 [https://perma.cc/PV4G-G9VJ] (“Do not, under any 
circumstances, let your Roomba run over dog poop. . . . Because if that happens, it will spread the 
dog poop over every conceivable surface within its reach, resulting in a home that closely 
resembles a Jackson Pollock poop painting.”).
 115. Justin McCurry, South Korean Woman’s Hair ‘Eaten’ By Robot Vacuum Cleaner as She 
Slept, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2015, 11:53 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2015/feb/09/south-korean-womans-hair-eaten-by-robot-vacuum-cleaner-as-she-slept 
[https://perma.cc/Y6HR-2FNS] (detailing the event and noting that the vacuum may not have 
been appropriately programmed for cultures where it is common to sit or nap on the floor). 
116. Macrina Cooper-White, Robot Suicide? Rogue Roomba Switches Self On, Climbs onto 
Hotplate, Burns Up, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2013, 1:26 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/13/robot-suicide-roomba-hotplate-burns-
up_n_4268064.html [https://perma.cc/69MY-F9EB]. 
117. See Mick Bilton, Nest Thermostat Glitch Leaves Users in the Cold, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/fashion/nest-thermostat-glitch-battery-dies-
software-freeze.html [https://perma.cc/G487-CSSQ] (“For those who are elderly or ill, or who 
have babies, a freezing house can have dire health consequences. . . . [P]ipes could freeze and 
burst, causing major damage.”). 
118. See, e.g., Basit Mahmood, Lover Tried To Poison Diabetic Fiancé Using ‘Remote 
Controlled Insulin Pump,’ METRO (Mar. 17, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://metro.co.uk/2019/03/17/lover-
tried-poison-diabetic-fiance-using-remote-controlled-insulin-pump-8916952 
[https://perma.cc/B9EV-X5Q] (describing a case of intentional insulin overdose via a remote 
controlled pump). 
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could injure or kill drivers,119 passengers,120 other drivers,121 and 
pedestrians.122 
This Article brackets cybersecurity-related harms to focus on 
harms resulting from corporate remote interference. To fully 
conceptualize the scope of potential harms posed by connected devices 
that affect our bodies and environment, however, it is worth discussing 
the potential physical threats posed by hacked devices.123 In the mad 
rush to be first to market, companies unaccustomed to considering 
cybersecurity issues are slapping sensors and transmitters on 
everything from Barbie dolls to Buddhist prayer beads,124 resulting in 
the neologism that “[t]he ‘S’ in ‘IoT’ stands for ‘security.’”125 Even 
reputable and experienced tech companies are producing insecure 
products. One team of researchers was able to remotely take control 
119. See, e.g., Nathan Bomey, Tesla Model X Driver Killed in California Crash Wasn’t Holding 
Steering Wheel, NTSB Says, USA TODAY (June 7, 2018, 1:04 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2018/06/07/tesla-model-x-autopilot-crash-
ntsb-report/681148002 [https://perma.cc/XB6B-YE69] (describing the fatal crash of a partially 
autonomous vehicle).
 120. See, e.g., Jake Lingeman, Tesla Sued After Speed Limiter Removed, Passenger Killed in 
Fatal Crash, AUTOWEEK NEWS (Jan. 11, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://autoweek.com/article/ 
luxury/tesla-sued-after-speed-limiter-removed-passenger-dead-fatal-
crash [https://perma.cc/J96S-EZZF] (describing a lawsuit over a passenger’s death in a crash 
involving a partially autonomous vehicle).
 121. See, e.g., Tim Stelloh, Tesla Was in Autopilot Mode Before Utah Crash, Driver Tells 
Police, NBC NEWS (May 14, 2018, 6:06 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/tesla-was-
autopilot-mode-utah-crash-driver-tells-police-n874136 [https://perma.cc/72GH-PSMF] 
(describing how a partially autonomous vehicle ran a red light and struck a truck).
 122. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, 
Where Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/19/technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html [https://perma.cc/8QQJ-74NZ] (describing 
the death of a pedestrian after being struck by a partially autonomous vehicle).
 123. See supra note 15. 
124. Samuel Gibbs, Hackers Can Hijack Wi-Fi Hello Barbie To Spy on Your Children, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2015, 6:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/26/ 
hackers-can-hijack-wi-fi-hello-barbie-to-spy-on-your-children [https://perma.cc/NT5J-5769]; Ko 
Tin-yau, Buddhists Go High-Tech: Acer To Launch Smart Prayer Beads, EJINSIGHT (Jan. 30, 
2018, 5:06 PM), http://www.ejinsight.com/20180130-buddhists-go-high-tech-acer-to-
launch-smart-prayer-beads [https://perma.cc/KYU2-CEU3]; see  JAN-PETER KLEINHANS, 
STIFTUNG NEUE VERANTWORTUNG, INTERNET OF INSECURE THINGS: CAN SECURITY 
ASSESSMENT CURE MARKET FAILURES? 5 (2017) (“The current trend is to make everything 
‘smart’ – toaster, fridge, thermostat, lighting.”).
 125. Cf. KLEINHANS, supra note 124, at 9–14 (describing how IoT devices are vulnerable to 
exploitation by hackers and criminals and suggesting ways to improve the security of IoT devices). 
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of a Jeep SUV while it was being driven;126 another team identified 
flaws in Apple’s HomeKit smart-home system that would have 
permitted hackers to unlock front doors.127 The insecurity of the 
“Internet of Things Inside Our Body”128 risks deadly hacks, as 
highlighted by Vice President Dick Cheney’s decision to disable his 
heart implant’s wireless connectivity while he was in office129 and the 
FDA-mandated recall of more than four hundred thousand 
pacemakers due to a cybersecurity vulnerability.130 Other hackers have 
demonstrated that it is possible to take control of smart lights and use 
them to induce epileptic seizures.131 Further, the more electrical grids, 
transportation services, health and medical systems, and other critical 
infrastructure are incorporated into the IoT ecosystem, the more likely 
it is that disruption of those systems will threaten human safety and 
national security.132 In June 2017, for example, the NotPetya malware 
attack rendered data on compromised systems completely inaccessible, 
forcing banks to close, hospitals to cancel operations, and the radiation 
126. Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, WIRED 
(July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway 
[https://perma.cc/6YCN-AMZT].
 127. Samuel Gibbs, Apple Fixes HomeKit Bug That Allowed Remote Unlocking of Users’ 
Doors, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2017, 5:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2017/dec/08/apple-fixes-homekit-bug-remote-unlocking-doors-security-flaw-iphone-
ipad-ios-112-smart-lock-home [https://perma.cc/546E-GYMG].
 128. See Kerr, supra note 20, at 341–43 (listing the multiple medical uses and capabilities of 
radio-frequency implantable devices and warning of the corresponding need for stronger privacy 
regulations).  
129. Dana Ford, Cheney’s Defibrillator Was Modified To Prevent Hacking, CNN (Oct, 24, 
2013, 9:51 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/20/us/dick-cheney-gupta-interview/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/UBF7-GUQC]. 
130. Swati Khandelwal, FDA Recalls Nearly Half a Million Pacemakers over Hacking Fears, 
HACKER NEWS (Sept. 1, 2017), https://thehackernews.com/2017/08/pacemakers-hacking.html 
[https://perma.cc/A9KC-FVJQ].  
131. Eyal Ronen & Adi Shamir, Extended Functionality Attacks on IoT Devices: The Case of 
Smart Lights 3–5 (2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, Invited Paper, 
2016).
 132. See DeNardis & Raymond, supra note 15, at 486–87 (discussing the importance of power 
grids and transportation infrastructure to military effectiveness and Russia’s targeting of these 
systems in Ukraine as a hybrid-warfare approach). The risks associated with an over-connected 
military have often been explored in science fiction. See generally, e.g., P.W. SINGER & AUGUST 
COLE, GHOST FLEET: A NOVEL OF THE NEXT WORLD WAR (2016); BATTLESTAR GALACTICA 
(1978). 
610 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:583 
monitoring system at Ukraine’s Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant to go 
offline.133 
While hackable cars,134 home-security systems,135 pacemakers,136 
and other IoT devices certainly create problems worth addressing,137 
the current focus on the physical risks of criminal hacks distracts from 
the physical risks of corporate remote interference. As detailed in the 
next Part, corporations can do anything hackers can do—but their 
actions are legitimized by contract. 
II. BARRIERS TO CIVIL LIABILITY SUITS 
Classically, contracts allow parties to negotiate their respective 
obligations, and informed party consent justifies superseding default 
rules. Meanwhile, tort liability for rights that cannot be contracted 
away acts as a backstop to protect potentially vulnerable parties.  
In the IoT context, however, notwithstanding the escalating 
possibility of physical harm resulting from corporate remote 
interference,138 contract and tort law operate in tandem to create a 
133. Nicole Perlroth, Mark Scott & Sheera Frenkel, Cyberattack Hits Ukraine Then Spreads 
Internationally, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/ 
technology/ransomware-hackers.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5ECP-CLRF].
 134. Greenberg, supra note 126.
 135. See Edenborough v. ADT, LLC, No. 16-CV-02233-JST, 2016 WL 6160174, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 24, 2016) (discussing a class action suit alleging that a home security system used 
unsecured and unencrypted protocols, rendering it vulnerable to hacking).
 136. Khandelwal, supra note 130. 
137. As IoT devices proliferate, so do stories of hacked IoT devices causing harm, ranging 
from hackers terrorizing children through baby monitors, to wide-scale privacy violations, to 
worldwide botnet attacks that have taken down large swaths of the internet. For examples of these 
incidents in their stated order, see Richard Adhikari, Webcam Maker Takes FTC’s Heat for 
Internet-of-Things Security Failure, TECHNEWSWORLD (Sept. 5, 2013), 
https://www.technewsworld.com/story/78891.html [https://perma.cc/Y5U4-8GNB] (reporting 
how hackers posted live feeds from nearly seven hundred household cameras); Man Hacks 
Monitor, Screams at Baby Girl, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2014), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/man-hacks-monitor-screams-baby-girl-n91546 
[https://perma.cc/U8WL-VP6T]; and Lily Hay Newman, What We Know About Friday’s Massive 
East Coast Internet Outage, WIRED, (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internet-
outage-ddos-dns-dyn [https://perma.cc/YYS8-K9WA] (describing how Mirai-based “botnets” 
compromised IoT devices to launch the largest distributed denial-of-service (“DDoS”) attack to 
date, taking “down a big chunk of the Internet for most of the Eastern seaboard”). 
138. Again, this Article brackets purely economic harms, privacy harms, and cybersecurity 
harms to focus on physical harms resulting from corporate remote interference. 
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series of hurdles for would-be plaintiffs. This Part details how our 
current civil liability system inappropriately shields IoT companies.139 
This is not to say that civil liability mechanisms are incapable of 
evolving to address these situations. Common law principles are 
relatively tech neutral, allowing them to adjust to different 
circumstances. For example, the general duty of care—that an actor 
“has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct 
creates a risk of physical harm”140—applies equally to someone riding 
a bike, driving a car, or operating a tractor. However, absent a better 
understanding of how IoT-enabled harms operate and propagate, 
judges are likely to apply contracts, products liability, and negligence 
doctrinal standards narrowly, in ways that functionally minimize 
corporate liability. Further, because these devices allow for corporate 
action at a distance, technology’s ability to redirect responsibility and 
disrupt the causal chain is heightened in the IoT context. 
A. Contractual Obstacles 
Most IoT terms of service notify users of the possibility of 
corporate remote interference and condition the purchase and use of a 
device on consumer acknowledgment and agreement to those terms.141 
Standing alone, contractual notice renders this form of electronic self-
help lawful,142 even in states that otherwise prohibit it.143 When paired 
139. Cf. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 143–44 (discussing how private firms 
use contracts of adhesion, such as shrink-wrap contracts and click-wrap contracts, to sidestep 
consumer protection laws and tort law accountability mechanisms in the intellectual property 
context).
 140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 7(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
141. See Whittaker, supra note 100 (identifying one smart speaker company that refused to 
provide necessary software updates to users who did not accept modifications to privacy terms).
 142. See, e.g., In re VTech Data Breach Litig., No. 15-CV-10889, 15-CV-10891, 15-CV-11620, 
15-CV-11885, 2018 WL 1863953, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2018) (dismissing a breach of contract 
claim for discontinued services, as the company’s Privacy Policy allowed defendants to terminate 
online services at any point). 
143. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”) restricts “electronic 
self-help,” the repossession of software. Only Virginia and Maryland have adopted the UCITA, 
but both states permit contracting parties to consent to such actions. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 22-816 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-508.16 (2017); see also Brian D. McDonald, The 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16 BERK. TECH. L.J. 461, 474 (2001) 
(describing the nearly full and qualified adoptions of the UCITA by Virginia and Maryland, 
respectively). Connecticut also restricts electronic self-help, with an expansive definition that 
includes using electronic means to locate collateral, but it also permits contracting parties to agree 
that it can be employed. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-609 (2016) (stating that repossession is only 
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with exculpatory clauses, notice can restrict or even eliminate 
corporate liability; when paired with disclaimers or express warranties, 
it can bar breach of warranty claims; standing alone, it can preclude 
common law tort suits.144 
1. Exculpatory and Other Liability-Limiting Clauses. 
Unsurprisingly, IoT-device terms of service agreements attempt to 
minimize industry liability for the harms resulting from their remote 
interference145 through liability disclaimers or caps on the costs of 
breaches.146 Specific- and exclusive-remedy clauses allow companies to 
predetermine customer rights.147 For example, Nest’s terms of service 
note that, should someone not want the company’s over-the-air 
updates, “[their] remedy is to stop using [the Services and] the 
Product[s].”148 Meanwhile, monetary ceilings on direct damages149 and 
allowed “if the debtor separately agrees to a term of the security agreement authorizing electronic 
self-help that requires notice of exercise”). 
144. Granted, these statements are generalizations, as every state has different standards for 
evaluating these varied claims. 
145. As others have detailed, the “law of the firm” often favors the company at the expense 
of the consumer. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 147–48; see Melissa T. 
Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to 
Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4 (2012) (observing that “[s]tandard forms are 
ubiquitous, but hardly innocuous” and describing common terms and waivers that privilege 
industry).
 146. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-316(4), 2-718, 2-719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951) 
(allowing contract modifications that limit damages and remedies).
 147. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (allowing parties to agree to an exclusive remedy). See, e.g., 
TESLA, MODEL S MODEL X MODEL 3 NEW VEHICLE LIMITED WARRANTY (2017–2018) 
[hereinafter Tesla Warranty], 
https://www.tesla.com/sites/default/files/downloads/Model_S_X_Warranty_NA_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A77E-YEYJ] (“The performance of necessary repairs and parts replacement by 
Tesla is the exclusive remedy under this New Vehicle Limited Warranty or any implied 
warranties.”); see also Philips Hue Terms, supra note 77 (“If you do not want such updates, your 
sole remedy is to cease using the Services altogether.”).
 148. Nest License Agreement, supra note 78.
 149. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719 (allowing limitation of damages). For example, Tesla’s warranty states 
that it “shall not be liable for any direct damages in an amount that exceeds the fair market value 
of the vehicle at the time of the claim.” Tesla Warranty, supra note 147, at 8. Alexa’s terms of use 
state that “in no event will our licensors’ or our service providers’ aggregate liability with respect 
to any claim arising from or relating to this Agreement or your use of Alexa exceed fifty dollars 
($50).” Alexa Terms, supra note 77. Nest limits liability to no more than two times the amount 
paid by the consumer, Nest License Agreement, supra note 78; and Philips Hue limits liability to 
the amount of fees paid in connection to the service, Philips Hue Terms, supra note 77. 
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exclusions of special, incidental, or consequential damages150 also limit 
corporate liability.151 
These terms purportedly reflect the informed agreement of the 
contracting parties; in reality, most of these “agreements” are contracts 
of adhesion where unsophisticated consumers have limited 
information about the risks of remote interference and no opportunity 
to bargain, effectively allowing companies to unilaterally price harms. 
Given that many IoT devices are used by individuals who are not in 
privity of contract with the IoT company, IoT companies are 
reasonably trying to “find ways to ‘bake’ or incorporate ‘the equivalent 
of a click-wrap’ agreement into the functionality of their device,” to 
limit corporate liability with regard to all device users.152 Ultimately, 
these contracts “launder injustice”153 insofar as they legitimize 
otherwise unfair allocations of liability. 
Granted, the ability to contractually limit liability is not 
unbounded.154 While we are far from the days when courts would strike 
down any contractual limitation on liability for negligence,155 most 
states circumscribe a limit’s application. Exculpatory clauses that limit 
150. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-715 (describing and defining incidental and consequential damages). For 
example, “Tesla . . . disclaims any and all indirect, incidental, special and consequential damages 
arising out of or relating to your vehicle.” Tesla Warranty, supra note 147, at 7. Similarly, Nest 
excludes any “consequential, exemplary, special or incidental damages.” Nest License Agreement, 
supra note 78.
 151. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 149 (discussing how exculpatory clauses 
purport to relieve firms of liability from negligence damages and litigation remedies generally). 
152. E.g., Mauricio Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues for 
Businesses, 43 NORTHERN KY. L. REV. 29, 61 (2016); e.g. id. (“If the product lacks a user interface 
where the end-user can check a box or otherwise agree to terms, the product should require the 
user’s agreement through a website or mobile application prior to enabling functionality.”).
 153. Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 272, 291 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 
2014) (“[C]ontract possesses the power to launder injustice, creating legitimate entitlements 
between parties where previously there were none and, moreover, inducing the parties to 
recognize these entitlements.”).
 154. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(providing the contexts under which terms exempting parties from liability are unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy, including: (1) when the harm is caused intentionally or recklessly; (2) 
when the harm is caused negligently by (a) an employer to his employee, (b) by one owing a duty 
of public service, or (c) when the harm is done to someone of a protected class; and (3) when 
physical harm to a consumer would result from use of a product, unless that term is fairly 
bargained for and consistent with the policy underlying that liability).
 155. See The Steamer Syracuse, 79 U.S. 167, 171 (1870) (“It is unnecessary to consider the 
evidence relating to the alleged contract of towage, because, [even] if . . . the canal-boat was being 
towed at her own risk, nevertheless, the steamer is liable, if, through the negligence of those in 
charge of her, the canal-boat has suffered loss.”). 
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future liability for physical injury are invalid in three states.156 Other 
states invalidate exculpatory clauses that are overly broad,157 are 
presented in complex or unclear language,158 attempt to waive liability 
for intentional acts159 or gross negligence,160 or are otherwise 
unconscionable161 or contrary to public policy.162 Further, under the 
U.C.C., clauses limiting liability for bodily harms caused by consumer 
156. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-702 (2017); Hiett v. 
Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 897 (Va. 1992). 
157. See, e.g., Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 691 N.W.2d 334, 343 (Wis. 2005) 
(considering multiple factors and ultimately holding that the exculpatory waiver in a swimming 
facility agreement was too broad and did not provide notice or an opportunity to bargain).
 158. See Swartzentruber v. Wee-K Corp., 690 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) 
(“[E]xculpatory provisions in contracts are to be strictly construed so as not to relieve one from 
liability for his own negligence unless it is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.” (quotations 
omitted) (quoting Glaspell v. Ohio Edison Co., 505 N.E.2d 264, 265–67 (Ohio 1987))). 
159. See, e.g., Moore v. Waller, 930 A.2d 176, 179 (D.C. 2007) (“[C]ourts have not generally 
enforced exculpatory clauses to the extent that they limited a party’s liability for gross negligence, 
recklessness or intentional torts.” (quoting Carleton v. Winter, 901 A.2d 174, 181 (D.C. 2006))); 
Mankap Enters., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 427 So.2d 332, 333–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983) (“The law is settled that a party cannot contract against liability for his own fraud in order 
to exempt him from liability for an intentional tort, and any such exculpatory clauses are void as 
against public policy.” (citations omitted)). 
160. See, e.g., Smallwood v. NCSOFT Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1227 (D. Haw. 2010) 
(describing this as “the majority rule”); Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 468 (Cal. 
1963) (delineating the Tunkl factors for when an exculpatory clause is invalid as contrary to public 
policy). This norm is sometimes enacted in state statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 
2013) (“All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from 
responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation 
of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”).  
161. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(defining the scope of unconscionability and holding that, where the element of unconscionability 
is present at the time a contract is made, the contract may be unenforceable); Day v. CTA, Inc., 
324 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Mont. 2014) (“A contract is unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion and 
if the contractual terms unreasonably favor the drafter.”).
 162. See, e.g., Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 384–85 (N.Y. 1983) 
(“[A]n exculpatory agreement, no matter how flat and unqualified its terms, will not exonerate a 
party from liability under all circumstances. Under announced public policy, it will not apply to 
exemption of willful or grossly negligent acts.”); Dimick v. Hopkinson, 422 P.3d 512, 517 (Wyo. 
2018) (“Wyoming courts enforce exculpatory clauses releasing parties from liability for injury or 
damages resulting from negligence if the clause is not contrary to public policy.” (quoting 
Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wyo. 1986))). California courts consider six factors to 
identify when an exculpatory clause should be held invalid as contrary to public policy. Tunkl v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92 (Cal. 1963). 
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goods are prima facie unconscionable,163 and—when litigated—courts 
rarely uphold such clauses.164 
Given the variability of these rules and many consumers’ lack of 
access to justice, however, companies often purport to waive all claims 
to the extent legally possible—and then some.165 For instance, Tesla’s 
warranty states that its “limitations and exclusions shall apply whether 
your claim is in contract, tort (including negligence and gross 
negligence), breach of warranty or condition, misrepresentation 
(whether negligent or otherwise) or otherwise at law or in equity.”166 
Some IoT contracts attempt to waive liability even for “reasonably 
foreseeable” harm;167 others induce reliance on a risk-avoidance 
service and then claim to waive liability when corporate remote 
interference results in a failure to provide that service.168 Although an 
exculpatory clause’s scope will be limited in situations where a 
company’s remote interference constitutes an intentional act or gross 
negligence, in the forty-seven states that do not proactively invalidate 
exculpatory clauses, carefully crafted contractual terms can minimize 
corporate liability for injuries resulting from ordinary negligence.169 
For example, although retaliatory bricking of a garage door based on a 
bad Amazon review would likely be considered an intentional act that 
163. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951). This is a rebuttable 
presumption. See Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 852–53 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that the exculpatory provision at issue was not unconscionable because of the buyer’s familiarity 
with the document and awareness of the terms, and thus the clause was valid and enforceable); 
Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 1973) (noting that, in this case, the 
defendant failed to rebut the presumption of unconscionability). 
164. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 286 n.12 (Alaska 1976) (noting that 
courts “rarely uphold” waivers of liability for personal injuries). 
165. Memo from Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, S.C. on Exculpatory Agreements and 
Liability Waivers in All 50 States (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/EXCULPATORY-AGREEMENTS-AND-LIABILITY-WAIVERS-
CHART-00214377x9EBBF.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8S5-PLEY]. 
166. Tesla Warranty, supra note 147, at 7–8.
 167. See, e.g., id. (stating that its warranty limitations and exclusions apply “even if Tesla is 
advised of the possibility of such damages or such damages are reasonably foreseeable”). 
168. Uconnect—a company that makes and services software for Fiat Chrysler—notes in its 
terms of service that it has the right to make software updates without notice and that, during 
updates, “you may be unable to use the Uconnect Services or place a call to 9-1-1 until the 
software update is complete.” Uconnect Terms, supra note 77, ¶¶ 9.3, 17; see also id. ¶ 25 (“Sprint 
reserves the right to modify the Uconnect Services (including remote updates on the Device) . . . 
at any time without notice or liability to you in its sole discretion. . . . Sprint may deactivate the 
Uconnect Services at any time without notice or liability to you.”). 
169. Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, supra note 165, at 6–7 (detailing standards for different 
states). 
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invalidates the contractual exculpatory clause, the automated bricking 
of that same door after nonpayment may retain the clause’s 
protection.170 
Nor will modern courts likely find exculpatory clauses void as 
unconscionable in cases involving IoT devices marketed for individual 
or household use. As has been frequently bemoaned, “the doctrine [of 
unconscionability] offers little hope in the consumer goods realm.”171 
While the U.C.C. creates a strong presumption of unconscionability for 
IoT devices that cause bodily harm,172 it does not create a similar one 
for property damage;173 nor will it easily be applied when IoT devices 
cause bodily harm indirectly.174 Further, courts are generally unwilling 
to find commercial contracts procedurally unconscionable,175 
particularly—as will be the case for most IoT items—where the 
consumer has options regarding which product to buy176 or where the 
contract circumscribes corporate liability for a recreational or frivolous 
activity.177 And even though IoT-device terms of service are often 
“take-it-or-leave-it” contracts, this is insufficient to establish 
170. Gallagher, supra note 104. 
171. Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1311, 1364 (2015); see also Lonegrass, supra note 145, at 3 (observing that the 
unconscionability doctrine “has been an ineffectual tool for consumer protection”). 
172. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951). 
173. Id.; see, e.g., Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 83 N.J. 320, 331– 
32 (1979) (distinguishing between personal injury loss and property loss). 
174. See infra Part II.D. 
175. In addition to the libertarian argument in favor of parties being able to bind themselves 
“as they see fit,” Hall v. Sinclair Refining Co., 242 N.C. 707, 709 (1955), courts justify upholding 
exculpatory clauses in the business context on the ground that it promotes efficiency. As noted 
by one court, “[Exculpatory] clauses enable businesses to engage in commerce without incurring 
excessive financial risks that might otherwise make doing business prohibitively expensive.” 
Locke v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 669, 676 (N.D. Ill. 2014); see also Gladden v. 
Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 144–45 (“Limitation of liability and exculpation clauses are . . . 
commercially reasonable in at least some cases, since they permit the provider to offer the service 
at a lower price, in turn making the service available to people who otherwise would be unable to 
afford it.”); Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally 
Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 438 (2008) (“[C]ourts are reluctant to apply the doctrine of 
unconscionability in the commercial context.”).
 176. Scott J. Burnham, Are You Free to Contract Away Your Right to Bring a Negligence 
Claim?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 383 (2014). However, the existence of a market for IoT 
devices should not be a relevant factor in an unconscionability analysis—as discussed below, the 
market is unlikely to provide the information consumers would need to make an informed 
selection among products. See infra Part II.E. 
177. Burnham, supra note 176, at 383. 
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procedural unconscionability.178 Meanwhile, for a provision to be 
found substantively unconscionable, the terms must be “shocking to 
the conscience,” “monstrously harsh,” or “exceedingly calloused”179— 
and exculpatory clauses rarely meet this high bar.180 In addition to these 
familiar limits, remote interference introduces an additional snarl: 
because the unconscionability doctrine applies to the sale of goods, 
courts may not apply it to sales of IoT devices that bundle a good with 
one or more services, especially where the injury results from the 
cessation of a service.181 
While courts will sometimes void contractual provisions as 
contrary to public policy, they are often unwilling to do so on the 
grounds that efficiency and economic growth require predictability and 
stability in contract and property regimes.182 For a public policy 
argument to succeed in the IoT context, the court must confront the 
larger question of whether these market values outweigh the aims 
achieved by requiring companies to shoulder liability for the physical 
harms caused by their remote interference.183 But this determination 
requires a thorough understanding of how corporate remote 
178. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 96–97 (N.J. 
2006) (“The determination that a contract is one of adhesion, however, is the beginning, not the 
end, of the inquiry into whether a contract . . . should be deemed unenforceable . . . . A sharpened 
inquiry concerning unconscionability is necessary when a contract of adhesion is involved.” 
(citations omitted)), superseded in part by statute in Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 
2011); see also Burnham, supra note 176, at 381 (“Most of the time, the exculpatory clause is going 
to be found in a contract of adhesion. But as the courts say ad nauseam, that is not enough to 
establish unconscionability, even procedural unconscionability.”); Joshua N. Cohen, Sound the 
Alarm: Limitations of Liability in Alarm Service Contracts, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 813, 818 (2016) 
(“Often, exculpatory clauses are found in standard-form contracts that are offered on a ‘take it 
or leave it’ basis, known as contracts of adhesion. However, the mere fact that an exculpatory 
clause appears in an adhesion contract is not enough to establish procedural unconscionability.” 
(citations omitted)).
 179. See, e.g., Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 2013). 
180. See, e.g., Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So.3d 256, 260 (Fla. 2015) (explaining 
that while “[p]ublic policy disfavors exculpatory contracts because they relieve one party of the 
obligation to use due care and shift the risk of injury to the party who is probably least equipped 
to take the necessary precautions to avoid injury and bear the risk of loss,” the preference of 
courts is to respect the freedom to contract and honor contractual terms whenever possible; 
accordingly, “unambiguous exculpatory contracts are enforceable unless they contravene public 
policy” (citations omitted)); Lonegrass, supra note 145, at 4 (noting that this aspect of the doctrine 
“discourages decision makers from inquiring whether boilerplate [contract] terms produce 
unacceptably harsh results”).
 181. Elvy, supra note 14, at 118. 
182. Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, supra note 165, at 2. 
183. This Article proposes various public policy arguments for limiting the scope of corporate 
exculpatory clauses below. See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
618 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:583 
interference enables and increases consumer harm, both at the 
individual and aggregate levels.184 
2. Warranty Claims. When purchased items do not operate as 
expected, consumers can bring breach of warranty claims grounded in 
express or implied warranties. Assuming an IoT company does not 
explicitly state that it will not remotely alter or deactivate the IoT 
device—indeed, most terms of service have statements to the opposite, 
expressly reserving the right to engage in such activities185—a 
consumer’s only possible warranty claim for harms arising from remote 
interference would be a violation of an implied warranty of 
merchantability.186 This generally means that the goods are “fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,” are of a fair quality, 
and “conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the 
container or label.”187 But breach of warranty claims for consumer 
harms resulting from remote interference will likely fail, either because 
the IoT device will be deemed incidental to the provision of a service, 
such that U.C.C. implied warranties will not attach,188 or because they 
are barred by contractual provisions.189 
Courts rarely find that devices that exist primarily to provide a 
service have an implied warranty of merchantability. Where a product 
bundles a good with a service, as is often the case for IoT devices, courts 
employ the predominance test to evaluate whether an implied 
warranty attaches; if the product’s primary purpose “is the rendition of 
service, with goods incidentally involved,” courts will generally find 
that there is no implied warranty of merchantability.190 An Amazon 
184. For a discussion of how intervening actors introduce seeming breaks in the causal chain, 
see infra Part II.D. 
185. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
186. There is also an implied warranty of fitness, which applies when a seller is assisting a 
buyer with a purchase. U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951). Absent 
significant revision, however, this warranty will not apply to postsale situations where remote 
interference results in harm, as it only governs the seller’s actions at time of sale. 
187. U.C.C. § 2-314.
 188. Elvy, supra note 14, at 114–17. While courts have found two common law implied 
warranties in service contracts—namely, an implied warranty of good workmanship and of 
habitability—these warranties will generally not be relevant for most IoT devices purchased for 
individual or household use.
 189. Id. at 119.
 190. See, e.g., Ogden Martin Sys. Indianapolis v. Whiting Corp., 179 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 
1999); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 
983 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing implied warranty claims regarding Sony’s Playstation consoles 
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Echo, which “connects to Alexa to play music, make calls, set music 
alarms and timers, ask questions, [and] control smart home devices” 
might fail this test.191 
IoT devices that are primarily goods, like a “smart” scale, will have 
an implied warranty of merchantability. But savvy companies can 
include various provisions in their terms of service contracts to 
preclude breach of warranty claims for harms resulting from remote 
interference. This implied warranty only represents a promise about 
the condition of the product at the time it is sold; it does not guarantee 
that a product will last or operate consistently for any specific length of 
time, and sellers can contractually modify the warranty’s time period.192 
Furthermore, implied warranties do not address problems arising from 
failure to follow directions or improper maintenance; an IoT company 
could certainly argue that contractually prohibited tinkering or failure 
to install an update would constitute a failure to follow directions or 
engage in proper maintenance, voiding any express or implied 
warranty.193 Finally, IoT companies can include disclaimers and express 
warranties that circumscribe implied consumer rights. Courts tend to 
uphold implied warranty disclaimers194 and find that express warranties 
displace implied ones.195 
3. Trespass to Chattels and Conversion. Common law courts have 
developed various torts to protect an individual’s right to be free from 
others’ interference with lawfully possessed property. Here again, 
however, the combination of contractual provisions and the tethered 
on the grounds that network services predominated and that “network services are not subject to 
the UCC” because they do not satisfy the definition of “goods”).
 191. Echo (2nd Generation) – Smart Speakers with Alexa and Dolby Processing, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/all-new-amazon-echo-speaker-with-wifi-alexa-dark-
charcoal/dp/B06X 
CM9LJ4 [https://perma.cc/9NFN-M8HS]. 
192. Some states provide that implied warranties are in effect for a specific period of time 
after the sale of the item, but these provisions usually allow sellers to modify that length of time 
with superseding explicit warranties valid for shorter periods. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1791.1(c) (2018). 
193. See, e.g., Tesla Warranty, supra note 147, at 7 (stating that warranties will be voided if the 
owner “do[es] not follow the specific instructions and recommendations,” including “[i]nstalling 
the vehicle’s software updates after notification that there is an update available”). 
194. Arlie R. Nogay, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the UCC: Warranty 
Disclaimers, the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement 
in the Nonprivity Context, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 873, 898 (1986); Scott, supra note 175, at 438. 
195. U.C.C. § 2-317(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951) (“Express warranties 
displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose.”). 
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nature of IoT devices shield IoT companies from claims for harms 
arising from their remote interference. 
If a consumer owns a device, the personal property torts of 
conversion and trespass to chattels would seem to address remote 
interference.196 Conversion is the “intentional exercise of dominion or 
control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of 
another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the 
other the full value of the chattel.”197 Acts that fall short of conversion 
might qualify as trespass to chattels, the act of “intentionally (a) 
dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with 
a chattel in the possession of another.”198 Liability attaches if the 
trespasser “dispossesses the other of the chattel,” “the chattel is 
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value,” “the possessor is 
deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time,” or “bodily 
harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or 
thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.”199 
Notwithstanding the Restatement’s requirement that there must be 
“physical contact” with the property,200 a number of courts have 
adopted trespass to chattels as a cause of action against digital 
activities, such as email spam and information-gathering software— 
also known as “crawlers” or “spiders.”201 
But contractual notice of remote interference will preclude these 
common law tort claims. Both trespass to chattels and conversion 
require proof that the defendant acted without the owner’s consent.202 
196. However, these items are increasingly licensed, rather than owned, by consumers, which 
creates an additional barrier to ownership-based tort claims. See, e.g., FAIRFIELD, supra note 21; 
PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 21; Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes, supra note 13.
 197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
 198. Id. § 217. 
199. Id. § 218. 
200. Id. § 217 cmt. (e). 
201. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(granting injunctive relief on the ground that spiders likely engaged in trespass to chattels); 
CompuServ, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (stating that 
the inundation of spam email was actionable trespass to chattels); see also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 
71 P.3d 296, 306–08 (Cal. 2003) (limiting recovery in similar cases to situations where the plaintiff 
could demonstrate either actual interference with the physical functionality of the computer 
system or the likelihood that such interference would occur). 
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 256; W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT 
E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (5th ed. 
1984). Modifying these common law torts to address remote interference would require more 
than extending an imperfect analogy; rather, it would require altering the consent standard, a 
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If the terms of service provide notice of the possibility of remote 
interference, defendants will argue that the consumer explicitly 
consented to such actions—and these arguments have proven largely 
successful in other contexts.203 
Further, both torts also require a showing that the plaintiff owns 
or has the right to possess the personal property at issue.204 However, 
at least in cases of remote interference permitted by contract, and 
particularly when employed as a response to a contractual breach, it is 
unclear whether the plaintiff has an exclusive right to the disputed 
property. 
Other intentional common law torts also fail. Trespass to the 
person claims—such as battery and false imprisonment—require that 
the defendant intended an action, be it contact or confinement. But it 
is unlikely that corporate actors would act with the requisite intent. 
Even where a physical harm is a foreseeable result of corporate 
interference, IoT companies are unlikely to act with sufficient purpose 
or have substantial knowledge that a specific contact would ensue to 
support a battery claim, especially as statistical knowledge is 
insufficient to demonstrate intent.205 Similarly, IoT companies are 
unlikely to act with the intent to confine someone, as required for a 
false imprisonment claim.206 Meanwhile, although issues of trespass to 
land—the tort of wrongfully interfering with another’s real property 
rights—often arise in the context of physical repossession, companies 
fundamental element of these claims. For example, all cases applying trespass to chattel reasoning 
to digital activities emphasize the importance of the plaintiff’s lack of consent.
 203. See, e.g., Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1053–54, 1062–63 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(“Courts in this district have interpreted ‘without permission’ to mean ‘in a manner that 
circumvents technical or code based barriers in place to restrict or bar a user’s access.’” (quoting 
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2012))). 
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217, 222(A).
 205. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 637 (4th ed. 2016) (“A plaintiff suing for battery does not 
establish the defendant’s intent merely by proving that the defendant appreciated or should have 
appreciated that his actions posed a risk of harmful or offensive contact . . . . Rather, the plaintiff 
must establish that the defendant actually knew that his actions would cause such contact.”); id. 
at 638 (“[I]t is very implausible to infer a purpose to cause a harmful touching from mere statistical 
knowledge.”).
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, 21, 35; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 
205, at 683 (“Accidental confinements, such as confinements arising out of misunderstandings, 
are ordinarily not actionable as false imprisonments.”). 
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can engage in remote interference without coming onto another’s 
land.207 
Given these various contractual hurdles, would-be claimants will 
need to look to products liability and negligence, which classically have 
provided redress for physical harms regardless of contractual 
agreements. However, as described in the following two sections, rote 
applications of products liability and negligence standards may not 
sufficiently incentivize consumer safety. 
B. Products Liability Problems 
Modern products liability law considers how best to allocate 
liability for harms arising from consumer use of a product, based on 
what the seller can, does, or should know about the product being sold 
and the foreseeable uses, misuses, and extraneous harms that might 
arise.208 Corporations cannot contract out of products liability claims, 
and these claims create a route of recourse for those not in privity with 
a company to bring suit, which will often be relevant in the IoT context. 
But while it is natural to look to products liability law to remedy harms 
caused by corporate remote interference, none of the three main 
products liability claims—that there is a manufacturing defect, design 
defect, or informational defect—map well onto these situations. 
Certainly, existing products liability law can be applied to IoT 
devices.209 As with any other product, “smart” devices can be poorly 
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329. Similarly, remote interference will not 
usually implicate nuisance, the tort of unreasonable interference with a person’s right to the use 
and enjoyment of their land. Id. § 822. That being said, a creative court might draw on trespass 
and nuisance concepts to create a new common law tort to address harms arising from remote 
interference. Cf. Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1165 (2018) 
(proposing “algorithmic nuisance,” a new claim grounded on the idea that platforms should not 
be able to “externalize the costs of their operations onto strangers”).
 208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998); 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 202, § 98. 
209. IoT devices do introduce some confusion into products liability law. While software has 
traditionally not been considered a product, an IoT device’s integration of software with a 
physical object raises the issue of whether it is a component part subject to strict liability for 
defects. See, e.g., Paez & La Marca, supra note 152, at 58–60; Scott, supra note 175. Also, it is 
unclear whether poor cybersecurity practices constitute a design defect or breach of implied 
warranty. See Butler, supra note 13 (arguing that companies could be held liable for harms caused 
by hacked IoT devices); Elvy, supra note 14, at 85 (“The failure of an IOT manufacturer to secure 
an IoT device or the data generated by an owner’s use of an IOT device should serve as the basis 
for breach of implied warranty claims under Article 2 [of the U.C.C.].”); Paez & La Marca, supra 
note 152, at 56; see also Baker v. ADT Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180138, at *27–36 (C.D. Ill. 
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designed, improperly manufactured, or inadequately labeled.210 When 
harm is caused by a design defect, manufacturing defect, or insufficient 
warning, it can be addressed under the appropriate standard.211 
Further, sellers’ growing information about, access to, and control over 
their products could significantly expand their obligations, as sellers’ 
increased knowledge could increase their liability for design or 
informational defects,212 postsale failures to warn,213 and even postsale 
failures to update.214 
But none of these claims squarely address the possibility of a 
company interfering with how a device functions, either as a 
dispassionate policy or as a malicious act. This is hardly a 
manufacturing defect;215 the possibility of remote interference is a 
feature, not a bug, of IoT devices. And informational-defect or failure-
to-warn claims will likely fail, assuming that the terms of service 
notified the purchaser about the possibility of remote interference and 
its potential consequences.216 
If anything, remote interference that results in harm might be 
considered a design defect. Design defects exist when a product is 
inherently dangerous or useless, because (1) it fails to meet consumer 
expectations regarding the product’s safety, (2) it fails a risk-utility test, 
or (3) the risks associated with its use could have been corrected with 
a reasonable alternative design. 
2015) (dismissing a claim of strict products liability regarding a hacked security system on the 
ground that it was precluded by the economic-loss doctrine).
 210. For example, in In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010), 
plaintiffs alleged classic products liability claims: first, that their cars had a software defect that 
caused them to accelerate even while the driver was applying the brakes; and, second, that the 
company had failed to warn purchasers of the risk of unintended acceleration. Id. at 1192. 
211. Manufacturing-defect cases tend to apply a strict liability standard; design- and warning-
defect cases usually apply some variant of a negligence analysis. See Gifford, supra note 32, at 
119–21. 
212. Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1802.
 213. Id. at 1802–04 (discussing how rationales for limiting a postsale duty to warn are 
undermined by the increasing amount of information available to sellers about postsale product 
use).
 214. Id. at 1805–08. 
215. Manufacturing defects happen in the manufacturing process, often due to poor-quality 
materials or workmanship. See generally LEWIS BASS & THOMAS PARKER REDICK, PRODUCT 
LIABILITY: DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING DEFECTS § 4:8 (2d ed. Sept. 2018). 
216. Informational defects and postsale failures to warn exist when a product has a 
nonobvious risk that could be lessened by an adequate warning. Most IoT contracts include notice 
of the possibility of remote interference. Indeed, in the context of licensed software, the law 
already “requires written notice of the possibility of electronic self-help.” Cohen, supra note 12, 
at 1112. 
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For claims to succeed under the consumer-expectations test, a jury 
must find that the product did not function as safely as a reasonable 
consumer might expect.217 Automobiles, coffee makers, and many 
other IoT devices do not obviously depend on the remote provision of 
services, and so a jury today might decide that a reasonable consumer 
could find certain kinds of remote interference unreasonably 
dangerous. However, this claim’s strength depends in part on how the 
social norms and relevant law evolve. Even today, contractual notice 
of remote interference will undermine claims that the consumer did not 
know it was a possibility. In the longer term, it may become more 
commonplace for companies to affect items in our homes, which in turn 
may make the possibility of harmful remote interference less and less 
surprising—or more and more “expected.” 
The risk-utility test weighs a product’s risk of causing harm against 
its expected usefulness. While this sounds objective and useful in the 
abstract, it is unpredictable in application when the value and damage 
potential of an item are both low or both high. For example, certain 
IoT devices, like smart fidget spinners, are neither useful nor 
dangerous. What would the test proscribe? Alternatively, connected 
automobiles, smart-home hubs, and medical devices can increase 
convenience or even be life-saving, but they also have a greater damage 
potential. Is the risk of harm worth the item’s utility? Unsurprisingly, 
courts have tended to apply the test arbitrarily,218 and would likely 
continue to do so when evaluating harms caused by corporate remote 
interference. 
In an attempt to increase predictability, the Restatement (Third) 
endorsed the reasonable-alternative-design test.219 To succeed, 
plaintiffs need to identify a design flaw and prove that a reasonable 
alternative design exists that would have reduced or eliminated the 
resulting harm, without increasing other kinds of harm.220 Whether an 
alternative design is reasonable requires an assessment of a host of 
217. This test, originally a misinterpretation of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
and rejected in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, has stubbornly persisted. 
Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1705–06 (2003). 
218. Scott Wilkov & Elisa Arko, No Alternative Design: An Often-Overlooked Defense to 
Product Liability Claims, 2017 FOR THE DEFENSE 47, 48, 
https://www.tuckerellis.com/webfiles/files/DRI%20For%20The%20Defense_Wilcov%20and% 
20Arko_April%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A3P-KDT9]. 
219. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. b. (“[T]he alternative to the 
product design must increase the overall safety of the product.”). 
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factors, including its economic feasibility, its technological feasibility, 
and its effect on the product’s longevity, maintenance, repair, and 
aesthetic.221 Further, a plaintiff must show that the alternative design is 
an actual alternative, rather than an entirely different product, as 
“[g]enerally, courts are unwilling to hold manufacturers liable for a 
defective design when the only means of making the product safer is to 
alter the defining characteristic of the product.”222 For example, 
plaintiffs arguing that ionization smoke alarms did not provide 
sufficient warnings compared with smoke alarms that incorporated 
both ionization and photoelectric technology lost their suit; the court 
held that the plaintiffs’ proposal was essentially a design for a different 
product.223 Nor will a product be considered defective just because it 
was not designed as safely as possible if the proposed alternative design 
requires changing a fundamental characteristic.224 
These requirements create multiple roadblocks for holding 
companies liable for harms resulting from remote interference. An IoT 
company could argue that proposed alternative designs would increase 
other kinds of harm, would be prohibitively expensive, would be 
technologically infeasible, or would essentially create a different 
product.225 Further, the alternative-design standard is poorly suited to 
solutions which require the creation of new policies and software, as 
courts evaluate the design’s appropriateness at the time of sale. For 
example, in response to the seemingly obvious claim that starter-
interrupt devices should not be able to deactivate cars idling at active 
intersections, a starter-interrupt device designer might reasonably 
argue that equipping them with an ability to avoid such situations (1) 
would be economically infeasible, (2) would create a different product, 
and (3) would require the creation of new software to monitor the 
speed of the car at the time the device is engaged. Certainly, a court 
might still find in the plaintiff’s favor—but it could just as easily identify 
precedent justifying a finding for the defendant. 
Finally, all three of the design-defect tests face a similar problem: 
they assume a static product design, not something that can be 
unilaterally altered postsale. Although courts have recognized postsale 
221. Id. § 2 cmt. f. 
222. Wilkov & Arko, supra note 218, at 50–52 (discussing common challenges to design defect 
claims). 
223. Hosford v. BRK Brands, Inc., 223 So. 3d 199, 206 (Ala. 2016).
 224. Id. at 204.
 225. Wilkov & Arko, supra note 218, at 50. 
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duties, they have been largely limited to a narrow duty to warn.226 
However, the Restatement does suggest that sellers and distributers 
may be liable for an unreasonable failure to provide appropriate 
postsale warnings when they learn of a new potential risk.227 
Accordingly, a plaintiff might argue that a company that remotely 
alters or curtails a device’s capabilities in ways that foreseeably 
increase the likelihood of harm has a renewed duty to issue an updated 
warning. 
This is, however, a rather low bar. Companies will find it easy to 
issue broad updated warnings, and even require users to acknowledge 
them to receive a needed system update, without practical effect or a 
significant net reduction in harm. As has been repeatedly 
demonstrated in the privacy-harms context, contractual provisions 
warning only of potential acts rarely provide effective notice.228 Merely 
conditioning continued use of an item on acknowledgment of a clause 
stating that the company might remotely deactivate the device for any 
reason—including but not limited to nonpayment of subscription fees, 
refusal to install required updates in a timely manner, public 
disparagement of the product, and so on—would hardly minimize 
harms resulting from remote interference. Absent more stringent 
requirements,229 such postsale warnings will effectively operate as a 
corporate liability shield. 
226. But see In re Old Carco, No. 09–50002, 2017 WL 1628888, *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 
2017) (noting that a postsale software update that addressed one problem (a tendency of some 
Jeeps to shift into neutral without driver input) but created another (it disabled certain four-wheel 
drive capabilities) might create an independent claim, but ultimately finding this question beyond 
the scope of the case); Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34 (arguing for increased 
postsale duties for IoT companies). 
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). While 
there was no uniform or consistent duty to warn at the time the Restatement (Third) was adopted, 
more than thirty states have since adopted various versions of this duty. See Tom Stilwell, 
Warning: You May Possess Continuing Duties After the Sale of Your Product! (An Evaluation of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability’s Treatment of Post-Sale Duties), 26 REV. 
LITIG. 1035, 1037 (2007). 
228. See, e.g., Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Consumer Privacy in a Behavioral 
World, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1471, 1506 (2018); Kirsten Martin, Do Privacy Notices Matter? 
Comparing the Impact of Violating Formal Privacy Notices and Informal Privacy Norms on 
Consumer Trust Online, 45 J. LEG. STUD. 191, 195 (2016); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. 
Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEG. STUD. 69, 72 (2016). 
229. See infra Part III.B.2 (detailing potential expansions of the warning requirement). 
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C. Negligence Hurdles: Unclear Duties, Unclear Breaches 
Would-be plaintiffs can also bring negligence claims, 
notwithstanding contractual terms purporting to limit them.230 To 
succeed, the plaintiff would need to show that the IoT company 
breached a duty of care—that it had an obligation to do or not to do 
something, and it did not satisfy this obligation.231 Depending on the 
case-specific facts and the analogies used, this standard may be difficult 
to meet in cases involving corporate remote interference. 
The existence of a duty and its scope will necessarily depend on 
the scenario. The easiest case for finding a duty will be where an IoT 
device purports to reduce or mitigate the possibility of a physical harm, 
such as an IoT fire alarm or security system, and the device fails to 
render that service because of some act of remote interference.232 It is 
less clear what duty an IoT company owes a consumer who breaches a 
contract—say, by attempting to jailbreak a device or failing to make a 
required payment.233 It is also unclear what duty IoT companies owe 
consumers to ensure that their remote interference does not enable 
intervening sources of harms.234 
In the absence of established duties, advocates and courts will cast 
about for helpful analogies, and the selection of one over another will 
have dramatic legal consequences.235 Given their ability to legally 
230. See, e.g., Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 874 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“Whether or not the plaintiff is in a contractual relationship with the manufacturer, the plaintiff 
can sue the manufacturer in tort only for damages resulting from physical injury to persons or to 
property other than the product itself.”). 
231. For a negligence claim to succeed, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements: duty, breach, 
causation, and injury. This Section assumes an injury has already occurred and considers the 
question of whether a duty has been breached; the causation analysis is addressed below. See infra 
Part II.D. 
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“One who 
undertakes . . . to render services to another . . . is subject to liability to the other for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if . . . (b) the 
harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.”). 
233. “Jailbreaking” devices—altering the software or hardware that limits their use—at 
minimum voids warranties and at its most extreme can carry fines or even criminal charges. 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2018) (criminalizing the creation or use of 
technologies that can disable certain architectural enforcement systems).
 234. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the role intervenors play in the causal chain). 
235. Compare Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 435–51 (2014) (reasoning 
that the Aereo streaming technology in question is best analogized to a cable system), with id. at 
451–63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the same technology is instead best analogized to a 
copy shop and library card). See also Rebecca Crootof, Autonomous Weapon Systems and the 
Limits of Analogy, 51 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 51 (2018) (teasing out how different analogies for 
autonomous weapon systems implicate entirely different legal regimes). 
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assume control of property or discontinue needed services, the three 
most obvious potential analogies for IoT companies are repossession 
agents, public utilities, or landlords. Accordingly, this Section considers 
the implications of relying on these three analogies to determine the 
duty IoT companies owe consumers, as well as how that duty might 
change should a consumer breach the contractual provisions.236 
Repossession agents have remarkably few duties toward 
individuals from whom they are taking secured property. So, while it is 
tempting to analogize IoT companies to repossession agents in the 
wake of a contractual breach, doing so would support a finding that no 
duty was breached. Most states simply prohibit trespass or other 
actions that would constitute a breach of the peace.237 Twelve states 
and Washington, D.C. have licensure requirements, which include 
additional restrictions.238 For example, Florida bars repossession 
agents from carrying firearms and requires them to maintain an 
accurate listing of the repossessed inventory;239 California bans the 
disclosure of personal information of individuals whose items have 
been repossessed.240 Assuming that an IoT company’s “digital 
repossession” does not breach the peace241 and complies with other 
relevant state requirements, there is little legal incentive under the 
236. As this Section concludes that these various analogies all raise problems, this Article 
argues for expanded corporate duties, grounded on the nature of the relationship between the 
IoT company and the device user. See infra Part III.B.2. 
237. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (outlining 
breach of the peace limitations to repossession); supra note 1 (citing state laws adopting this type 
of limitation, among others). 
238. These include California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon. and Pennsylvania. State Requirements, AMERICAN 
RECOVERY ASS’N, INC. (2019), https://repo.org/member-tools/state-requirements 
[https://perma.cc/JE4X-ABHB]. In other states, repossession agents must have a towing license, 
be bonded, or register with the state. Id. 
239. FLA. DEPT. OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., RECOVERY AGENT HANDBOOK 7, 
https://licensing.freshfromflorida.com/forms/P-00094_RecoveryAgentHandbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ 
4W7Y-265F]. Florida also requires repossession agents to be physically present for a repossession. 
Id. at 12. However, as this seems to presume that the primary, if only, alternative is for an 
unlicensed agent to carry out the repossession, id., it is not clear that courts would impose this 
requirement when a company engages in electronic self-help.
 240. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7508.7 (2014). 
241. Causing harm to defendants might constitute a “breach of the peace,” if that phrase is 
construed liberally, and courts do have a history of reading it expansively. See, e.g., supra note 89 
(citing Connecticut and New York courts, which held that oral protest alone can constitute a 
breach of the peace). 
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repossession-agent analogy for the IoT company to take care to not 
cause foreseeable harms.242 
Utility companies may also be a relevant legal analogy, 
particularly for IoT companies that provide an ongoing service 
necessary for a device’s functionality.243 Utilities have a “duty to 
exercise reasonable care to fulfill [their] obligation to provide 
continuing service,”244 and, in recognition of the customer’s 
dependence, they are required to provide reasonable notice of pending 
service terminations.245 In evaluating the reasonableness of the notice, 
courts expect the utility to “take into account the likelihood of damage 
to the consumer”246 and “act with the care that a reasonable person 
would exercise given the consequences of the shutoff.”247 Utility 
companies can terminate services in response to a customer’s 
contractual violations, including nonpayment, but they cannot use the 
threat of discontinued service to coerce or punish customers.248 Given 
users’ dependence on utilities, companies cannot create and enforce 
arbitrary rules regarding whom they will serve.249 
However, there are certain distinctions that limit the usefulness of 
the public-utility analogy. First, public utilities only have duties to 
those in privity: “[I]n the absence of a contract between the utility and 
the consumer expressly providing for the furnishing of a service for a 
242. Depending on how direct the harm is, there may be nonlegal market incentives to avoid 
causing harm. For example, no company will remotely deactivate a pacemaker in reaction to a 
missed payment—aside from the ethical issues, the reputational costs would be prohibitive. 
However, given how technology can misdirect responsibility from remote decision-makers to 
those closer in time and space to the harmful incident, see infra Part II.D, there will be fewer 
market incentives to prevent the enabling of intervening sources of harm.
 243. Cf. Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57, 76–79 (2015) 
(arguing that, when certain industries are necessary to the public and those industries have 
leveraged that necessity to consumer disadvantage, governments tend to respond with public-
utility-like regulation).
 244. Roger D. Colton, Prepayment Utility Meters, Affordable Home Energy, and the Low 
Income Utility Consumer, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L. 285, 297 (2001). 
245. See id. at 295 (“[I]t may be argued that a utility’s common law right to terminate service 
to enforce payment is conditional upon its duty to notify the customer of its intention to do so 
prior to exercising that right.”).
 246. See id. at 297 (quoting 15 STEPHEN R. PITCHER, AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 125 
(1978)). 
247. Id. at 298.
 248. Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and 
Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 326 (1962) (“[D]iscontinuance can not be used to coerce a 
customer into paying a bill when there is a bona fide dispute concerning its validity.”).
 249. See, e.g., Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 539, 547–49 (1858) (voiding 
contractual terms allowing the gas company to “capriciously select” whom to serve). 
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specific purpose, the public utility owes no duty to a person injured as 
a result of an interruption of service or a failure to provide service.”250 
If applied in the context of corporate remote interference, the utility 
analogy would not protect third-party users or bystanders. Second, 
precisely because they have the power to remotely terminate vital 
services, utilities are often public and heavily regulated industries,251 
and so there may be less of a need to impose additional liabilities on 
utilities than would be desirable for a private company with similar 
capabilities. 
Should a court analogize an IoT company to a landlord, there is a 
greater chance that it would find a duty to minimize foreseeable harms 
under the IoT company’s control—at least absent a contractual breach. 
Landlords have affirmative duties to protect the safety of their tenants. 
After Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.252 
established landlords’ tort liability for a third party’s criminal actions, 
almost all jurisdictions have found that landlords have a duty to keep 
common areas relatively safe, including both the physical premises and 
the overall environment.253 Generally, landlords are liable for 
negligence when “there is a ‘special relationship’ between the landlord 
and tenant” and when “there are ‘special circumstances’ by which the 
landlord’s act or omission expose[d] the tenant to an unreasonable risk 
250. 53 CAL. JUR. 3D, Public Utilities § 149 (1979) (citing White v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 25 Cal. 
App. 4th 442, 435–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)). 
251. As one scholar has described the power that utility companies have: 
There are some firms whose control over basic necessities and infrastructure 
create a greater moral danger of unaccountable power than ordinary firms or 
businesses. . . . Public utility regulations were seen as vital for regulating those 
private actors operating in goods and services whose provision seemed to require 
some degree of market concentration and consolidation—and whose set of users 
and constituencies were too vast to be empowered and protected through more 
conventional methods of market competition, corporate governance, or ordinary 
economic regulation. 
K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the 
Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1639 (2018). 
252. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 486–88 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(allowing tenants to sue their landlord for injuries arising from a criminal assault and robbery in 
the common hallway). 
253. See B. A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing 
Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 682 (1992) 
(stating that tort standards “have evolved from narrow exceptions, to a general rule of immunity, 
to a broad duty of care”). This “duty to provide a reasonable amount of security in common areas 
extends to preventing foreseeable injuries within the leased premises as well.” Catherine A. 
Hodgetts, Torts, in The Maryland Survey: 2002-2003, 63 MD. L. REV. 971, 971 (2004) (reviewing, 
among other recent decisions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Hemmings v. Pelham Wood 
L.L.L.P., 375 Md. 522 (2003)). 
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of crime.”254 The foreseeability of the harm and the landlord’s ability 
to control it are often determining factors in finding a duty.255 
However, the landlord analogy may only create a duty of care for 
IoT companies in situations where there is no contractual breach. 
Should a tenant breach a lease—say, by failing to pay—landlords can 
evict them,256 and landlords can often engage in self-help to do so as 
long as they provide the required notice and do not breach the peace.257 
It is unclear whether landlords have any other duties to minimize harm 
to tenants after nonpayment. For example, landlords do not have a 
duty to consider the implications of extreme weather258 or to check for 
pets before changing the locks.259 Applying the landlord analogy would 
allow IoT companies to engage in remote interference in response to 
contractual breaches with nearly no liability, although possibly subject 
to a notice requirement. 
If courts took to analogies for guidance, the choice of analogy will 
determine the scope of the IoT company’s duty. Assuming the harmed 
user did not breach the contract, both the utility and landlord analogies 
provide some basis for finding a duty of care to minimize foreseeable 
harms. The landlord analogy provides slightly more support for a 
finding that IoT companies owe a duty to everyone with whom they 
share a special relationship, rather than just to those with whom the 
companies are in privity. It also supports finding a duty to avoid 
254. Glesner, supra note 253, at 702. 
255. See id. at 686 (noting that, in some jurisdictions, “the landlord’s liability is determined by 
balancing the foreseeability and reasonableness of the risk of injury against the ability of the 
landlord to reduce that risk”); Irma W. Merrill, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed by Third 
Parties Against Tenants on the Premises, 38 VAND. L. REV. 431, 441 (1985) (reviewing 
precedential cases where courts have considered “areas that the landlord controls” and 
“foreseeability of the crime”).
 256. See Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good 
Faith as a Limitation on the Landlord’s Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 538 (1985) 
(observing that “the most common reasons for eviction relate to the tenant’s performance,” 
including nonpayment or other violations of lease terms). 
257. E.g., Thomas M. Whelan, Enforcement of Commercial Leases: Evictions and Dealing 
with a Tenant’s Personal Property, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 283, 290–91 (1997) (discussing 
Texas landlord–tenant statutory and contractual self-help remedies).
 258. See Pam Fessler, As Temperatures Fall, No Halt to Evictions Across Most of the Country, 
NPR (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/18/570796464/as-temperatures-fall-
no-halt-to-evictions-across-most-of-the-country [https://perma.cc/PN4U-YD9X] (“A few places, 
like Maryland and Washington, D.C., postpone evictions when it’s below freezing and over the 
holidays, although those places are the exception rather than the rule.”).
 259. Carl Campanile, Proposed Law Hopes to Help Trapped Pets After Evictions, N.Y. 
POST (Sept. 26, 2017, 4:24 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/09/26/proposed-law-hopes-to-help-
trapped-pets-after-evictions [https://perma.cc/W8G7-4ZRW]. 
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creating an environment where IoT device users are likely to be the 
victims of criminal acts.260 If the consumer did breach the contract, the 
repossession-agent analogy will be tempting, but it suggests the IoT 
company owes device users nearly no duty of care. In contrast, both 
the utility company and landlord analogies imply the existence of a 
minimal duty of notice of the companies’ intent to engage in responsive 
self-help, commensurate with the likelihood and degree of harm. 
These analogies may well be appropriate for some situations 
where corporate remote interference causes harm, but the analogy that 
works in one scenario should not be blindly applied in another. Rather, 
the appropriate analogy for assessing IoT companies’ duty toward 
device users and bystanders must be considered afresh with each new 
fact pattern—with an awareness that, in some circumstances, none of 
them may achieve the desired social goal.261 
D. Seeming Breaks in the Causal Chain 
Regardless of whether a suit is grounded in products liability, 
negligence claims, or both, a plaintiff will need to demonstrate that the 
IoT company’s remote interference caused their harm. Corporate 
remote interference can cause harm in three ways: (1) directly, (2) via 
induced reliance which then results in harm, or (3) by enabling 
intervening sources of harm.  
The first two categories have relatively straightforward causation 
analyses.262 First, remote interference may be the direct cause of harm, 
260. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (1970) (“In the case at 
bar we place the duty of taking protective measures guarding the entire premises and the areas 
peculiarly under the landlord’s control against the perpetration of criminal acts upon the landlord, 
the party to the lease contract who has the effective capacity to perform these necessary acts.”). 
Common carriers have been found to have a similar duty toward their passengers. See Hines v. 
Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 694 (Va. 1921) (“A carrier, in the discharge of [its] very high duty . . . , is 
bound to know the character of the place at which it wrongfully discharges them; and if the 
defendant wrongfully require[s] the plaintiff to get off at a dangerous place without knowing it, it 
d[oes] so at its peril.”); see also Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A 
Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1923 (2010) (noting that, where one entity creates “an 
unreasonable risk of criminal misconduct,” it owes a duty of care toward those who will be 
foreseeably endangered (quoting Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006–07 (N.H. 
2003))). 
261. For a discussion of other means of determining the appropriate scope of duty for 
corporate remote interference, see infra Part III.B.2 (articulating a standalone duty and various 
possible manifestations).
 262. See, e.g., Butler v. Pittway Corp., 770 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that a 
malfunctioning smoke alarm “can create an unreasonable risk of harm” and support a products 
liability claim because “the inhabitants of a structure who rely on such an alarm may be lulled 
into an unjustified sense of safety and fail to be forewarned of the existence of a fire”); Scott & 
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as when an implantable medical device is remotely deactivated. 
Second, harm may result when a user relies on an IoT device for a 
critical alert or alarm, and due to remote interference, the device does 
not provide it. For example, in 2016, a man who passed out while 
driving due to low blood sugar crashed his car, suffering injuries and 
totaling the vehicle.263 He filed a suit against Dexcom, alleging that its 
smart glucose monitoring device’s alarm did not go off when his blood-
sugar levels dropped.264 IoT medical alerts, fire alarms, carbon 
monoxide sensors, and security systems are only useful to the extent 
they are functional—unexpected failures foreseeably cause harm.265 
The third, and more complicated, situation arises where remote 
interference enables an intervening cause of harm. If your car is 
disabled while you are idling at a busy intersection, there is a higher 
likelihood that you will be hit by a car; if your front or garage door is 
remotely unlocked, there is a greater chance of burglary or assault. 
These situations raise questions about the proper scope of the 
proximate cause requirement,266 especially as new technology often 
masks the influence and responsibility of remote decision-makers in 
enabling intervening actors. Accordingly, the rest of this Section 
examines the problem of intervening causes. 
Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1029 (Ill. 1986) (holding, in a case where 
the failure of a fire alarm allowed a “small containable fire . . . [to] spread to engulf the entire 
building,” that the contractor who installed the fire alarm could be found negligent and thus held 
liable to neighbors injured by the fire).
 263. Emily Field, Blood Sugar Monitor Maker Hit with Suit over Car Crash, LAW360 (Aug. 
31, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/834866/blood-sugar-monitor-maker-hit-with-suit-
over-car-crash [https://perma.cc/SC6Q-FD62].
 264. Id.
 265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (“Where the 
reliance of the other, or of the third person, has induced him to forgo other remedies or 
precautions against such a risk, the harm results from the negligence as fully as if the actor had 
created the risk.”). 
266. Proximate cause was originally developed to limit the scope of negligence. As Judge 
Cardozo wrote, “the orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be 
the orbit of the duty.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 343 (1928). As products 
liability expands, courts are increasingly relying on proximate cause to limit the scope of liability. 
Where “the type of harm, manner of harm, or class of persons” harmed is unforeseeable, 
proximate cause shields manufacturers from liability. David A. Fischer, Products Liability— 
Proximate Cause, Intervening Cause, and Duty, 52 MO. L. REV. 547, 574 (1987). Under the risk-
utility test, a “potentially dangerous product is not defective if it is reasonably safe”; under the 
consumer-expectations test, dangerous products “are not defective if the danger is known or 
obvious.” Id. at 560. Generally, “[i]n cases of this kind, where a defective product produces an 
unforeseeable type of harm because of an intervening cause, proximate cause and intervening 
cause analyses are interchangeable.” Id. at 562. 
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1. Intervening Causes of Harm Versus Enabling Acts. The doctrine 
of intervening causes applies in situations where an unforeseeable act 
occurs and breaks the chain of causation. In Stahlecker v. Ford Motor 
Company,267 a woman’s car failed in a remote area, and a man found, 
raped, and murdered her.268 Her parents sued the car company, alleging 
that the car’s inoperability had caused their daughter’s death. The 
court dismissed the case, reasoning that the murderer’s actions were 
“independent and intervening” and that the car company “had no 
reason to expect intentional tortious or criminal acts by a third 
person.”269 Similarly, IoT companies could argue that intervening 
events break the chain of causation linking their possibly negligent 
actions to the consumers’ injuries. A company may have bricked your 
car while you were in an intersection, but it is the other driver that hit 
you. They may have deactivated your door lock, but it was the burglar 
who assaulted you.270 
The fact that there may be an intervening cause of harm, however, 
does not necessarily imply that the harm was unforeseeable—or that 
the entity that enabled it should not be held liable. In Addis v. Steele,271 
for example, the court held that an inn was liable for the injuries 
residents suffered in a fire set by an arsonist.272 Although there was an 
intervening criminal cause of harm, the lack of an escape route created 
a situation where injury from a fire was foreseeable.273 Similarly, 
landlords have a duty to take measures within their power to protect 
tenants from intervening criminal actors274 and business owners have a 
267. Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244 (Neb. 2003).
 268. Id. at 249–50. 
269. Id. at 251 (quoting the district court opinion). 
270. The affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, comparative negligence, and 
assumption of risk might partially or completely bar recovery where the individual’s actions 
increased the likelihood of harm. Take the example of the car stranded in an intersection: an 
individual who left a car and was subsequently hit by another presumably knew of the hazardous 
nature of the situation and willingly exposed himself to it, which suggests the IoT company should 
not bear full responsibility for the injury. 
271. Addis v. Steele, 38 648 N.E.2d 733 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
 272. Id. at 438.
 273. Id. (citing Fund v. Hotel Lenox of Boston, Inc., 635 N.E.2d 194 (Mass. 1994)). 
274. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(“[The landlord’s] duty is to take those measures of protection which are within his power and 
capacity to take, and which can reasonably be expected to mitigate the risk of intruders assaulting 
and robbing tenants.”). 
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duty to take reasonable measures to minimize the risk of foreseeable 
criminal acts.275 
These are all examples of what torts scholar Robert Rabin has 
termed “enabling torts”: situations where, in addition to an immediate 
perpetrator of harm, a plaintiff has a claim against “the individual, or 
more often, the enterprise, that set the stage for the suffering that 
unfolded. The Enabler.”276 Rabin argues that enabled torts do not 
depend on a relationship between the enabling defendant and the 
injured plaintiff; however, the existence of a relationship between IoT 
companies and users makes the case for liability “at least as strong if 
not stronger.”277 
Ultimately, if the intervening source of harm is sufficiently 
foreseeable, the causation requirement linking corporate remote 
interference to an individual’s injury is satisfied; if not, the intervening 
source of harm breaks the chain. As discussed in the next subsection, 
275. See, e.g., Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So.2d 762, 766 (La. 1999) (stating that the 
court “join[ed] other states in adopting the rule that although business owners are not the insurers 
of their patrons’ safety, they do have a duty to implement reasonable measures to protect their 
patrons from criminal acts when those acts are foreseeable”); Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 695 
(Va. 1921) (finding a train operator negligent for carrying a woman past her stop, as she was then 
raped while walking back through a bad neighborhood). 
While many courts are wary of extending the Posecai reasoning, most reiterate its 
standard, and some have relied on it to find questions of fact regarding whether business owners 
might have reasonably foreseen harms from third parties. See, e.g., Patton v. Strogen, 908 So.2d 
1282, 1288–89 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (using Posecai as a baseline standard from which to determine 
liability); Williams v. State, 786 So.2d 927, 932 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (same). 
276. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 437–38 (2000); see also John 
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The Restatement 
(Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211, 1211–12 
(2009) (noting that the “prevailing doctrine” in negligence law is to “recognize special rules that 
allow for, but also limit, remote-wrongdoer liability). “Enabling torts” might include negligent 
entrustment, “key in the ignition cases,” premise-violence cases, hazards in the workplace cases, 
secondhand-smoke cases, and suits against handgun manufacturers and distributers. See generally 
Rabin, supra (surveying these forms of “enabling torts”).
 277. Id. at 442. But see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 276, at 1238–40 (arguing that liability 
attaches in Rabin’s examples because there was a special relationship between the parties, even 
when one party is a stranger, creating an affirmative duty that was breached). Other “enabling 
torts” in the IoT context might include companies incurring liability when their weak 
cybersecurity practices permit third-party criminals to exploit known vulnerabilities, see Michael 
L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1553, 1586 (2005) (suggesting elements for a prima facie case of negligent enablement 
of cybercrime), particularly if they permit hackers to interfere with IoT devices in ways that cause 
physical harm, see Butler, supra note 13, at 921–22 (arguing that the economic-loss rule should 
not bar recovery for such claims, as “[u]nlike defective business software or other products 
previously considered, the security vulnerabilities that plague IoT devices threaten damage to 
private property and create unique risks to innocent bystanders”). 
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however, the foreseeability analysis may be affected by technology’s 
tendency to obscure the role of remote decision-makers. 
2. Technology Deflects Responsibility.  Not only do IoT devices 
enable corporate remote interference, they also mask the role of IoT 
companies in enabling the resulting injuries. Technology can shift 
responsibility from those who make decisions at a distance to those 
more temporally and physically close to an accident, even when the 
distant decision-makers had more power to minimize its likelihood or 
impact.278 This occurs in part because remote decisions are obscured by 
later actions279 and in part because courts tend to find that early users 
of new technology assume the risks and should shoulder the resulting 
harms.280 Sometimes this attribution is sensible, as when individuals 
involved in an accident are able to take steps to minimize a risk of 
harm; sometimes it is not, as when those immediate actors are 
presumed to have more power than they do.281 
Given how technology can mask the role of remote decision-
makers, intervening sources of harm are likely to be viewed as 
278. See Madeleine Clare Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human Robot 
Interaction 40 (Engaging Science, Technology, and Society, Working Paper, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757236 [https://perma.cc/VQS9-LP6B] 
(highlighting how “the human in a highly complex and automated system may become simply a 
component—accidentally or intentionally—that bears the brunt of the moral and legal 
responsibilities when the overall system malfunctions”); Molly K. Land & Jay D. Aronson, The 
Promise and Peril of Human Rights Technology, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW AND PRACTICE, 1, 11–12 (Molly K. Land & Jay D. Aronson, eds., 2018) (discussing how, 
because technology obscures agency, it interferes with traditional human-rights enforcement 
mechanisms); Ryan Calo, Robots in American Law 36 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author) (Mar. 15, 2016) (observing that judges have a tendency to attribute liability to the person 
“in the loop” over a robotic system). This is particularly true for accidents resulting from design 
decisions, which indirectly regulate users’ actions. Cf. LESSIG, supra note 45, at 133–35 (describing 
how regulatory “[i]ndirection misdirects responsibility,” sometimes allowing a regulating entity 
to “get[] the benefit of what would clearly be an illegal and controversial regulation without even 
having to admit any regulation exists”). Nor is this a new development: early accidents involving 
cars and airplanes were often attributed to user error, rather than the fact that steering devices 
detached or engines failed. See Graham, supra note 32, at 1260–66 (discussing examples). 
279. E.g., Graham, supra note 32, at 1257 (hypothesizing that a jogger hit by an unheard 
hybrid vehicle would probably blame the driver, rather than the vehicle’s lack of an alert noise); 
id. at 1260 (noting that, “in situations in which a third party might bring suit, responsibility for the 
harm may be shifted away from the technology itself and toward the user’s decisions vis-à-vis the 
innovation”).
 280. Id. at 1260–61 (“In suits brought by users themselves, the law often regards early 
adopters as taking their chances with a technology. . . . [T]he definite tendency [of the law] was to 
assign fault to the user, rather than engage in a probing review of the technology.”).
 281. Id. (quoting an issue of the magazine Scientific American from 1900 to support the claim 
that many automobile accidents occurred when steering wheels detached from the tires). 
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independent and unforeseeable actors, rather than the enabled and 
expected side effects of remote interference. Consider the common 
narrative of autonomous-vehicle accidents. At the time of this writing, 
increasingly autonomous vehicles have been involved in a number of 
fender benders. Recently, a driverless shuttle bus was involved in a 
crash less than an hour into its first deployment when it failed to back 
up as the vehicle in front of it began reversing.282 The following article 
is characteristic of how such incidents are described: 
A driverless shuttle bus being tested in Las Vegas was involved in a 
crash an hour into its first day on the job – although it wasn’t the 
vehicle’s fault. . . . 
The incident is the latest in a series of crashes involving driverless 
vehicles, the vast majority of which have been caused by the other 
vehicle’s driver. 
Almost all the incidents recorded by Waymo, Google’s autonomous 
vehicle arm, have been down to human drivers hitting the vehicles, 
and a major crash involving Uber’s driverless cars in March was down 
to the driver of the other car. . . . 
“We were like ’oh my gosh, [the other car is] gonna hit us, it’s gonna 
hit us!’ and then, it hit us!” one of the passengers told local 
station KSNV. “The shuttle didn’t have the ability to move back, 
either. [It] just stayed still.” 
A spokesman for the City of Las Vegas said: “The shuttle did what it 
was supposed to do, in that it[s] sensors registered the truck and the 
shuttle stopped to avoid the accident. 
“Unfortunately the delivery truck did not stop and grazed the front 
fender of the shuttle. Had the truck had the same sensing equipment 
that the shuttle has the accident would have been avoided.”283 
Rather than blame the designers who did not anticipate and 
address this common scenario or the company who deployed a shuttle 
incapable of interacting with human drivers, the narrative repeatedly 
blames the third-party operator of a delivery truck, who reasonably 
expected the other “driver” to move. Clearly, the delivery truck driver 
bears some responsibility for the accident. But even though the 
282. James Titcomb, Driverless Car Involved in Crash in First Hour of First Day, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2017, 12:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/11/09/ 
driverless-car-involved-crash-first-hour-first-day [https://perma.cc/5XB2-6RPL].
 283. Id. (emphasis added). 
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company and its designers could have made different business and 
design choices, their temporal remoteness and relative invisibility shift 
blame for the accident to the more immediately involved actor.  
E. A Market for Unsafe Remote Interference 
But won’t the market solve this problem? Either consumers will 
purchase less safe but cheaper devices, demonstrating that the cost 
savings is worth the added risk, or they will forego unsafe ones, 
incentivizing companies to invest in developing and advertising safer 
products. 
Unfortunately, the market for IoT devices has significant 
information asymmetries and failures that will prevent the invisible 
hand from perfecting it. First, there are the usual critiques regarding 
the reasonableness of assuming consumers are actually making 
informed purchasing decisions based on contractual terms.284 Also, 
reputational harms only attach if the company name is tied to an 
accident, but as noted above, technology’s ability to deflect 
responsibility from remote decision-makers can make it difficult to link 
an accident to a company. Further, one technology can sometimes 
shield another. For example, many are aware that the first autonomous 
vehicle to kill a pedestrian was an Uber car; far fewer know that it was 
a Volvo.285 Additionally, rather than creating a market for safer 
products, the damage potential of some IoT devices might encourage 
industries to collectively downplay the risk of harm. Just as airlines 
284. Often, consumers are not aware of or do not understand contractual provisions—in large 
part because sellers profit from consumers’ confusion. See, e.g., Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-
Form Contracts, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 2 (2014) (“[O]nly about one or two in one thousand shoppers 
access a product’s EULA for at least one second, yielding an informed minority of 0.2% that is 
orders of magnitude smaller than the required informed minority size in realistic market 
settings . . . .”); Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on 
the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 427–29 (2009) (finding empirical support for two ways in 
which online sellers’ obfuscation increases their profits); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy 
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1883–93 (2013) (arguing 
that consumers face structural and cognitive problems in gleaning information from contracts); 
Van Loo, supra note 171, at 1324–25 (reviewing claims that big retail shopping is marked by 
information asymmetries). Further, even if consumers are aware of the facts, such as the price of 
an item, they are often unable to accurately assess the associated risks. See Solove, supra, at 1887– 
88 (arguing that consumers have nearly no ability to accurately judge the consequences of sharing 
personal information).
 285. See, e.g., Wakabayashi, supra note 122 (noting that “the crash in Tempe will draw 
attention among the general public to self-driving cars . . . . and the companies advocating for it,” 
as opposed to any particular brand). 
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have little incentive to market their respective safety scores to a 
populace with an irrational fear of crashes,286 autonomous vehicle 
companies attempting to lure skeptical buyers have little incentive to 
highlight their comparatively low accident rates. 
IoT companies’ ability to evade the reputational costs that might 
otherwise attend accidents has two consequences, both of which 
encourage a market for lemons.287 First, consumers cannot accurately 
judge which IoT devices and contracts are safer and therefore cannot 
make informed choices when selecting among products. Second, and 
consequentially, IoT companies that act with due care are unable to 
pass the costs of doing so onto consumers, which will discourage them 
from shouldering those costs in the absence of other legal incentives. 
Ultimately, the market disincentivizes corporate investment in 
designing and manufacturing safer IoT devices. 
Granted, reputational costs will attach when an egregious act or 
spectacular accident can be tied to a particular IoT company. For 
example, Sonos is facing popular backlash and losing customers after 
announcing that customers who do not agree to policy changes that 
allow more intensive data gathering would not receive necessary 
software updates;288 Tesla’s stock crashed following an investigation 
into a fatal accident.289 
But even a sensational story may have relatively little impact, as 
companies are increasingly attempting to lock consumers in 
proprietary ecosystems.290 Company X’s smart toaster may receive 
286. Jack Linshi, Why Airlines Don’t Talk About Safety in Their Ads, TIME (Jan. 20, 2015), 
https://time.com/3669161/airline-ads-safety [https://perma.cc/3UCQ-S8PB] (“Putting the ‘S-
Word’ in slogans or commercials, airlines have found, doesn’t reassure passengers—it just 
reminds them of the random chance of danger their next trip might bring, however slight it may 
be.”).
 287. Akerlof, supra note 31, at 488 (arguing that, when consumers cannot distinguish between 
high- and low-quality (or safe and unsafe) products, “good” products are crowded out by “bad” 
ones).
 288. See Nick Whigham, Sonos Customers React Angrily to New Privacy Policy, NEWS.COM 
(Aug. 24, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://www.news.com.au/technology/home-
entertainment/audio/sonos-customers-react-angrily-to-new-privacy-policy/news-
story/3e088c4055685c1aed4ee5856bc353ce [https:// 
perma.cc/ZYT7-B8ZG]. 
289. Lora Kolodny & Ari Levy, Tesla Shares Drop After Report 
Says its Autopilot System Was Engaged During a Fatal Crash, CNBC (May 17, 2019, 3:24 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/17/tesla-shares-fall-on-report-autopilot-system-was-engaged-
during-crash.html [https://perma.cc/98T7-YVPP].  
290. See Patrik Fältström, Market-Driven Challenges To Open Internet Standards 7–8 (Global 
Comm’n on Internet Governance, Paper Series No. 33, 2016) (noting that many IoT companies 
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terrible reviews, but that might not be sufficient for someone enmeshed 
in Company X’s network to switch to Company Y’s smart toaster, 
given that the latter could not interact with the other items in their 
smart kitchen. Further, “in addition to traditional forms of lock-in, 
personal data introduces a form of monopoly power that deepens the 
connection between buyer and seller. Switching opportunities are not 
‘just a click away’ when the competitor lacks the advantages gained 
from years of developing personalization and knowledge about the 
user.”291 These ecosystems create significant barriers to entry for 
market newcomers, minimizing competition that might foster the 
development of safer IoT devices.292 Ultimately, in a situation defined 
by power and information asymmetries and high switching costs, we 
cannot rely on the market to produce safe IoT devices. 
* * * 
Regardless of one’s theory of tort law, the current situation is 
problematic. Under a fairness theory, IoT companies are knowingly 
creating nonreciprocal and therefore “unfair” risks of harm.293 IoT 
are intentionally avoiding open designs that would permit interoperability with other companies’ 
products). Amazon is just one of many IoT companies interested in creating a siloed ecosystem, 
as evidenced by the experience of one commentator: 
When you add Amazon Key to your door, something more sneaky also happens: 
Amazon takes over. . . . The Key-compatible locks are made by Yale and Kwikset, yet 
don’t work with those brands’ own apps. They also can’t connect with a home-security 
system or smart-home gadgets that work with Apple and Google software. And, of 
course, the lock can’t be accessed by businesses other than Amazon. No Walmart, no 
UPS, no local dog-walking company. . . . Amazon is barely hiding its goal: It wants to 
be the operating system for your home. 
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Wants a Key to Your house. I Did It. I Regretted It., WASH. POST 
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/12/07/amazon-wants-
a-key-to-your-house-i-did-it-i-regretted-it/?utm_term=.e14e2981887e [https://perma.cc/8ULE-
VS4H]. 
291. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 841 (2019) (footnote omitted). 
292. Id. at 840 (discussing how Google and Amazon strategically offer entry-level products at 
cheap prices to drive future consumer purchases and raise switching costs, thus creating barriers 
to entry for newer companies).
 293. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 541– 
42 (1972) (arguing that unexcused nonreciprocal risks—where the defendant “generates a 
disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity”—unfairly 
shift losses); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 311, 343–44 (1996) (articulating an approach that would require an enterprise to 
compensate those harmed by its profitable and risky activities, if those harmed do not benefit 
from those activities to the same extent as the enterprise, which could also justify imposing 
increased liability on IoT companies). 
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companies are also not required to make their users whole, despite the 
fact they bear at least partial moral responsibility for the resulting 
harms.294 And, as the costs of accidents are not being appropriately 
allocated, the resulting harms will not be efficiently deterred.295 How, 
then, should civil liability standards be changed to better achieve 
fairness, justice, and efficiency? 
III. A CIVIL LIABILITY INFLECTION POINT 
The proliferation of IoT devices has brought us to the cusp of a 
potential legal inflection point. Decisions made now about who should 
bear liability for harms resulting from remote interference will create 
a powerful feedback loop that will forge our future assumptions about 
IoT companies’ obligations and consumer rights. 
Just as technological development can spur legal evolution, legal 
defaults and tech-enabled capabilities influence social norms and 
expectations. Law permitted social media and e-commerce platforms 
to collect and monetize personal data, creating an environment where 
many believe personal privacy is endangered, if not already gone. Law 
permits e-book retailers to employ digital rights management 
technologies to limit how many people can share a copy, normalizing a 
restriction that would have been unimaginable with bound books. 
294. Corrective-justice and civil-recourse theories also favor IoT companies bearing more 
liability. Under a corrective-justice theory, there are currently inadequate remedies for harms 
resulting from the breach of interpersonal duties. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 
320 (1992) (“Corrective justice imposes the duty to repair the wrongs one does.” (emphasis 
omitted)). Meanwhile, under a civil recourse approach, IoT companies are inappropriately 
evading their responsibility for having wrongfully injured users, largely because those harmed by 
remote interference do not have a sufficient legal means of seeking redress. See John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Responsibility, in  PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (“Tort law is best understood 
as law that defines duties not to injure others, and that holds those who have breached such duties 
vulnerable to their victims’ demands for responsive action.”). 
295. Under a Calabresian law-and-economics approach, liability should attach to the 
“cheapest cost avoider”—the party best suited to make the “cost-benefit analysis between 
accident costs and accident avoidance costs” and to act on that determination. GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26–28 (1970). 
While users certainly have some limited discretion with regard to whether they breach contractual 
terms and how much they rely on an IoT device, this pales in comparison to the power IoT 
companies exercise. IoT companies commission and design devices and, by extension, control 
their damage potential. IoT companies also draft the terms of service, which are largely contracts 
of adhesion, outlining when they can engage in remote interference. IoT companies also have 
more information about the situation and its likely risks, as well as ultimate control as to when 
they choose to exert their power to remotely alter or deactivate an IoT device. Lastly, IoT 
companies can best spread the costs of accidents. 
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Today, law seems to permit IoT companies to engage in remote 
interference without having to bear an appropriate amount of liability 
for its harmful externalities. 
Once social norms are established, they affect how legal questions 
are evaluated. If it is generally assumed that IoT companies have an 
obligation to avoid causing foreseeable harm, courts and other legal 
actors will be more likely to strike exculpatory clauses as 
unconscionable, find a design defect in cases regarding harms resulting 
from remote interference, or articulate a duty for the purpose of a 
negligence analysis. If not, they will not. 
After reviewing prior evolutionary moments, this Part offers 
proposals for how our civil liability standards could evolve to better 
incentivize companies to protect consumers from foreseeable harms 
resulting from their remote interference. 
A. Evolutionary Moments 
The history of tort law is regularly punctuated with instances 
where new technologies alter social relations between entities, spurring 
legal evolution. The concept of ultrahazardous activities, the creation 
of no-fault workers’ compensation and motor-vehicle insurance, and 
the rise of mass tort litigation can all be partially traced to underlying 
technological changes and accompanying social shifts. Two of the more 
momentous examples in American tort law are the development of 
modern “negligence” and the products liability revolution. In both of 
these situations, courts and legislatures responded to new, 
technologically enabled accident crises and changes in power dynamics 
by altering allocations of liability—in diametrically opposed ways—to 
better achieve social goals. These moments exemplify two possible 
ways forward for IoT corporate liability. 
1. The Industrial Revolution and Decreased Industry Liability. 
Personal injury claims were rare in preindustrial America.296 When 
someone brought a case, courts evaluated it under something akin to a 
strict liability standard.297 To the extent preindustrial cases mention 
“negligence,” the term usually entails a defendant’s failure to fulfill a 
296. Gifford, supra note 32, at 80–83. 
297. HORWITZ, supra note 32, at 85. 
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duty toward a specific other, such as a shopkeeper’s obligation to 
deliver a purchased item in good condition to the purchaser.298 
The Industrial Revolution—and the advent of machines with “a 
marvelous capacity for smashing the human body”—changed 
everything.299 Locomotives, automobiles, steamboats, and factory and 
mining machines created “an accident crisis like none the world had 
ever seen.”300 Additionally, for the first time in history, the majority of 
these serious accidents were impersonal, “stranger” cases. Instead of 
being harmed by a family member, neighbor, or other familiar person, 
people were being mangled by machines whose owners they did not 
know—and whom they were far more willing to sue.301 
As more and more personal injury suits were brought, courts 
began changing the standard under which they evaluated claims, from 
strict liability to the modern negligence analysis.302 Whereas it had once 
been sufficient to show that the defendant caused an injury, plaintiffs 
now also needed to demonstrate that the defendant had not acted with 
reasonable care. 
Scholars have posited different explanations for this shift. Edward 
White links the development of modern negligence to the explosion in 
“stranger” cases, arguing that courts had to develop a new standard to 
298. See, e.g., id. at 85–88 (discussing early nineteenth-century negligence cases, including 
those involving the public duty of sheriffs); WHITE, supra note 32, at 13, 15 (“Prior to the 1830s, 
with the exception of a handful of cases in New York, the term ‘negligence’ generally referred to 
‘neglect’ or failure to perform a specific duty imposed by contract, statute, or common law.”). But 
see W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 700 (2008) 
(arguing that, prior to the Industrial Revolution, there was a “default duty of care”).
 299. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 467; see also WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 32, 
at 7–8 (describing the evolution of Justice Holmes’ analysis of tort law, from the individual injuries 
of Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850), to a more collective response to the injuries 
created by industrial progress). 
300. See Witt, Toward a New History, supra note 32, at 694. 
301. Gifford, supra note 32, at 89–90. Gifford also argues that a host of other social and legal 
shifts made bringing personal injury suits easier and more appealing. These included the 
emergence of deep-pocketed corporations, id. at 89, the creation and expansion of liability 
insurance, id. at 90–91, “the abolition of the witness disqualification rule,” which prohibited 
individuals with an interest in the outcome of a case—including the plaintiff—from testifying, id. 
at 81, 91–92; see also Witt, Toward a New History, supra note 32, at 753–54 (describing the history 
of the witness disqualification rule), and the appearance of a personal injury bar, Gifford, supra 
note 32, at 92–93. 
302. Gifford, supra note 32, at 93 (“Legal scholars usually agree that the law governing 
personal injury claims changed from a strict liability standard in 1820 to a negligence regime by 
1870.”). 
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address the new relationship between injurer and injured.303 Morton 
Horwitz and Lawrence Friedman claim that the law evolved in 
recognition of a need to protect fledging industries, namely factories, 
mines, and railroads.304 John Fabian Witt suggests that the emergence 
of a fault-based liability system can be traced to the influence of 
“nineteenth-century political liberalism.”305 Donald Gifford attributes 
the rise of modern negligence liability directly to the new technology 
and the harms and social practices it enabled.306 All agree, however, 
that this legal change resulted in a contraction of industry liability,307 as 
it is far more difficult to prove that a defendant breached a duty of care 
than that its act caused an injury. 
2. Mass Manufacturing and an Expansion in Industry Liability. In 
contrast, the rise of mass manufacturing and new transportation 
systems spurred the development of products liability law, which 
extended manufacturers’ duty of care from those in privity to anyone 
who might foreseeably be harmed by their products. Scholars have 
described the resulting, primarily post-1960s shift as “among the most 
dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system”308 and as 
“the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established 
rule in the entire history of the law of torts.”309 
303. WHITE, supra note 32, at 16 (“[T]he modern negligence principle in tort law seems to 
have been an intellectual response to the increased number of accidents involving persons who 
had no preexisting relationship with one another . . . .”).
 304. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 468; HORWITZ, supra note 32, at 99–100 (describing the 
legal change as providing “substantial subsidies for those who undertook schemes of economic 
development”); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century 
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1717–20 (1981) (describing this as the “prevailing 
view” and arguing that the shift to negligence was far less dramatic and intentional than Horwitz’s 
description).  
305. WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 45; see also id. at 45–49 (describing the 
difference between the strict liability and negligence standards in terms of “classical legal 
thought” concepts, such as separation between private and public spheres and the exercise of 
individual rights).
 306. Gifford, supra note 32, at 76–77, 104–05 (concluding that the development of the 
negligence regime can be explained by “technology in and of itself” and resulting factors, 
including “the increased severity of injuries resulting from the proliferation of new machinery”).
 307. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 32, at 99–100 (describing the transformation of common 
law doctrines “to create immunities from legal liability”); Cardi & Green, supra note 298, at 699 
(describing “duty’s first doctrinal appearance . . . as a means of limiting liability”). 
308. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985).  
309. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. 
REV. 791, 793–94 (1966) (footnote omitted). 
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Historically, consumer protections for product-caused harms were 
based on privity of contract: only those party to a contract of sale could 
bring suit for harms caused by an object.310 As mass production and 
cross-country transportation increased the geographic, temporal, and 
contractual distance between the manufacturer of a product and the 
ultimate consumer, however, courts began to hold companies liable for 
the harms their products caused, regardless of whether there was a 
linking contract. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,311 Judge Cardozo 
argued that manufacturers of products that could “place life and limb 
in peril when negligently made” owed a duty of care to direct 
consumers, their family members, and even to bystanders to anticipate 
and prevent likely harms caused by defective products.312 In Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co.,313 Judge Traynor noted in his famous 
concurrence: “As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production 
. . . the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a 
product has been altered. Manufacturing processes . . . are ordinarily 
either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public.”314 And, 
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,315 Judge Traynor cited his 
Escola concurrence in holding a manufacturer strictly liable for a 
product defect.316 Products liability law was born. 
The Industrial Revolution and the associated rise of “stranger 
cases” prompted courts to contract industry liability; the rise of mass 
production and newly distant seller–buyer relations spurred a 
reactionary expansion of industry liability.317 The proliferating IoT 
310. Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (imposing a privity requirement to 
limit liability in early products liability law). 
311. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
 312. Id. at 1053; Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1217, 1232 (2017) (describing the scope of MacPherson’s holding). 
313. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
 314. Id. at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
315. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
 316. Id. at 901. 
317. Products liability law has since continued to evolve, mostly in ways that again contract 
industry liability. See generally, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the 
American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1263 (1991) (discussing the evolution of products liability and asserting that liability without 
defect is undesirable); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in 
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure To Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990) 
(encouraging courts to develop stricter guidelines for product warning cases); James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical 
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (pointing to changes in products liability 
decisions favoring defendants); Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive 
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ecosystem and the new relationships it enables herald another 
potential liability inflection point. 
B. Expanding Corporate Liability 
We are at a crossroads. In one potential future, law will continue 
to shield corporations from liability for harms resulting from remote 
interference. In a world where IoT companies have few incentives to 
protect device users from the harms of corporate remote interference, 
consumers will come to accept that using IoT devices entails an 
assumption of risk, shifting their expectations even in the absence of 
contractual protections. In another future, where law evolves to 
incentivize companies to better protect consumers, societal 
understandings of consumer rights will evolve to create stronger 
default assumptions favoring consumer safety. 
The remainder of this Part outlines different routes toward that 
second future. In some situations, it may be possible to apply existing 
tech-neutral doctrine more expansively. For example, implied 
warranties or design-defect standards could be interpreted to 
encompass postsale corporate actions. Alternatively, it may be clearer 
to explicitly articulate tech-specific restatements of existing standards. 
Doing so may make it easier to strengthen the unconscionability and 
public-policy doctrines, recognize broader relational duties, and 
extend proximate cause standards to address the particular issues 
raised by corporate remote interference. 
Ultimately, given the considerable known unknowns about how 
various kinds of IoT devices will be integrated into our society, this 
Article does not purport to prescribe one single solution. Instead, it 
presents options that advocates, judges, and policymakers should 
consider when weighing precedential legal decisions during this critical 
but bounded regulatory opportunity. 
1. Limiting Corporate Exculpatory Clauses. Contract law might 
evolve to better protect IoT-device users, either through strengthening 
the unconscionability doctrine or by employing public policy 
arguments to limit the scope of corporate exculpatory clauses. 
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (considering the exculpatory effect of warnings that 
shift responsibility to consumers to protect themselves); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive 
Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(1992) (examining punitive damages in products liability and describing reform efforts). 
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a. Strengthening Unconscionability Claims. At least initially, 
courts may find that disclaimers of liability arising from remote 
interference—particularly for IoT devices that do not obviously 
depend on the remote provision of a service, like an automobile—are 
unexpected and therefore void as unconscionable.318 Many today are 
startled to learn that a company can remotely boot someone’s car, but 
that reaction is already swiftly fading as we become more accustomed 
to corporate remote interference. Consequently, grounding legal 
conclusions on the fact that remote interference is surprising is not a 
tenable long-term approach.319 As we become accustomed to the fact 
that companies can remotely affect items in our homes, remote 
interference will become less and less shocking, but the consequences 
will remain equally harmful. 
Strengthening the unconscionability doctrine would better limit 
the reach of exculpatory clauses in the context of corporate remote 
interference.320 Many of the justifications for a limited 
unconscionability doctrine—that the market will solve the problem or 
that consumers knowingly assumed the risk—do not hold in the IoT 
context, as the market is unlikely to provide the information consumers 
would need to make informed choices about the relative risks of 
different products.321 Instead, just as provisions that purport to waive 
liability for physical harms caused by consumer goods are presumed to 
318. See, e.g., Traxler v. PPG Indus., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 607, 616 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (“Courts 
have found a term to be substantively suspect if it ‘reallocates the risks of the bargain in a 
objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.’” (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 
135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 487 (Cal. App. Ct. 1982))); Acosta v. Fair Isaac Corp., 669 F. Supp. 2d 716, 
721 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (“Contract terms which distribute risks in an unreasonable or unexpected 
way will be found to be substantively unconscionable.”); Hartland Comput. Leasing Corp. v. Ins. 
Man, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (“Only such provisions of the standardized 
form which . . . are unexpected and unconscionably unfair are held to be unenforceable.”).
 319. See supra Part II.B (discussing how corporate remote interference may become more 
commonplace, in the context of analyzing the applicability of products liability law). 
320. There is a growing body of scholarship proposing reforms to strengthen the 
unconscionability doctrine. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1034–39 (2015) (surveying recommendations 
for fine-tuning the doctrine, including recognizing unconscionability as a tort with punitive 
damages, expanding remedies to include attorney’s fees, and shifting the burden of proof to the 
defendant); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1278–90 (2003) (suggesting that unconscionability be 
strengthened with regard to nonsalient contract terms); Lonegrass, supra note 145, at 5 (noting 
that courts are increasingly employing a “sliding scale approach” to evaluating consumer 
contracts that “deemphasizes traditional, formalist markers of assent” and arguing for its 
expanded application).
 321. See supra Part II.E. 
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be unconscionable,322 provisions that purport to waive liability for 
foreseeable physical harms caused by remote interference should be as 
well, with a high bar for rebutting the presumption.  
b. A Public Policy Argument. Stepping back, it is worth 
considering the more fundamental question of whether it is ever 
appropriate for IoT companies to contractually evade liability for the 
physical harms caused by their remote interference. For devices that 
create a risk of physical harm, contract law’s current and much 
maligned legal fiction that opening a package or using a device 
constitutes agreement to opaque terms of service and corporate-
liability limitations is no longer tenable.323 
There are multiple arguments that exculpatory clauses contravene 
public policy. The right to be free from foreseeable product harms 
could be considered an inalienable entitlement, which cannot be 
contracted away.324 From a law-and-economics perspective, honoring 
exculpatory clauses may inefficiently shift the duty of care away from 
the entity best situated to prevent, bear, or spread the costs of the 
injury.325 There is also precedent for requiring companies to bear the 
costs of developing safer products and safer practices: the federal 
government requires compliance with various safety standards,326 and 
322. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951). 
323. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166 
U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1135–36 (2018) (“There is a good argument that courts have stretched the 
definition of consent too far in the browsewrap cases generally. . . . Consent should mean 
informed consent with a reasonable alternative, not simply a legal acknowledgement of the 
existence of boilerplate somewhere.”); cf. Tschider, supra note 14, at 110–11 (arguing that IoT 
devices “disrupt the historical informed consent model,” as “[a] traditional model of prior notice 
followed by consent is not compatible with real-time improvements precipitated by the ‘always-
on’ nature of pervasively connected devices”).
 324. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (discussing 
inalienable entitlements in property and liability rules). To the extent remote interference can be 
portrayed as an intentional tort or gross negligence, it will fit relatively comfortably into 
traditional prohibitions on contracting away liability. See supra text accompanying notes 159–69. 
325. Applegate v. Cable Water Ski, L.C., 974 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(explaining why exculpatory clauses are disfavored by public policy); see also Dresser Indus., Inc. 
v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 507–08 (Tex. 1993) (describing clauses that “relieve a 
party in advance of responsibility for its own negligence” as “an extraordinary shifting of risk”); 
RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 26, at 138–40 (critiquing the efficiency argument for 
exculpatory clauses for harm caused by negligence); Burnham, supra note 176, at 390 (wondering, 
in light of the moral hazard raised by enforcement of exculpatory clauses, “if a firm has no liability, 
then will it take precaution against accidents?”). 
326. These include Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (“FMVSS”) and Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) safety standards. The authority for the National Highway 
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most states limit companies’ ability to contract out of liability for 
physical harms.327 
If they are not struck as void, exculpatory clauses should at least 
be strictly construed against IoT companies in situations where remote 
inference causes consumer harm. This may result in the clauses being 
drafted in extremely clear language that better puts the consumer “on 
notice of the range of dangers for which he or she assumes the risk of 
injury, enabling him or her to minimize the risk by exercising a greater 
degree of caution.”328 Finally, if judges strike or strictly construe 
exculpatory clauses, they should do so in a way that limits their 
application in other and future contracts.329 
2. Broadening Relational Duties. The fact that IoT devices foster 
a personal and ongoing relationship between companies and users 
suggests that the companies have a heightened duty toward users.330 
Accordingly, this Article proposes recognizing that IoT companies 
have a duty to users and bystanders to refrain from engaging in remote 
interference that creates a foreseeable risk of physical harm or 
property damage. Put another way, IoT companies have a duty to only 
employ remote interference when it is reasonably safe to do so.331 
Arguably, this duty is merely a particularized version of a broader, 
extant duty of care, given that “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to 
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) to promulgate the FMVSS is found in 49 U.S.C. § 301 
(2018); see also Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2018)).
 327. See Matthiesen, Wickert & Lehrer, supra note 165, at 6, 9 (“A majority of states hold 
that such agreements generally are void on the grounds that public policy precludes enforcement 
of a release of liability for harms caused by aggravated misconduct or gross negligence” and 
“[m]ost states will not enforce waivers intended to protect the provider against liability for gross 
negligence, reckless conduct, willful/wanton conduct, or intentional acts.”). 
328. Cox v. U.S. Fitness, LLC, 2 N.E.3d 1211, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
 329. See Beh, supra note 320, at 1031 (noting that, rather than focusing on deterrence “to 
serve broader public policies beyond the case at issue,” courts “tend to favor benign forms of 
severance of unconscionable terms”).  
330. Cf. Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1797 (“[P]roximity will give rise 
to the kinds of special relationships that continue to matter in law.”). For example, given that 
many companies now can exercise postsale control over property, IoT companies may have an 
attendant obligation to restrict the use of potentially dangerous property by malicious or negligent 
users. Id. at 1809. 
331. Cf. ELLIOT F. KAYE & JONATHAN D. MIDGETT, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
COMMISSION, A FRAMEWORK OF SAFETY FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS: CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 2 (Jan. 31, 2019) (“Manufacturers and retailers of IoT devices 
and software should anticipate safety concerns as new capabilities are added to the IoT ecosystem 
or products are modified, updated or re-purposed throughout their useful lives . . . .”). 
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exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of 
physical harm.”332 Even so, there is utility in clearly articulating it to 
acknowledge the issues particular to the IoT context. 
The scope of this duty will necessarily vary based on the nature of 
the relationship between the IoT company and device user, the likely 
gravity and frequency of harm, and the foreseeability of harm. 
Although this Article collectively refers to IoT-device designers, 
manufacturers, sellers, and service providers as “IoT companies,” a 
court evaluating a claim of harm grounded in remote interference will 
need to disaggregate the various entities to determine the scope of their 
respective duties. Courts will also need to evaluate the damage 
potential of the IoT device on a case-specific basis, as remote 
interference with different IoT devices will occur at different rates and 
cause different degrees of harm. A deactivated Fitbit is an 
inconvenience; a deactivated pacemaker may be a death sentence. The 
damage potential of an IoT device will affect what degree of harm is 
foreseeable, and the expected use of an item will implicate different 
duties owed toward different people. IoT vehicles will be used in 
situations where bystanders and third parties may be harmed. IoT 
hairbrushes? Not so much. Ultimately, it may be sensible to employ a 
balancing test, as the court in Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.333 did in 
a related context, suggesting that “[t]he greater the foreseeability and 
gravity of the harm, the greater the duty of care that will be imposed 
on the business.”334 
Additionally, the standard may vary depending on the social 
utility of the device and the corporate reason for the remote 
interference. If harm results from a blanket change in company policy 
designed to benefit the company, there should be a higher standard of 
care—and possibly even a rebuttable presumption of strict liability. 
However, a lower standard of care might be justified if the corporate 
remote interference is a genuine attempt to comply with new 
regulations or to act in the best interest of the device’s users or the 
larger public. 
Analyzing the standard of care for corporate remote interference 
in response to user breaches will be particularly complicated. On the 
one hand, breaches have built-in notice: a consumer might be assumed 
332. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
333. Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762 (La. 1999).
 334. Id. at 768. 
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to know that a missed payment on a subscription service will result in 
it being discontinued or that altering a device’s hardware may incur 
risks or void warranties. On the other hand, because IoT companies 
often write and enforce their own contractual terms, purported 
consumer “breaches” deserve close examination. A consumer who 
fails to make a monthly payment on the Nest account has less 
justification for complaint than a consumer who is tinkering with its 
hardware in an attempt to limit its surveillance capabilities.335 
This proposed duty is the mirror image of a corporate postsale 
duty to update a product to protect consumers from newly discovered 
risks. Even staunch critics of a postsale duty to update recognize it is 
legitimate when three requirements are met336: (1) “the danger the 
product poses [is] so extraordinary, pronounced, or special that a post-
sale warning will not protect consumers”;337 (2) “the manufacturer [is] 
able to identify and locate product owners or users”;338 and (3) “the 
manufacturer [is] able to regain control of the product.”339 The same 
rationales would support a duty not to remotely interfere with an IoT 
device in a way that would foreseeably cause harm.340 Certainly, 
postsale warnings alone would not prevent the harms of corporate 
remote interference,341 unless they are explicit and nearly 
contemporaneous with the risk that spurred the warning.342 And the 
IoT company can identify and locate product owners and users because 
it is exerting control over the product. 
The remainder of this Section considers different potential 
manifestations of this duty, including as an implied warranty of 
335. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 48 (reporting on efforts to prevent the data of Nest users from 
being sent to Nest servers). 
336. Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1805–06 (describing the duty to 
update as “a rare duty that noted scholars have vigorously rejected and that courts have 
repeatedly refused to recognize, with the exceptions purportedly amounting in some cases to 
intellectually vacant aberrations” (quotations and footnotes omitted)). 
337. Douglas R. Richmond, Expanding Products Liability: Manufacturers’ Post-Sale Duties 
To Warn, Retrofit and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 7, 60 (1999).
 338. Id.
 339. Id. 
340. Some of the strongest case law precedent for a duty to update has developed in the 
aviation context, where—as may be the case in the IoT context—there is both a great risk of harm 
and a “close and continuing relationship between [a company] and its customers.” Smith, 
Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1806–07.
 341. See supra Part II.B. 
342. See infra Part III.B.2.b. 
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reasonable interference, as an interference defect under products 
liability law, and as an IoT-specific informal fiduciary duty. 
a. An Implied Warranty of Reasonable Interference. Courts might 
create a common law implied warranty of reasonable interference, 
prohibiting IoT companies from engaging in remote interference that 
results in foreseeable harm either as an element of a breach of contract 
claim or as part of a negligence claim. Implied warranties are a 
“contorts” solution to a “contorts” problem343: they are “a curious 
hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract—a 
contractual term promising quality but imposed by law rather than 
agreement.”344 
There are already a number of common law implied warranties. 
As discussed above, implied warranties of merchantability and fitness 
for a particular purpose accompany sales of goods.345 Others attach to 
the provision of services. Most states have some version of an implied 
warranty of good workmanship, though they differ on whether this 
warranty sounds in contract law or negligence.346 Some courts have 
found that architectural design–build contracts have an implied 
warranty “of the sufficiency of the plans and specifications for the 
contemplated purpose.”347 Residential leases are considered sales of 
both shelter and services and have implied warranties of habitability.348 
343. Implied warranties, such as the implied warranty of good workmanship, are sometimes 
evaluated under contract law and sometimes under tort law. See Amica Mut. Ins. v. Abar Dev., 
LLC, No. CV095032593S, 2013 WL 1800453, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2013) (stating that 
the claim was “based on a breach of a contract and not brought independently outside of that 
context”); Milau Assoc., Inc. v. N. Ave. Dev. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (N.Y. 1977) (discussing 
the contractual implied warranty of good workmanship as part of a negligence claim); Melody 
Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1987) (noting that warranties, often 
designated as elements of contract law, are not so easily categorized, and that “implied warranties 
are created by operation of law and are grounded more in tort than in contract”). 
344. Debra L. Goetz, Kathryn L. Moore, Douglas E. Perry & David S. Raab, Article Two 
Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1190 (1987).
 345. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
 346. See supra note 343 and accompanying text. 
347. Robert M. Hanlon, Note, Implied Warranties in Service Contracts, 39 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 680, 687 (1964); see also Kishwaukee Cmty. Health Servs. Ctr. v. Hosp. Bldg. & Equip. Co., 
No. 80 C 1850, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2671, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 1988) (stating, under Illinois 
law, even if “an architect does not warrant its services . . . an implied warranty can attach to the 
sale of a product by a design/builder”).
 348. See, e.g., Park W. Mgmt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 (N.Y. 1979) (describing 
how a residential lease is a sale of “shelter and services” and carries three implied warranties: 
“first, that the premises are fit for human habitation; second, that the condition of the premises is 
in accord with the uses reasonably intended by the parties; and, third, that the tenants are not 
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While these common law implied warranties do not directly address 
harms arising from remote interference with IoT devices,349 they 
provide a blueprint for an implied warranty of reasonable interference. 
The creation of a new implied warranty is often justified on the 
grounds that the common law must evolve to keep up with changing 
relationships to “reflect the realities of present day society.”350 Implied 
warranties tend to arise where, as here, there is an uneven relationship 
between the contracting parties—where one occupies a position of 
dependence or vulnerability or the other has superior information or 
control and enjoys a position of (possibly unwarranted) trust.351 
Relevant considerations include whether one party has induced the 
reliance of the other on the former’s skill or knowledge, is better 
situated to minimize the likelihood of harm, or is better able to 
distribute the loss of accidents.352 These factors all weigh in favor of 
creating an implied warranty of reasonable interference, which would 
establish liability for harms experienced by owners, users, and 
bystanders.353 
Breach of warranty claims for bundled good/services products 
often flounder at the predominance test, which distinguishes 
warranties that attach to goods from warranties that attach to 
subjected to any conditions endangering or detrimental to their life, health or safety”); David A. 
Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389, 394 (2011) 
(noting that nearly all jurisdictions have adopted the implied warranty of habitability in rental 
agreements).
 349. Elvy, supra note 14, at 114–17 (discussing why extant implied warranties generally do not 
apply to IoT devices and IoT companies). 
350. Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1974); see also id. at 1169 (creating an 
implied warranty of habitability for residential leases based on the “realities of the modern urban 
landlord-tenant relationship”).
 351. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty 
and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 934–35 & n.46 (2006) (describing scholars’ 
articulations of the characteristics of fiduciary duties); id. at 936–38 (describing various factors 
courts have considered in determining whether “a particular relationship warrant[s] the 
imposition of fiduciary duties”). 
352. Goetz et al., supra note 344, at 1190 n.185. 
353. The U.C.C. extends express and implied warranties to bystanders and other third parties 
“who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by” a product. U.C.C. § 2-318 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1951). Two of the three U.C.C. categories of protected 
bystanders have no privity requirement, and while the third is limited to a buyer’s family or guests, 
some courts have nonetheless applied it to employees and bystanders. Jennifer Camero, Two Too 
Many: Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 86 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 21–23 (2012). 
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services.354 An implied warranty of reasonable interference should 
dispense with this increasingly artificial distinction and focus instead 
on whether the underlying harm was reasonably foreseeable and 
preventable.355 
Ultimately, however, the creation of an implied warranty of 
reasonable interference may only be a temporary solution. Even if it is 
nonwaivable and not subject to disclaimers,356 and even if the 
contractual standard is lower than the common law version, courts 
often defer to contract terms and find express warranties supersede 
implied ones. Accordingly, if an implied warranty is created, IoT 
companies will undoubtedly respond by including explicit and less 
onerous warranties in their terms of service. 
b. Interference Defects. Because IoT devices are products, it is 
natural to look to products liability law to address their associated 
problems. But for products liability law to be applicable, courts may 
need to develop a new kind of claim. As discussed above, products 
liability law developed in the context of a changed relationship 
between companies and consumers. Design defects, manufacturing 
defects, and informational or marketing defects can be understood as 
identifying different kinds of relationships between consumers and 
entities in the products supply chain, where each actor has a different 
standard of liability for kinds of caused harm. None of these squarely 
addresses the new kind of relationship between IoT companies and 
354. Ellen Taylor, Applicability of Strict Liability Warranty Theories to Service Transactions, 
47 S.C. L. REV. 231, 252 (1996) (describing the predominant-purpose test as one which determines 
whether the U.C.C. applies to contracts for both goods and services by asking “whether [the 
contracts’] predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of 
service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g. contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction 
of sale with labor incidentally involved (e.g. installation of a water heater in a bathroom”); see, 
e.g., Elvy, supra note 14, at 105–12 (discussing the predominant-purpose test in the IoT context). 
355. In determining that U.C.C. implied warranties attached to utility services, one court 
argued that “implied warranties, as defined by the courts of this state, should apply to the sale of 
services as well as to the sale of goods. We see no reason upon which a logical distinction can be 
based . . . .” Buckeye Union Fire Ins. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d 316, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1972); Taylor, supra note 354, at 264 (“To the extent that implied warranties are intended to 
protect consumers, there is no clear basis for treating purchasers of goods differently from 
purchasers of services.”). 
356. The implied warranty of good workmanship recognized in Texas, for example, is 
nonwaivable and cannot be disclaimed. Richard M. Alderman, Warranty Disclaimers and the 
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, HOUS. LAW., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 14. But see Centex Homes 
v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tex. 2002) (“The implied warranty of good workmanship serves 
as a ‘gap-filler’ or ‘default warranty’; it applies unless and until the parties express a contrary 
intention.”). 
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consumers, where the company has a postsale ability to remotely alter 
how a device functions based on its ongoing surveillance of the user. 
Given this context, courts might delineate “interference defects” 
as a fourth kind of products liability claim. An interference defect 
would exist when remote interference renders a device inherently 
dangerous, either because it directly harms someone, deactivates a 
relied-upon critical service, or foreseeably enables an intervening 
source of harm.357 Interference defects might be evaluated under a 
strict liability or negligence standard and have compensatory and 
specific-performance remedies.358 
Additionally or alternatively, courts could explicitly recognize that 
remote interference necessitates more extensive warning requirements 
than are currently required. For example, Connecticut is unique in that 
it prohibits electronic self-help, unless a “debtor separately agrees to a 
term . . . authorizing electronic self-help that requires notice of 
exercise.”359 This requirement addresses the need for near-
contemporaneous notification and creates an opportunity for 
engagement and negotiation between the parties.360 Similarly, IoT 
357. Under this definition, an “interference defect” would cover harms arising from the 
actions of both IoT companies and criminal hackers. A more limited definition, focused only on 
corporate remote interference, could also be employed. 
358. Historically, courts have been reluctant to require specific performance of personal 
services, both because of the difficulty in evaluating how well a service is performed, see Alan 
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 293 (1979) (“Courts, in enforcing 
the supervision defense, are concerned with their inability to supervise performance . . . .”), and 
because orders limiting personal freedoms are uncomfortably similar to creating an involuntary 
servitude, see Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 2020, 2023 (2009) (rejecting the conventional wisdom that specific performance violates 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude). These concerns are less 
applicable in the IoT context. First, unlike the construction of a building or an employment 
contract, the services IoT companies provide are roughly fungible: the app used by one consumer 
is the same app used by another, even though their data may be particularized. As with public 
utility services, these fungible services can be compelled. Cf. The Duty of a Public Utility To 
Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, supra note 248, at 329 (noting that 
mandamus actions can be used to compel restoration of utility services). 
Second, assuming that an IoT company offers these services to multiple customers, 
requiring performance for a specific individual hardly implicates the liberty interests of either the 
company or its employees. Schwartz, supra, at 297 (“[R]equiring a sizable corporation that 
renders services to perform for a given promisee does not violate the corporation’s associational 
interests or the associational interests of its employees.”). The case would be somewhat different 
if the IoT company was closing that portion of its business; in that situation, requiring specific 
performance would be less reasonable.
 359. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-609 (2012).
 360. Id. (“Before resorting to electronic self-help . . . the secured party shall give notice . . . 
stating: (A) That the secured party intends to resort to electronic self-help . . . on or after fifteen 
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companies could be required to alert consumers when they intend to 
engage in remote interference that might result in harm, with the 
timing and strength of the warning designed with awareness of the 
damage potential of the act. If the remote interference has been 
triggered by a user’s contractual breach, an alert could state the nature 
of the breach and provide a means of contacting the company so the 
user has an opportunity to dispute the claim and address mistakes.361 
This would alleviate some of the concerns about algorithmic 
enforcement limiting opportunities for interaction and otherwise 
providing insufficient due process.362 
Acknowledging a new “interference defect” claim or a heightened 
duty to warn might be the best way to address most run-of-the-mill 
injuries caused by remote interference. To deter hidden or explicit 
abusive action, however, courts might want to consider a third option: 
raising the moral bar for IoT companies by finding that they have an 
informal fiduciary duty to device users. 
c. IoT Fiduciaries. Tort law has long premised certain duties, 
particularly those regarding the sharing of personal information, on 
legally defined relationships. Doctors, therapists, accountants, and 
lawyers are all commonly recognized as fiduciaries—entities who have 
a “position of superiority or influence [over another], acquired by 
virtue of [a] special trust.”363 In addition to these “formal” fiduciary 
relationships, courts often find that “informal” fiduciary relationships 
exist where “a relationship of ‘trust’ exists and that one party 
dominates, is superior to, or is especially vulnerable to another 
days . . . ; (B) The nature of the claimed breach . . . ; and (C) [A representative’s contact 
information].”).
 361. Cf. Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 560–62 
(2016) (describing how customer-service departments address the vast majority of industry– 
consumer disputes and the importance of ensuring appropriate procedures to meet both 
businesses’ and consumers’ needs). 
362. For a discussion of the underlying values of due process, see Danielle Keats Citron & 
Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
1, 20 (2014) (“[T]he underlying values of due process—transparency, accuracy, accountability, 
participation, and fairness—should animate the oversight of scoring systems . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). See generally Citron, supra note 80 (arguing that administrative adoption of 
algorithmic decision-making threatens traditional due process rights). 
363. Tornado Techs., Inc. v. Quality Control Inspection, Inc., 977 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2012) (quoting Nichols v. Schwendeman, No. 07AP–433, 2007 WL 4305718, at *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 11, 2007)). 
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party.”364 Thanks to the flexible nature of fiduciary law,365 scholars 
regularly build on the concept to suggest new duties in relationships 
characterized by power, trust, and vulnerability.366 
To the extent there is a bedrock requirement for finding a 
fiduciary duty, it is that there must be a relationship between the 
parties characterized by “high levels of trust” and in which one party is 
“in a position of domination, inferiority, or vulnerability.”367 Further, 
“[t]he degree of control, complexity, and dominance or the broad range 
of the underlying relationship can also help direct courts in figuring out 
how strictly to enforce fiduciary duties and how to impose a proper 
remedy.”368 
When consumers are particularly vulnerable and the risk of harm 
is significantly high, courts could recognize an informal fiduciary 
relationship that justifies a heightened duty of care.369 Individuals 
364. Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 672 (2009). In Bazan v. 
Muñoz, 444 S.W.3d 110, 118 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014), the court explained:  
[I]nformal fiduciary relationships may arise when one person trusts and relies upon 
another, whether the relationship is moral, social, domestic, or merely personal. 
Because not every relationship involving a high degree of trust and confidence rises to 
the stature of a formal fiduciary relationship, the law recognizes the existence of 
[informal fiduciary] relationships in those cases in which influence has been acquired 
and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed. 
Id. at 118 (citation omitted).
 365. See Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 (Conn. 1955) (“[E]quity has carefully 
refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as to 
exclude new situations.”). 
366. For examples of scholarly articles that call for expansion of fiduciary duties, see generally 
Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006); 
Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, Don’t Let Go of the Rope: Reducing 
Readmissions by Recognizing Hospitals’ Fiduciary Duties to Their Discharged Patients, 62 AM. U. 
L. REV. 513 (2013); Leib, supra note 364; and Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as 
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995). But see generally Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners 
Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209 (calling for limitations on the expansion of fiduciary duties).
 367. Leib, supra note 364, at 672; see also Hafemeister & Porter, supra note 366, at 545–46 
(discussing the vulnerability of the beneficiary).
 368. Leib, supra note 364, at 682–83 (emphasis in original).
 369. See DeMott, supra note 351, at 926 (arguing that the law of fiduciary duties can best be 
understood as applying in circumstances where there is a justifiable expectation that one “actor’s 
conduct will be loyal to the interests of another”). 
This would complement Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain’s proposed “information 
fiduciary” concept. IoT companies would certainly qualify as “information fiduciaries”—entities 
“who, because of their relationship with another, [have] taken on special duties with respect to 
the [customer data] they obtain in the course of the relationship.” Jack M. Balkin, Information 
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2016); Jack M. Balkin 
& Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain To Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-
fiduciary/502346 [https:// 
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relying on implantable medical devices that regulate necessary life 
functions; individuals relying on fire alarms, carbon monoxide 
monitors, and other critical alert systems; and individuals using cars 
and other items with the capacity to cause significant physical harm 
must all trust IoT companies to avoid an ill-timed remote interference. 
In these and similar situations, notice of the possibility of remote 
interference would not be sufficient to prevent harm; instead, 
recognizing these companies as IoT fiduciaries would encourage them 
to take more affirmative action to minimize foreseeable harms.370 
Given that breaches of fiduciary duties can be addressed with both 
compensatory and punitive damages,371 a fiduciary framing would be 
useful in addressing abusive self-help practices or other misuses of 
power. Certainly, the Garadget company owner—who bricked a 
customer’s internet-connected garage door opener in response to a bad 
Amazon review372—violated even the weakest version of a duty of 
loyalty.373 And a duty of loyalty might also prohibit using remote 
interference to limit a device’s abilities with the aim of increasing sales 
or otherwise enriching the corporation,374 holding devices hostage to 
extort preferable terms, or using data gathered to strategically time 
inconvenient or dangerous remote interferences. 
3. Extending Causation. Regardless of how a duty not to engage 
in remote interference that creates a foreseeable risk of harm is 
perma.cc/E98D-KYWN]; see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY 
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 103 (2004) (“I posit that the law should hold that 
companies collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship with 
us.”). 
Under the information fiduciary model, IoT companies would have a duty to refrain from 
using data gathered by IoT devices to enrich themselves at the expense of device users. However, 
as these duties are limited to data-related harms, recognizing that IoT companies are information 
fiduciaries will not address the range of physical harms they may cause. Similarly, doctors are 
information fiduciaries—they have a duty not to use patient data to enrich themselves at their 
patients’ expense—but a doctor’s fiduciary role toward patients is hardly limited to protecting 
their information.
 370. See Leib, supra note 364, at 674–75 (“Although the [fiduciary] duty resembles a basic 
requirement to avoid negligence, the duty is flexible and can require more substantial diligence 
than would be required of non-fiduciaries.” (footnote omitted)).
 371. DeMott, supra note 351, at 930. 
372. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
373. While the duty of loyalty is a core fiduciary duty, “the strictness with which it will be 
enforced varies, depending on the type and scope of the fiduciary relationship at issue.” Leib, 
supra note 364, at 674. 
374. See Mullis, supra note 102 (reporting on how Apple pushed an update that slowed older 
iPhones, leading some to allege that the aim was to increase sales of newer versions). 
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articulated, courts must also apply a causation standard that 
acknowledges how companies’ remote decisions can increase risks to 
consumer safety. 
As noted above, identifying a causal link between corporate action 
and a resulting harm will be relatively straightforward where remote 
interference is the direct cause of harm or where an IoT company 
induced the user’s reliance on a service or device and then, due to 
remote interference, failed to provide it. Intervening causes of harm 
and situations where the technology masks the remote decision 
maker’s responsibility, however, test the current boundaries of the 
proximate cause limitation. 
In light of the ongoing relationship between IoT companies and 
their device users, situations where remote interference enables 
harmful intervenors should be evaluated under an expansive 
proximate cause standard. Not only is the IoT company the entity best 
situated to have prevented the injury,375 but intervenors will often be 
difficult to find or judgment proof, and the law’s “deterrence rationale 
would be defeated if those enabling wrongdoing can escape judgment 
by shifting liability to individuals who cannot be caught and thus 
deterred.”376 Doing so would not unduly stretch the proximate cause 
analysis. At least where the defendant has a special relationship with 
the harmed individual that gives rise to an affirmative duty,377 courts 
are increasingly comfortable expanding causation standards to 
encompass situations where a defendant “paved the way for the third 
party to injure another,”378 even when that third-party intervenor is a 
criminal actor.379 
375. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 276, at 444 (discussing how, in the context of apartment 
buildings, the enabler is in a better position than the victim to diminish the risk of foreseeable 
harm). 
376. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1836 (2010) 
(citing Rabin, supra note 276, at 444).
 377. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 276, at 1238–40, 1243. 
378. Citron, supra note 376, at 1836; see also Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 
1007 (N.H. 2003) (recognizing a “special circumstances” exception where “a duty is owed to those 
foreseeably endangered” if a party “create[s] an unreasonable [and foreseeable] risk of criminal 
misconduct”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.  1965) 
(discussing responses to criminal misconduct); Rabin, supra note 276, at 441–42 (observing that 
the erosion of the proximate cause limitation “can be regarded as a temporal shift in moral 
sensibilities from a more individualistic era to one in which tort law . . . increasingly reflects more 
expansive notions of responsibility for the conduct of others”).
 379. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970) (evaluating causation and liability in the criminal context). 
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Expanding the proximate cause analysis does not entail doing 
away with it entirely. There will be many fact patterns with intervening 
causes that break the chain of causation, or at least weigh against the 
company bearing full liability.380 And, just as proximate cause can be 
used to avoid underdeterrence, “judges ought to use proximate cause 
to avoid overdeterrence. They should also restrict liability in cases 
involving the kinds of losses that the public would not want to spread 
and involving the kinds of accidents that . . . liability is not likely to 
deter.”381 What is important, however, is that causation in these cases 
is evaluated with an awareness of how remote interference can enable 
certain intervenors and how technology can deflect responsibility from 
remote decision-makers. 
C. Implementation 
IoT companies’ power over device users and bystanders highlights 
the need for regulatory intervention.382 For simplicity’s sake, this 
Article has implicitly assumed that courts would take the lead in 
expanding corporate liability. However, they are far from the only legal 
actors who can implement this Article’s proposals.383 This final Section 
teases out some of the respective institutional strengths and limitations 
of the judicial, legislative, and agency rulemaking processes and of 
lawmaking at the state and federal levels.  
1. Judicial, Legislative, and Agency Rulemaking. In many ways, 
the common law is well suited to address harms resulting from remote 
380. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 276, at 1221–23 (providing examples of practical 
limits on enabled torts, such as the fact that car manufacturers have no duty to instruct dealers to 
refrain from selling to incompetent drivers, even though it is foreseeable that such drivers will 
purchase cars). 
381. Fischer, supra note 266, at 582. 
382. Cf. Rahman, supra note 108, at 240 (arguing that similar power imbalances in other 
contexts “justified regulatory interventions to redress issues like fraud, barriers to access, 
information asymmetries, and bargaining disadvantages”). 
383. Common law tort concepts are often relatively tech-neutral standards that have stood 
the test of time; given this, legislatures and agencies regularly draw on tort principles as a guide 
for more tailored rulemaking. For example, a draft bill was proposed in the Senate that responded 
to the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal and drew heavily on the tort law concept of 
fiduciary duties to articulate what duties information platforms owe their users. The bill died in 
the 115th Congress and has not been renewed. See Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. § 
3(a) (2d Sess. 2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3744/text 
[https://perma.cc/Z96H-SMA7] (“An online service provider shall fulfill the duties of care, 
loyalty, and confidentiality . . . .”). 
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interference.384 While delayed and reactive, common law legal 
evolution ensures that problems are addressed as they arise, avoiding 
limiting potentially beneficial innovation through early and overbroad 
rulemaking.385 Individual plaintiffs bring tort suits in response to the 
harms that matter to them.386 Courts are able to review situations on a 
case-by-case basis and calibrate liability to the device, its damage 
potential, the nature of the relationship between the IoT company and 
consumer, the foreseeability of harm, and the actual amount of harm 
caused. Meanwhile, the potential breadth of common law torts 
incentivizes industry to consider all of the harms a new technology 
might cause, rather than only those identified in an agency’s 
mandate.387 While an agency may have limited claims it can consider, 
common law judges must evaluate all complaints that come before 
them. And while an agency is subject to regulatory capture, a common 
law judge is relatively independent. 
Ideally, over time, the common law will “work itself pure.”388 
However, tort law will only evolve rigorously if these cases make it to 
court, and there are a host of legal and practical barriers that will 
prevent them from doing so. Should IoT companies engage in remote 
interference without notice, users may not even know their device has 
been modified. Technology’s tendency to misdirect responsibility away 
from remote decision-makers likely affects which entities people blame 
for harms resulting from remote interference.389 Injured individuals 
may also be deterred by high litigation costs or an assumption that 
384. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 162–63 
(1995) (enumerating the benefits of tort’s case-specific method for addressing harms caused by 
new technologies); Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk 
Regulation Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48, 65 (2018) (arguing that courts are uniquely well 
suited to evaluating whether an action violates a plaintiff’s common law entitlement to be free 
from wrongful injury). 
385. Of course, common law responses to particular situations can sometimes create rules that 
are overbroad or inappropriate when applied in others. 
386. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 291, at 171 (“Perhaps the most attractive feature of using 
private law is that harmed consumers will be in the best position to advocate for themselves, 
rather than relying on the government to acquire information about various harms and regulate 
companies accordingly.”).
 387. Lyndon, supra note 384, at 163. 
388. Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73–74 (2003) (“[N]ew forms of 
technology create . . . new forms of resource use, [which] might not map well with the existing 
framework of property rights. A common law system . . . should be able to respond to these 
changes both by preserving what makes sense in the older system and by changing what does 
not.”).
 389. See supra Part II.D. 
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potentially void contractual terms are enforceable.390 Given that many 
harms caused by remote interference may be relatively minor, class 
action suits may be the only means by which consumers could 
affordably bring the kinds of complaints that would allow the relevant 
common law to develop. But courts often enforce mandatory 
predispute arbitration clauses that eliminate the right to a jury trial and 
aggregate remedies, such as class action suits.391 Even if some plaintiffs 
win suits or arbitrations challenging certain contract provisions, 
nondisclosure provisions may mean that other potential plaintiffs 
never learn that certain terms are unenforceable; furthermore, contract 
damages in the relatively few successful cases may not be sufficiently 
high to deter companies from continuing to employ these generally 
lucrative terms.392 Finally, as tort law provides only ex post and 
imperfect remedies, an overreliance on a tort law solution may result 
in a societal failure to avoid foreseeable harms that will dramatically 
impact individual lives.393 
Furthermore, while courts may be good at calibrating liability in 
individual cases, they may not be the best institutions to weigh the 
varied social concerns raised by IoT devices.394 For example, increasing 
390. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 26, at 145; see also Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the 
Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 
9 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 1, 8–10 (2017) (discussing how landlords regularly include deceptive and 
clearly invalid terms in their contracts, which significantly affects tenants’ decisions to forgo valid 
legal rights and claims); Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract 
Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1133 n.22 (2009) (“[I]nvalid [contractual] terms continue to be used 
by those who are well aware that they are unenforceable as written, presumably because . . . the 
other party to the contract . . . either does not realize the clause is unenforceable as written or is 
not willing to risk the resources needed to establish its invalidity.”).
 391. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 26, at 143. Arbiters also tend to be more deferential 
to contractual language, further limiting the reach and import of tort law. See Alan Scott Rau, 
The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 449, 451–52 
(2005) (focusing on the contractual nature of arbitration and the freedom of parties to make 
private choices about how to resolve their disputes); see also Joshua D.H. Karton, The Arbitral 
Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, 2–3 (2015) (discussing this 
in the international arbitration context). Further, choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clauses 
mandate litigating in jurisdictions where the law favors the firm or makes it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to bring suit. Radin, Regulation by Contract, supra note 26, at 143.
 392. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 26, at 145. 
393. Cf. Kysar, supra note 384, at 20 (“Legislative and regulatory approaches may work well 
on a prospective, industry-wide or economy-wide basis, but they often contain no compensatory 
provisions at all for those particular parties who have suffered or will continue to suffer.”).
 394. Cf. id. (noting that judges are often considered “normatively inappropriate decision 
makers for the sensitive societal tradeoffs involved in . . . safety decision making”); Hoofnagle et 
al., supra note 291, at 171 (“[P]rivate law is limited in the sense that it does little to prevent the 
macro, economy-wide effects of tethering, such as the competitive drain caused by lock-in.”). 
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liability will incentivize IoT companies to take more safety precautions, 
but it will also justify additional corporate surveillance.395 
Alternatively, there may be situations where a connected device has 
information that the user is incapacitated or intends to commit an 
illegal act—say, a car might recognize that its driver is inebriated—and 
depending on what social values we privilege, we may prefer that the 
device does not operate.396 Increasing corporate liability may chill 
innovation, but a light chill may be warranted if the alternative is 
significant risk to consumers’ safety. A legislature or administrative 
agency is far better suited to hosting a public discussion and balancing 
competing social goals than a court considering the facts of a single 
(and possibly exceptional) case.  
Legislatures and agencies also have institutional strengths for 
developing the law of corporate remote interference. Legislative action 
to protect consumers is particularly effective when harms are diffuse 
and small, imposed on a large number of people, and cannot be 
attributed to a single source.397 This will often occur in the IoT context. 
Meanwhile, agencies can develop specialized knowledge and expertise, 
allowing them to address problems that arise with regard to a particular 
technology or its use.398 If their mandate is sufficiently broad, agencies 
can address harmful conduct that would not be covered under existing 
tort law.399 They can remedy some of the information asymmetries 
inherent to ex post tort litigation by requiring companies to disclose 
information, and more expansive definitions of harm allow agencies to 
take action to curb various kinds of corporate overreach and unfair, 
395. See Eugene Volokh, Tort Law v. Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 879, 881–83 (2014). 
396. See Smith, Proximity Driven Liability, supra note 34, at 1809 (suggesting that IoT 
companies may have an obligation to restrict the use of potentially dangerous property by 
malicious or negligent users, as “a company’s ongoing control over a product could imply a 
commensurate responsibility to restrict, by contractual or technological means, access by those 
clearly incompetent to handle it”). 
397. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Product Safety Regulation and the Law of Torts, in PRODUCT 
LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 151, 153 
(1994). 
398. Woodrow Hartzog has detailed the regulatory tools available to the FTC in the robotics 
context, many of which also apply to issues raised by IoT devices. These include agencies’ 
extensive notice and disclosure jurisprudence; new theories of design and secondary liability, 
under which companies may be liable for poor design choices or designs that allow others to 
indirectly harm consumers; and robust data-security jurisprudence. Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair 
and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 818–23 (2015). But see Lyndon, supra note 384, at 142 
n.20 (discussing agency limitations in recognizing and addressing technical problems). 
399. Cf. Hartzog, supra note 398, at 814 (“[T]he FTC can regulate consumer harms that fall 
outside the scope of traditional torts and other regulatory efforts.”). 
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deceptive, or abusive practices.400 Further, unlike consumer plaintiffs, 
agencies are not bound by contractual fine print.401 
Happily, there is no need to select one single medium of legal 
evolution among courts, legislatures, and agencies; the various 
rulemaking processes can coexist and supplement each other in 
developing laws for corporate remote interference.402 In the absence of 
legislative or agency action, courts can act as a stopgap.403 Meanwhile, 
as exemplified in the climate-litigation context, targeted tort suits can 
spur new legislation that systematically addresses an issue.404 
Conversely, should courts neglect to address the harms of remote 
interference, or do so in ways that do not incorporate broader policy 
concerns, that failure may encourage other institutional responses.405 
For example, legislatures regularly modify concerning tort 
precedents.406 The different sources of regulation can also work 
together to address outlier situations: statutes can address the majority 
of cases and serve as a baseline framework for evaluating exceptional 
fact patterns in tort cases, and tort standards can act as a supplemental 
enforcement device for conduct that does not violate a statutory or 
agency standard.407 
400. Id. at 820 (“[T]he FTC is more capable of addressing small and nuanced changes in 
design that affect consumers.”); Hoofnagle et al., supra note 291, at 185, 186–92 (arguing that 
“[c]onsumer protection law is uniquely situated to vigorously pursue the maintenance of 
functional free markets while upholding the benefits of consumer rights” and suggesting targeted 
legal improvements, such as requiring sellers to disclose devices’ anticipated lifetimes and 
enacting statutory right-to-repair laws).
 401. Hartzog, supra note 398, at 817. 
402. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 153–54; see also Lyndon, supra note 384, at 143 
(noting that different sources of law “provide different procedural options or formats for 
addressing the social costs of technical change”).
 403. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 153.
 404. Kysar, supra note 384, at 19.
 405. Cf.  WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 695–96 (detailing how workers’ 
compensation systems displaced common law regulation of nineteenth-century industrial 
accidents); Kysar, supra note 33, at 49 (“[J]udges unabashedly and creatively forged a new body 
of products liability law to respond to the rise of a mass consumer marketplace[, which] . . . had 
the effect of protecting the common law from the kind of wholesale displacement that had 
occurred in the case of worker injury.” (footnotes omitted)). 
406. Examples include state statutes that determine when a minor must be held to the 
standard of an adult, statutes that set standards for informed consent, punitive-damage caps for 
malpractice, and standards of social-host liability. See, e.g., GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, 
supra note 205, at 124 (discussing how, in response to Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 
1968), the California legislature enacted a bill qualifying the California courts’ expansive 
understanding of landowners’ potential duties towards trespassers). 
407. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 397, at 153–54 (describing how the tort and regulatory 
systems can best complement each other). 
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2. Federal and State Lawmaking. The possibility of ex ante 
regulatory action raises the question of whether these issues are better 
addressed at the federal or state level.  
There are some reasons to prefer federal regulation. National 
standards usually make industry compliance easier, as an industry does 
not need to tailor its practices to different rules in different states. 
Federal regulation avoids the challenge that state-by-state laws might 
place an undue burden on interstate commerce.408 Federal agencies 
also may be better structured to regulate certain kinds of IoT devices, 
such as IoT medical devices or IoT vehicles, given that they are already 
aware of specific issues and governance structures associated with their 
less-connected cousins. 
Conversely, many of the issues this Article discusses relate to 
consumer protection law, products liability law, and common law tort 
duties—subjects that have traditionally been developed at the state 
level. This might be an ideal space for states to serve as laboratories of 
experimentation in anticipation of federal regulatory action.409 And, in 
light of the current federal political gridlock, states are more likely to 
operationalize this Article’s proposals. 
Granted, state law will be most influential when compliance 
requires a change at the hardware or physical-infrastructure level. 
When a state law only governs software or the provision or termination 
of a service, it will be relatively easy for companies to alter policies on 
a state-by-state basis. Indeed, the connected nature of IoT devices will 
allow companies to change how a particular device operates when it 
crosses state or national boundaries.410 
That being said, individual state laws will not necessarily result in 
myriad contradictory standards; instead, state laws may create 
consistent nation-wide best practices.411 For example, a California 
408. But see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (“[T]he dormant Commerce Clause, properly understood, 
leaves states with much more flexibility to regulate Internet transactions than is commonly 
thought.”).
 409. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
410. For a concise fictional consideration of the dystopian possibilities, see Cory Doctorow, 
Sole and Despotic Dominion, REASON (Dec. 2018), https://reason.com/archives/2018/11/17/sole-
and-despotic-dominion [https://perma.cc/728U-YZ86].
 411. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 6 (1995) (discussing the “California Effect,” which refers 
to “the critical role of powerful and wealthy ‘green’ political jurisdictions in promoting a ‘race to 
the top’ among their trading partners . . . help[ing] drive many American regulations upward”); 
Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 N.W.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (discussing the European 
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requirement that starter-interrupt devices only trigger when the car is 
parked within five miles of where it spends 60 percent of its time would 
(1) demonstrate the feasibility of such a practice—which might be 
relevant when courts across the country consider whether there is a 
reasonable alternative design; (2) encourage companies forced to 
invest in creating the technological infrastructure to implement the 
practice nationally; and (3) influence both the market and tort law 
nationally by shifting consumer expectations regarding IoT companies’ 
basic harm-prevention measures. 
In short, both federal and state law approaches to regulating IoT 
devices could result in a unified national standard, with agency 
regulation offering the benefits of incorporating expertise and state 
regulation offering the benefits of experimentation. Again, these two 
approaches need not be mutually exclusive. Just as agency regulation 
of unfair business practices can exist alongside state consumer 
protection law, agency regulation of IoT devices can coexist with state 
statutory and common law. 
CONCLUSION 
Most technological advances are incremental, and most laws are 
sufficiently tech neutral to stretch to cover new developments. As a 
result, most technological innovations cause little to no legal 
disruption.412 Parking restrictions apply equally to human-driven and 
self-parking cars; laws that ban bringing guns on airplanes cover both 
industrially manufactured and 3D-printed firearms. From time to time, 
however, a new technology will enable new kinds of conduct or 
generate new negative externalities, which in turn create uncertainty 
about the application of extant rules, expose or highlight existing 
contradictions, or even undermine the fundamental assumptions of an 
entire legal regime.413 
Union’s similar effect on global regulations); Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William 
McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law 6–10 (Univ. of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 19-25, Aug. 27, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433922 
[https://perma.cc/3VU7-WQ3W] (discussing the “Delaware Effect,” “California Effect,” and 
“Brussels Effect” in the context of privacy regulations). 
412. Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?, 8 MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 589, 596 (2007) (“Despite occasional statements that some new technology 
changes everything, legal problems stemming from technological change are relatively rare and 
quite specific.” (footnote omitted)). 
413. See generally Rebecca Crootof, Regulating New Weapons Technology, in THE IMPACT 
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3, 6 (Eric Talbot Jensen & 
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The Internet of Things creates a new relationship and power 
dynamic between companies and consumers that is not anticipated by 
our current civil-liability regime. By collecting personalized data and 
maintaining an ongoing communications link, IoT devices allow 
companies to provide a host of convenient, entertaining, and even life-
saving services. Simultaneously, IoT companies lock consumers into 
contractual governance regimes and use IoT-enabled surveillance and 
remote interference to enforce their rules, sometimes at the risk of 
consumer safety. Meanwhile, rather than incentivizing IoT companies 
to minimize foreseeable injuries, contract and tort law currently work 
in tandem to shield IoT companies from liability. 
A techlaw perspective helps situate this moment in a larger story, 
highlighting the iterative relationship between law, society, and 
technology. New technologies may create social change and legal 
uncertainty, but law is a flexible tool that can evolve to address new, 
tech-facilitated conduct. In the wake of the Industrial Revolution and 
the associated increase in “stranger cases,” courts limited company 
liability by creating the modern version of “negligence”; the rise of 
mass production and cross-country transportation networks changed 
seller–buyer relations and prompted the products liability revolution’s 
reactionary expansion of industry liability. 
IoT devices are yet another new technology that alters social and 
power relations between industry and individuals, creating a potential 
liability inflection point. Our choices now will determine whether law 
evolves to preserve or constrain industry’s new, tech-enabled powers. 
A conservative application of existing contract and tort law will result 
in consumers continuing to bear the brunt of harms resulting from 
corporate remote interference, and social norms and consumer 
expectations will follow suit. Alternatively, expansive articulations and 
applications of current doctrines could retain the benefits and more 
fairly allocate the costs of this new technology going forward. 
Ronald T.P. Alcala eds. 2019) (discussing “four ways in which a new technology can be legally 
disruptive” through the lens of new weapons technologies). 
